Security Council Reform by Amb. PARK Soo Gil, Permanent Representative
at the High Level Open-ended Working Group
Mr. Chairman,
My delegation pays tribute to your unwavering commitment to achieving the badly-needed reform in all aspects of the UN's activities during your presidency of the General Assembly. We appreciate, in particular, the extraordinary effort you have personally devoted to devising a formula for Security Council reform.
My Government has studied your proposal with the utmost attention and seriousness that it deserves. We recognize that your proposal contains some positive elements, such as an attempt to limit the use of veto power by the original permanent members only to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter and no provision of veto power for new permanent members. Furthermore, your proposal also contains a new set of innovative measures in dealing with the working method of the Security Council. Nevertheless, my Government finds it difficult to agree to certain important elements of your proposal.
First of all, let us examine your proposal on the basis of one of the most important criteria: does it make the Security Council more representative, and thus, more democratic? It goes without saying that any increase in the number of seats -- whether they be permanent or non-permanent -- would broaden the participation of Member States in the Council. But the real question to ask is whether broadening participation on the Council actually leads to a proportionate increase in the representativeness of the Council. Your proposal calls for a 60 percent increase in the number of Council seats, which could, depending on the modality of the increase, indeed make the Council 60 percent more representative than it is now. However, on average, the chances for countries of the general membership to serve on the Council at a given time would only improve by 33 percent: from 10 over 180(0.06) to 14 over 175(0.08).
This discrepancy arises primarily because more than half (5 out of 9) of the proposed new seats would be permanently set aside for a new class of powers and made unavailable for the general membership.
The proposed doubling of permanent seats would also have drastic effect on the balance between permanent and elected seats on the Council. The current ratio of permanent members to elected members is 1: 2; under your proposal, that would change to 1: 1.4. In other words, the Council would actually become less democratic than it is now. And the dynamics of the Council would tilt further in favor of permanent members, making it more difficult for the general membership to counter-balance the power of permanent members in the work of the Security Council. In short, the proposed increase in permanent seats would be a set-back for the cause of representation and democracy.
Granted, democracy is not the only criterion we need to consider in reforming the Security Council. But, we must remember that the international legitimacy of the Council's decisions is fundamentally based upon whether, and to what extent, the Council is regarded as representative. Just as with national governments, the more the Council grows aloof and unrepresentative of its constituents, the less it will be considered accountable, and therefore, the less its decisions will be seen as legitimate.
Mr. Chairman,
Let me now assess your proposal from a second criterion: whether it would make the Council more effective. If the Council is to enhance its capability to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter, it should better reflect the realities of international power distribution. What this means in practical terms is that Member States with a greater capability and willingness than others to contribute to international peace and security should be allowed to serve on the Council with greater frequency. Some would argue that the proposed increase in permanent seats is the best answer to this problem. We do not share this view. The structural changes in international relations over the last five decades which reform is intended to reflect cannot simply be boiled down to the emergence of only five new major powers, each possessing, more so than others, power resources relevant for international peace and security. In our view, it is more accurate to say that the last five decades have witnessed the emergence of a significant number of States with both the capability and willingness to make meaningful contributions to international peace and security.
Although the aspirations of certain countries to permanent member status are understandable, we wonder how one could justify the magnitude of discrimination between them and the greater number of other countries with comparable capabilities who would be permanently compelled to compete for a relatively small number of elected seats every five, ten or more years, with all the stress and diplomatic acrobatics that that process entails. As Ambassador Fowler of Canada eloquently pointed out in our last session, a crucial shortcoming in your proposal is that it would marginalize and alienate many of these States, thus depriving them of an important incentive for their participation in the work of the Organization, especially in its work on peace and security.
Let me now turn to the third criterion by which we have assessed your proposal: would it enhance the role and operational efficiency of the Council? We all know how difficult it is to get an issue placed on the Council agenda, and have it duly acted upon, if it goes against the wishes of the permanent members. Even with only five permanent members, many important inter-state or intrastate conflicts are not properly addressed or resolved by the Council. Increasing the number of permanent members would only make this problem worse, and would exclude more and more conflicts from the purview of the Security Council. The dynamics of the Council would give even permanent members without the veto enough clout to block decisions they find unsavory. If the Council ends up dealing only with issues on which none of the proposed 10 permanent members are opposed, we might see the relevance of the Security Council steadily eroded as the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Your proposal would also be likely to undermine the Council's efficiency in other ways. If the increase in permanent membership were to affect the number of official languages in the LTN, which is not totally impossible, more time would be wasted waiting for documents to be translated into all official languages before they could be distributed. And likewise, if expanding the ranks of permanent members entails an increase in the number of time zones involved, more time would be wasted waiting for all the permanent members to receive instructions from their capitals.
The fourth criterion by which we assessed your proposal is whether it would allow for adequate and timely adjustments to the composition of the Security Council to reflect future changes in the structure of international relations. Operative paragraph 8 of your proposal incorporates the idea of reviewing the situation in ten years after the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter. If the review is understood to mean that the new permanent members would retain their status unless voted out by a two-thirds majority, then this arrangement would provide those members with a virtually assured way of perpetuating their status, because a one-third minority would be enough to block any effort to unseat them.
This defies our common sense of fairness and justice, not only because it allows a one-time decision to hold sway for all time, but also because non-permanent members require a two-thirds majority to be elected, while new permanent members would need the support of only a one-third minority to maintain their status. A review mechanism makes sense only when it is devised in such a manner as to periodically reflect the dynamic characteristic of international relations in the composition of permanent membership. Otherwise, as a growing number of countries overtake permanent members in their power resources relevant for international peace and security, the gap will grow between the composition of the Council and the underlying international realities which originally shaped it. Discrimination between permanent members and the general membership would also become, more and more, a source of resentment and contention. Over time, this would gradually undermine the legitimacy and authority of the Council to act on behalf of the general membership. This is certainly not consistent with the vision which my Government holds for the Security Council in the twenty-first century.
Lastly, we have difficulty accepting the distinction which the proposal makes between developing States and industrial States, as indicated in operative paragraph 1) b. There is no uniform definition of developing States. The meaning of that term is constantly evolving as many developing States undergo rapid industrialization. In some parts of Asia and Latin America, in a matter of a decade or two, there may not be too many developing States left. If the proposed three new permanent members from the developing world subsequently evolve into industrialized States, will they still be allowed to retain their permanent membership? Are they to automatically lose their status or be made subject to a review?
In sum, democracy, effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council are likely to suffer, if your proposal is implemented. For all its good intentions, your formula could actually exacerbate the problems we are trying to solve. Moreover, it could deal a blow to the health and vitality of the Organization by making a few countries permanently better off, while making dozens of other countries with similar, or in some cases, even greater capabilities to contribute to peace, worse off forever. The fact that the Security Council has never been perfect in its composition and method of work does not justify further strengthening of the flaws of the existing system. After all the debate we have gone through over the past three years in this working group, let's not lose sight of the broader goals and purposes we are trying to achieve.
So if President Razali's well-meaning proposal is not agreeable, what is? What changes would make the Council more representative, effective and efficient? An ideal solution would be to reduce the number of permanent members and increase that of elected members, while providing for some mechanism whereby more frequent rotation by those countries with greater capabilities to contribute to international peace and security could be ensured. But we are all well aware that a decrease in permanent membership is not a feasible option. If we cannot agree on a formula acceptable to all stake-holders, the most realistic option for the present is to go for the lowest common denominator, which is to expand only the non-permanent category of seats, without precluding future discussion on permanent membership.
Mr. Chairman,
Let me say a word about the time-frame for Security Council reform. My delegation questions the wisdom of trying to rush to a decision before a clear consensus has emerged. Let's not forget that we are dealing with an issue whose outcome will have far-reaching consequences for the future of our organization and the dynamics of international relations for many decades to come. We have nothing to lose by exercising caution and patience, and by making a decision when conditions are ripe. Any rush to reach a decision, under the current circumstances, will only exacerbate divisiveness among Member States, making compromise at a later stage more difficult. In this vein, we share the view of the Non-Aligned Movement as stated in the Declaration of the NAM Foreign Ministers in New Delhi early this month.
Before I finish, allow me to comment on Cluster II issues. We note the imbalance between Clusters I and II in your proposal. The proposed expansion of the Council would be binding and irreversible in nature, whereas the proposed improvements in working methods would not be. We attach particularly great importance to the reform of the veto system. And in that respect, your proposal falls short of our expectations. We feel that the reasonable call of a large majority of Member States to curtail the potential overuse of the veto should be heeded. Our historic mission to reform the Security Council would not be complete without the requisite reform in the veto system.
Mr. Chairman,
I can assure you of my delegation's full and active participation as we proceed with our discussions in this working group. As always, we remain open-minded to any constructive new suggestions and proposals.
