Global Policy Forum

By Fred Oluoch

Unless Congo's president-elect Joseph Kabila, finds ways of dealing with his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, he will not be in a position to stamp his authority on the vast country despite winning the elections.

With a slim majority of 58 per cent against Bemba's 42 per cent, the 35-year-old Kabila faces questions of legitimacy given that millions of Congolese spread over a large geographical area voted against him.

Emerging from five years of inherited presidency, Kabila fell short of the overwhelming majority that could have given him the mandate not only to unite the country but also bridge the entrenched east-west divide.

Now, he has to figure out how to deal with Bemba, who has threatened to unleash hostilities at any time. Bemba appears determined to overturn the election results by a combination of legal means and violence even before the swearing-in, slated for December 10.

The former rebel, who has also gone to court challenging Kabila's win, has the capacity to cause a major disturbance and Kabila has to chose between reaching out to him and incorporating him into a government of national unity or opting for a military solution at a time when he has been rejected by the western section of the country.

So entrenched is the east-west divide that while Kinshasa, Bemba's stronghold, generally sank into a funeral mood after the announcement of the results, the east witnessed celebrations, although these were somewhat subdued, perhaps out of fear that full-scale celebrations in the east could endanger "their man" in Kinshasa.

Correspondents on the ground noted that Bemba's strategy like a double-edged sword, where he gives the impression that he has opted for the legal redress, but at the same time is sending strong signals that he cannot rule out military confrontation in the future.

It is widely believed that Bemba's supporters attacked and burned the Supreme Court in Kinshasa last week as an indication that he has little faith in the justice system since all the sitting judges were appointed by Kabila. Other observers wonder why he opted for an action that in essence paralysed the hearing of the petition he had lodged against the results

Analysts say that given that there are a sizeable number of militants who are not ready to accept the results, coupled with the fact that it is unlikely the Supreme Court will overturn the verdict of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), these militants may want to settle scores on the battlefield.

At the moment, it is still difficult to say whether Kabila will succeed in convincing Bemba to join him in a government of national unity. Bemba insists that he won the elections but was robbed of victory. Consequently, there is talk that he turned down an offer of the post of prime minister.

As things stand, Kabila can only win Bemba over if he promises to shield him that he could shield him from the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has indicted the former vice-president for atrocities committed during the civil war. However, Kabila has no power over the Court.

Yet, should Bemba be carted off to the ICC to face the charges, Kabila risks being accused of conspiring with the Court to get rid of his formidable opponent, which could lead to more serious violence.

Apart from dealing with Bemba, Kabila has to unite the country by getting rid of the deeply entrenched east-west divide, building institutions and entrenching democracy. He may also have to forgo the previous practice of rewarding friends around him and instead identify qualified technocrats from all over the country to rebuild the dilapidated infrastructure, which has suffered from decades of corruption and war.

Kabila's chances of winning acceptance by the west are also complicated by the fact that some of his diehard supporters such as Kyungu wa Kumwanza, had threatened before the elections that they would not accept a Kabila loss, threatening to secede and reclaim the Katanga province, which they believe the UN took away from them in the 1960s.

Observers say that it would be difficult for Kabila to persuade his opponents to accept his rule since his supporters had threatened to do the opposite had he lost the elections.

With clashes having erupted in Kinshasa and the Congo River area soon after the election results were announced, Kabila will have to depend on the UN and EU troops for longer than expected. Correspondents on the ground say had the foreign troops not been there after the first round of elections in August, Congo would have exploded into a full- scale war.

Observers say it may be costly for the UN and EU forces to stay longer in Congo after the elections, but it may be more costly if they leave now only to come back a few months down the line to quell such a war.

The history of UN peacekeeping is replete with such examples; Haiti and East Timor are two case studies where war broke out immediately the UN handed over power to the legitimate elected leaders. This trend is likely to be repeated in the mineral-rich Congo.

Kabila also needs the UN to help him rebuild the national army, which currently is incapable of providing security to all Congolese. There are fear, too, that once the UN peacekeepers leave, there will be no arbiter to turn to, especially for the disgruntled elements, who will have no choice but to return to the bush.

Militarily, Kabila is taking solace in the fact that his government has an estimated 14,000 loyal troops. Besides his experience as a general in the Congolese army during the anti-Mobutu war and his father's reign, Kabila has direct control of a 7,000-strong army unit known as the Republican Guard, which unconfirmed reports say includes a few Zimbabwean commanders.

Besides the reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed by war and streamlining an economy steeped in corruption, Kabila faces the challenge of dismantling the country's many private armies, including Bemba's and integrating them into the army.

In January 2001, Kabila became the world's youngest head of state following the assassination of his father Laurent Desire Kabila. Five years later and a little bit more hardened, Kabila has the challenge of spreading his influence in a nation of 56 million people.

Unlike the abrasive Bemba, who was likely to threaten the interests of the West had he taken power, Kabila is seen as daddy's boy - docile and, according to his detractors, easy to manipulate. He lacks the charisma of his opponent, is not a good speaker, generally perceived by his opponents as a "foreigner" - he is yet to master French and Lingala to the level of his fluency in Kiswahili.

While there is a general consensus that he has managed to bring relative peace to the Congo, his critics perceive him as too young, weak, and inexperienced to bring total peace. But herein also lies his strength.

Kabila seems to enjoy the support of the Western power who perceive him as one who can safeguard their economic interests in the Congo, compared with Bemba. This is because a lot of mining deals were cut with Western companies by Kabila's father and he is expected to maintain the status quo.

Bemba, on the other hand, had threatened to overturn these agreements, arguing that they are essentially meant to enrich Kabila's coterie at the expense of the poor masses. However, Kabila has never been directly associated with any corrupt dealings despite the fact that the five-year civil war was characterised by shady business deals.

Still, the issue of minerals being exploited by foreigners while Congolese go hungry, is one of Kabila's major challenges. Already, questions are being asked over whether he will have the courage to revive state mining corporations and revoke the licences offoreign companies.

Congolese are yearnning for just such a move but observes say that the West, the IMF and the World Bank will not let him do anything like that. As a result, Kabila is likely to go along with the interests of some powerful Western nations, given that they have been crucial to his stay in power since taking over from his father in 2001. He has also learnt a lesson from his father, whose assassination was attributed to his attempts to give the Congolese their fair share of the country's mineral wealth.

Going for Kabila, is the fact that the new constitution and electoral law, brought into force in February and March 2006, respectively, created a relatively weak parliament incapable of challenging his executive powers.

It is the president and not the prime minister who will preside over the Council of Ministers. In contrast to the ministers' obligations, the president does not have to answer to parliament for policy decisions.

According to the recently ratified constitution, the president has the right to dissolve parliament in case of a serious crisis between the legislative and executive branches. While parliament has power in theory to sanction and even dismiss the government by an absolute majority vote, the president's power to dissolve parliament is likely to undermine the House's capacity to keep the president in check.

Similarly, weak parties will make it easier for him to co-opt and divide the opposition for his own political survival. Parties have been banned for most of the country's history, with brief windows of activity from 1960-1967 and 1990-1997. While the young Kabila repealed his father's ban on party activities in 2001, most parties remain weak and without a clear vision or ideology. Thus, it will take a while for strong opposition parties to develop in the current landscape, an opportunity he could use to consolidate himself in the face of Bemba's threat.

Indeed, in spite of the 2002 power-sharing agreement that includes four vice-presidents from rebel groups who fought during the war, and a Cabinet of more than 50 ministers in his interim administration, Kabila has been running a staff of 200, described by the opposition as a "parallel government."

Another key challenge facing Kabila is the need to transform the judiciary in a manner that wins the trust of both his supporters and opponents. The courts have not recovered from the days of Mobutu, who stood above justice and could name and dismiss judges at will. The justice sector still suffers from political interference and lacks of resources. Like other civil servants, judges were left to fend for themselves in the years of Congo's decline, living off the fees paid by litigants.

Neglect of the judiciary, together with the weak police force in charge of implementing legal decisions, has rendered the penal system almost defunct.

The new constitution created three new courts, replacing the Supreme Court. They are the High Court of Appeals; the Constitutional Court, which can hear cases against the prime minister and the president in addition to interpreting the constitution; and the State Council, with jurisdiction over civil cases brought against central administrative authorities.

However, these courts will not be set up until after the inauguration of a new government, and will require significant additional funding and support to fulfil their mandates of providing checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches.

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C íŸ 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.