Global Policy Forum

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

As spring approaches in Afghanistan, a number of factors are likely to contribute to a significant escalation of the country's ongoing guerrilla war.

These include Iran, which fears the US presence in its region, Pakistan's mafia groups, a local cartel of Afghan governors-cum-warlords who foresee no political future for themselves in elections scheduled for next year, as well as Islamic radicals looking to regroup for an assault on the United States and it allies.

The border areas alongside Pakistan are the hotbed of these activities, notably around Pakistan's South and North Waziristani belts and the Chaman area. Increasing reports are emerging from Afghanistan of battles between anti-foreign forces and Afghan militias and US troops, with a number of casualties on both sides. The main characteristic of the guerrilla attacks has been what appears to be, for the first time, a consolidated strategy.

For instance, the attack that was mainly initiated along the border of South Waziristan Agency. The Shakin area came under fierce fire several times. Then sporadic attacks erupted in Argon, Zabul and Gazni. Once US forces were engaged in these attacks, the attackers suddenly changed tactics and briefly occupied Zabul, before fleeing approaching US gunship helicopters and fighter aircraft, seemingly conveying the message that the Afghan administration anywhere other than the capital Kabul is a house of cards.

This is exactly the same strategy that the Taliban adopted in 1994 prior to taking full control of the country. Coincidentally, before they completely took over Kandahar in 1994, Zabul, Shakin and Argon were their main playing fields, as is the case now. A Pakistani tribal leader in Wana, which is the headquarters of South Waziristan Agency, told this correspondent in a telephone interview that in coming days bigger cities like Gazni and Kandahar can expect serious turmoil.

The area with the most unrest is inhabited by the Kharoti and Siplani tribes. He said that unlike Khost, Paktia and Gardez, which are situated alongside North Waziristan Agency, where commanders such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Saifullah Mansoor are well-known figures, there is no trace of mujahideen leaders in the attacks on Zabul, Argon and Shakin.

Trade between Afghan and Pakistan tribes knows no borders, and much of it involves moving smuggled goods. At the same time, the transport mafias make a mint, so they take exception to US troops attempting to block them, such as at the check post at Spin Boldek. Understandably, from their point of view, they want the troops to go, so they are happy to lend their support to the anti-US commanders along the Afghan border, providing them both material help and sanctuaries when these fighters want to melt into Pakistan. This was hinted at recently by Afghan interim leader Hamad Karzai and Foreign Minister Abdullah when they say that Afghan guerrilla attacks were being supported from Pakistan.

Meanwhile, with the fall of Baghdad, Iran has become sandwiched between a US-dominated Iraq to the west and Afghanistan to the east, where US troops also have a strong presence. Soon after the fall of Kabul in early 2002, Asia Times Online (Iran unites against American presence ) maintained that Iran would try to maintain its presence in the western Afghan province of Herat and would try to influence events in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the US accused Iran of trying to support several rebel groups in Herat against US interests.

The governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, is accepted as playing a pivotal role in the anti-US movement, notably by refusing US demands to disarm warlords in his areas. Khan was one of the more prominent commanders during the anti-Soviet resistance movement of the 1980s. When the Soviets made Herat the hub of their activities, they believed that local army officers, as well as the population, were docile. But Khan secretly worked hand-in-gloves with the Islamic radical movement and staged a massive rebellion in the garrison, killing many Soviet forces and their families as well as seizing their weapons. The revolt proved to be a turning point in the anti-soviet movement in Afghanistan.

When they fled the country in the face of the US-led troops in early 2002, the Taliban peacefully handed over the reigns of power to Ismail Khan in Herat, which made the US authorities deeply suspicions of his ultimate motives, especially given his radical religious beliefs. Furthermore, Iran's support for his administration in Herat is an open secret.

Former Afghan premier and guerrilla leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has organized his commanders around Jalalabad and Kunhar in the east, although he is very much in touch with his loyals in northern Afghanistan. Mir Arif, the governor of Kunduz, is one of these. And even though he is an ethnic Uzbek, because he is associated with Hikmatyar's Pashtun-orientated Hezb-i-Islami, several Pashtun warlords support Mir Arif.

The governor is a major supply line for the rebels, and there is little that the US or the Karzai administration can do about it. And he has the potential to rally other commanders as well as General Abdul Rasheed Dostum in Mazar-i-Sharif into a powerful anti-US grouping.

Meanwhile, about a year ago Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Afghan cell rearmed several commanders in Jalalabad, Hilmand, Kunhar and Paktia - mostly commanders who had been allied with the Hezb-i-Islami before the Taliban. This was an attempt for Pakistan to regain a foothold in the country as its influence had been voided by the fall of the Taliban. Ironically, Hikmatyar's reemergence follows his return to Afghanistan from Iran, from where he was expelled from exile under US pressure. He roamed across Afghanistan to regroup his former commanders who had become independent warlords into an anti-US front.

This situation gave the US a chance to point a finger at the ISI for its involvement in Afghanistan, and President General Pervez Musharraf was quick to put a stop to such behavior by establishing a planning and strategic division at General Headquarters Rawalpindi. But already a large amount of ammunition and money had been moved to the Hezb-i-Islami commanders.

After the rapid retreat of the Taliban, many Arab, Chechen and Uzbek fighters took refuge in Pakistan and deserted locations along the Iranian border. But with the recent guerrilla attacks in southeastern Afghanistan virtually making administration impossible, many of these foreign fighters have returned. One of them is Khalid bin al-Atash, a one-legged Arab fighter and a key planner within Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Khalid initially fled to Karachi, but after US intelligence raids he went to Quetta, and then to Iran. Now he is in Afghanistan.

Given all these factors, it is apparent that the situation in Afghanistan is not simply one of local unrest, but once again a potential breeding point and a safe sanctuary for an international Islamic resistance front against US interests where already thousands of Arabs, Chechen and Uzbek fighters are fast regrouping for a broader role in the region to harm the interests of the US and its allies.

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