Amb. PARK Soo Gil, Permanent Representative
at the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
With regard to Conference Room Paper 8 (CRP8) presented by the Bureau, my delegation thanks the Bureau for their efforts to move the process forward. Notwithstanding, I should like to comment on several aspects of its content with the understanding that Korea's support for expansion in the non-permanent category remains unchanged.
I am pleased to note that the Bureau reaffirms through its paper the need to achieve "general agreement" on all aspects of reform of the Council. This stance not only accords with General Assembly resolution 48/26 (3 December 1993), but also represents the overwhelming sentiment of participating members in Working Group discussions.
We are pleased by the non-imposition of a specified time-frame, as evidenced in paragraph 7. If a comprehensive package is to be based upon general agreement, then it stands to reason that no artificial time-frame should be imposed.
We note that Part A, dealing with Cluster I issues, is significantly shorter than Part B on Cluster II. My concern is that this may create the erroneous impression that a convergence of views exists on Cluster I issues and that there is no need to document the major varying opinions associated with it. As we see it, the core of Part A, with some adjustments, appears to duplicate CRP1, and overlooks the broader share of discussions in the Working Group, including divergent arguments on such issues as size, composition, periodic review and permanent regional rotation. All in all, CRP8 seems unbalanced and needs a great deal of improvement.
We were struck by the suggestion that the same rights enjoyed by the current P5 be extended to new permanent members, supported by the argument that "this view was strongly underlined by the membership." As far as I know, the clear majority opposes granting the veto to any new member. Five is more than enough. It is illogical and rather self-defeating to allow the proliferation of veto holders, while at the same time trying to minimize the overuse or abuse of the veto.
Turning now to the details of CRP8. Paragraph 3 makes a distinction between developing states and industrialized states in eligibility criteria for permanent seats.
Without prejudicing our position supporting the expansion of non-permanent seats only, my delegation already pointed out the practical problems associated with that distinction during the previous session. So, I will not repeat them here. However, I must emphasize that our problems with it should not be misinterpreted as reservations on increased representation of the developing states in the Council. We strongly support redressing the inequities in the current composition of the Security Council. Our point is that the categorization in paragraph 3 of the CRP8 fails to provide a level playing field for a considerable number of countries who are positioned between industrialized and developing status. We are concerned at the possibility of marginalizing those countries and undercutting their active participation in the activities of the United Nations.
In this regard, a hypothetical question comes to mind. What would happen if, over the course of say, ten years or so, a country that became a permanent member as a representative of the developing world, evolved to become an industrialized nation. Should their permanent membership in the Council be revoked or terminated simply because they no longer fit the criteria of a developing state?
Paragraph 5 of CRP8 deals with the expansion of the non-permanent category and its distribution by region. In this regard, I should like to remind all participants of the current under-representation of the Asian group. As it stands, the Asian Group is comprised of 49 countries. Among those, only 3 are Security Council members including one permanent member. In terms of electoral competition, 48 Asian countries, excluding China, vie for two non-permanent seats. In other words, a ratio of 1:24. This is compared to Eastern Europe's 1:19 ratio. (20 less Russia=19). Africa's 1:18 (3/53), Latin America's 1:17 (2/33), Western Europe and other States' 1:12 (2/24). Therefore, it is clear that the Asian countries face the stiffest competition in securing a Council seat. For these reasons, particular attention should be paid to rectifying Asia's under-representation in formulating any scheme for the expansion of the non-permanent category.
Mr. Chairman,
Part B of the paper dealing with Cluster II issues incorporates many of the constructive suggestions put forward during our intensive discussions in this Working Group. My delegation appreciates the Bureau's sincere effort to do so.
Given the absolute majority's convergence of views on the main body of Cluster II, we hope those suggested improvements can soon be translated into concrete measures.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, my delegation assigns a high priority to maintaining a transparent and open-ended setting for deliberations on this important subject. In that spirit, I wish to assure you that my delegation will continue to be an active participant and remain amenable to any new constructive initiatives or proposals by which to facilitate our common objective of reforming the Security Council.
Thank you.
