Global Policy Forum

Haiti Update X: The Six Month Plan

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By Avi Steinberg *

Africana
May 5, 2004


The months leading up to the 2004 US Presidential election are a dangerous period for the world. Bush's war in Iraq might be a big campaign issue all over the US, but Haiti is a big issue in a vital state, Florida. For that reason alone, Haiti will remain a focus through November and not much longer. Perhaps it's a coincidence that the UN "peace-keeping" force, which begins its patrols on June 1, has been given a six-month mission — i.e., through November.

Even if that is a coincidence, it is a very convenient one indeed for the Bush administration. Either way, there can be no doubt that the US is woefully neglecting its commitments. UN special envoy Reginald Dumas has recently said that a sustained commitment of at least 20 years would be necessary in order to bring peace and prosperity to Haiti. Kofi Annan requested two years; the US and the Security Council have approved a paltry six months.

The US defended the decision for a short mission by saying that it needed to "monitor progress and watch costs," which is another way of saying that it considers Haiti a very low priority. Costs, of course, are always too high, especially for the impatient and the unwise. "Progress," on the other hand, will be determined by a number of superficial actions like a commitment to new elections — these actions that will be implemented quickly and under the watchful eyes of foreign soldiers so that the US can declare "progress" and depart.

Rushing to elections, which is only one of a number of reformist measures does not address the core problems afflicting Haiti. As we've seen, faulty elections do not resolve conflicts, they enflame them. The most recent revolt in Haiti was sparked in part by bitterness caused by alleged electoral abuse by Aristide. This time around, his Lavalas party — which still commands popular loyalty — will likely be cut out of the ruling equation. An election makes little difference in a country in which power is gained and held by the men with the best weapons. In Haiti, it's one rifle=one vote. Regardless of the corruption of Aristide, the armed rebellion that toppled him was hardly a model of electoral politics. In this context, elections without social and economic reform are a self-serving farce and far from "progress."

Perhaps Bush will trumpet this false progress days before the election. But once progress is declared, the US will forget about Haiti and the country will fall into the hands of the criminals who are now poised to take over. Poverty, despair and violence will continue and, at some point, escalate once more. Haiti's interim leader, Prime Minister Gerard Latortue, knows that his days in the limelight are numbered and he intends to make the most of it. As the UN approved its short mission and the US prepared to leave, Latortue set off to the US to request aid and to garner support for the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity (HERO) act, a trade bill that promises to bring hundreds of manufacturing jobs to Haiti.

This is a critical period for Latortue and his government. Latortue wants to remind the U.S that military disengagement in Haiti doesn't mean that the US has disengaged from Haiti. Help comes in a variety of forms, most notably, money, jobs, and continued political backing. Latortue knows that in this election half-year, US politicians might listen to him. He's even meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus, which has a number of outspoken Aristide supporters. Latortue has lived in the US, in south Florida, and he understands the political seasons. He knows he has a window of opportunity that will shut quickly and decisively come November.

Latortue's US support is about the only power card he is able to play and he is wisely, if fruitlessly, trying to strengthen his hand. If he is able to get support from the Caribbean Community (Caricom), which has still refused to recognize Haiti's new government, all the better. Although its members are caught between immense US pressure and local pressures, Caricom can't hold out indefinitely.

With or without Caricom's support, as long as Latortue has US attention and US/UN military might behind him, he can ignore the armed warlords who control much of Haiti and who outgun his forces. With US/UN support, the rebels must behave and let Latortue play Prime Minister. All of this will change when the US stops paying attention and the UN pulls out its forces. Latortue is trying to shore up US support now for use later, when he becomes exposed for what he truly is: a very weak and vulnerable unelected leader with no army and, perhaps, no police force. Even if a government-sponsored army or police force forms, the ranks will be filled with men loyal to rebel leaders like Guy Philippe and other assorted criminals. There's a reason why Aristide disbanded the army — they are a threat to civilian government. And a weak police force is, as the Aristide years have proven, disastrous.

By giving Haiti six months instead of a serious commitment, the world and the US have made their intentions very clear. Without US support, Latortue will have little choice but to acknowledge the authority that the armed militiamen already hold — at that point, Latortue will be nothing more than a political face on a criminal body politic. The season of disengagement has officially begun even before it has started. Perhaps President Kerry will begin to re-examine US policy on Haiti after the election.


About the author: Avi Steinberg is a freelance writer living in Boston. After studying American foreign policy at Harvard, he received a fellowship in 2002-3 to live in Jerusalem and study international conflict. He is on staff at Transition Magazine.


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