by Davit Avalishvili

A few days ago the Georgian National Security Council considered the issue of changing (expanding) the Russian peacekeepers' mandate in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. At the same time, this problem was considered in general, in the context of the future fate of Gali District (Samurzaqano), by using the paraphrase of a well-known statement Gali District is a key to Abkhazia, or, in other words, it is quite expedient to pay special attention to this district.

Proposals approved by the Georgian National Security Council have been sent to the group of UN secretary-general's friends on Georgian issues, Russia of course (including the commander of the peacekeepers) and the UN. The consideration of this proposal may be temporarily hindered by the fact that the UN secretary-general's special envoy Dieter Boden is leaving his post soon and the appointment of a new envoy will take some time. However, all the formalities will probably be over by mid-June.

As for the proposals approved by the National Security Council, there is nothing particularly new about them. Georgia has been raising the issue of extending the peacekeeping operations to Samurzaqano (and then the whole Abkhazia) for several years. This time the proposal envisages extending the peacekeepers' activities to the Ghalidzga river, giving them the administrative authority and establishing a joint administration in Gali District. That would be a kind of a coalition administration, whose decisions would be implemented by the peacekeepers, rather than the local police.

One can say with confidence: every party receiving these proposals (the UN, the group of the UN secretary-general's friends on Georgian issues, i.e. Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA) will carefully study and approve them and will request the consent of the Abkhaz side. And that is absolutely impossible. The Sukhumi regime will never agree to the expansion of the peacekeeping area, since the separatists have strong fortifications on the right bank of the Gali canal. All the more they will not agree to limitations on their jurisdiction in Gali District and the establishment of the coalition administration there.

Despite the common stereotype , the Abkhaz separatists are as unlikely to easily give up Gali District (for a low price) as they are unlikely to give up Gudauta District.

The thing is that Georgia has no lever of influence over Sukhumi. Russia will not jeopardize its relations with the Adygeis North Caucasian people whom Georgians identify with the Abkhaz by closing the Psou border for "Georgia's sake". Even if they close the border and impose a blockade on the separatists (to force Sukhumi to agree to Georgia's proposals), Abkhazia will remain connected to the outside world, first of all to Turkey, where hundreds of thousands of Adygeis live, by the sea. Never mind that the question remains of why Russia would go into so much trouble for the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Thus, we are stuck in a blind alley again, waiting for the consent of the separatist regime.

Hypothetically, we can imagine an ultimatum the Georgian armed forces would deliver after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. If that ultimatum were backed by real military strength, the separatists would quickly become more willing to make concessions. But then again, the reforms in the Georgian armed forces are facing serious problems. The Americans, who started the implementation of the Train and Equip programme, have made their requests clear. They will only finance this programme if Georgia finances some of it. Not only political, but also the (state) military and financial responsibility will be shared this way. Fortunately, according to recent reports, the necessary funds were found yesterday, and the programme will not be discontinued.

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