Global Policy Forum

By Rolf Ekeus*

For seven years, a United Nations team of inspectors under my direction uncovered biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs in Iraq by scouring financial records, tracking down imported equipment, searching laboratories and bases, and accounting for every one of the more than 900 Scuds the Soviet Union had provided to Baghdad. The Iraqi government did its best to conceal most of this dangerous infrastructure.

Our experience from those years proves beyond doubt that Iraq has the ambition and ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But it also shows that international weapons inspectors, if properly backed up by international force, can unearth Saddam Hussein's weapons programs. If we believe that Iraq would be much less of a threat without such weapons, the obvious thing is to focus on getting rid of the weapons. Doing that through an inspection team is not only the most effective way, but would cost less in lives and destruction than an invasion.

The question is whether weapons inspections can provide credible assurance to an international community anxious to disarm Iraq. On that, there is considerable debate and disagreement. But many people underestimate the sophistication of inspections and the experts who devoted themselves to this challenge.

Take Iraq's biological weapons program, often cited as evidence of Baghdad's ability to deceive weapons inspectors. In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on Thursday, President Bush attributed the successful uncovering of the bioweapons program to the fortuitous defection of a senior Iraqi weapons official in 1995. In this case, the president does not appear to have been well briefed. In fact, in April 1995, four months before the Iraqi official defected, U.N. inspectors disclosed to the Security Council that Iraq had a major biological weapons program, including a sizable production facility. In later reports in June and July, the inspection team, known as the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, or UNSCOM, added details about Iraq's research into weapons that could spread anthrax, botulism, aflatoxin and gas gangrene.

The defection of the Iraqi weapons official, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, in August provided some additional confirmation and prompted the Iraqi regime to make some more admissions, but the inspectors learned few new details.

The discovery of Iraq's bioweapons program was the work of smart inspectors, not a godsend. One example of the many discoveries shows the detective work involved. By examining letters of credit issued by Iraq's central bank, UNSCOM found a Western company that had exported a spray drying system to Iraq. The piece of equipment is common in agriculture. But when we interviewed them, puzzled company officials said that the Iraqi importer wanted to use it to mill particles so small they would stay suspended in the atmosphere. That set off alarm bells, because the only reason to do that would be to make sure that particles could be inhaled. There is no civilian reason to do that with this piece of agricultural equipment. To find other corroborating evidence, UNSCOM searched normally innocent institutions such as hospitals, university labs, health centers and veterinary centers, and slowly a picture emerged of a major weapons program. UNSCOM profited from breakthroughs in genetic analysis to discover traces of biological weapons in samples obtained earlier at suspect facilities. If, in the face of Iraq's total denial and non-cooperation, the inspectors could find that kind of carefully concealed activity, that should give us reason to trust a renewed U.N. inspection system.

UNSCOM had other successes as well. In 1995, we found out about missile guidance systems Iraq had smuggled in from Russia the same year, even as inspections were going on. With inspectors in hot pursuit, Iraqi officials tried to avoid detection by throwing the equipment into the Tigris River, but UNSCOM divers were able to fish it out. This case was proof that Iraq not only concealed, but tried to reconstitute prohibited weapons programs.

Using documentation of Soviet Scud missiles delivered to Iraq in the 1980s, including serial numbers of and data about individual missiles, engines, warheads, fuel pumps and guidance systems, and taking advantage of Russian and former East German experts with detailed knowledge of Scuds, inspectors were able to account for more than 900 missiles. The destruction of those missiles that still remained after the two earlier Gulf wars was then certified by UNSCOM.

The U.N. inspectors also found that Iraq was more advanced in its pursuit of nuclear weapons than it had admitted or than was widely believed. Iraq had obtained practically the entire design of a nuclear explosion device, and appeared to have mastered most other technical aspects of the production of nuclear weapons. It had not managed to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear device, though. To remedy this, Iraq had embarked on expensive efforts to enrich uranium. This capacity was also dismantled by inspectors.

In similar fashion, UNSCOM also found and destroyed stockpiles of chemical weapons, such as mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and VX. The inspectors also demolished large quantities of chemical weapons munitions, including rockets and bombs.

In all these endeavors, UNSCOM benefited from intelligence support, including imagery provided by U2 planes which flew regularly over Iraq.

For a while, notwithstanding obstacles, the inspection regime worked. Then, in 1998, Hussein started systematically blocking inspectors from entering certain sites that were under suspicion. The permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council were divided about how to react, the inspectors withdrew, and U.S. and British planes were sent to bomb Iraq in Operation Desert Fox. In the four years since, there have been no U.N. inspectors in Iraq.

Thanks to the work of U.N. inspectors, not much was left of Iraq's once massive weapons programs when inspections halted. The question now is how much Baghdad has managed to acquire since then. Because of Hussein's clandestine techniques, little can be proven. Assessments can be made on what is possible and what is probable. A strong case can be made that Iraq, with access to considerable financial resources from oil sales since 1998, is making extensive efforts to rebuild its capabilities in weapons of mass destruction. Given his proven recklessness and boundless ambitions, Hussein is again posing a threat to the peace and prosperity of the Gulf region and beyond.

With his U.N. speech, President Bush has opened the door for the U.N. to send in inspectors again. If the U.N. now said it wanted to send in inspectors, Bush would be hard-pressed to say no to an organization he sought to spur to action. But the door might not be open long. The United Nations should take this opportunity to create a system of coercive or armed inspections in order to guarantee access to suspected weapons sites, as proposed by Jessica T. Mathews and others from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

How should a U.N. inspection regime be reconstituted to prevent Iraq from blocking inspectors and sowing discord among the five permanent members of the Security Council? The answer lies in a radical strengthening of the inspection system, based on the existing and largely untested U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The inspectors should be backed up by an inspection implementation force positioned in neighboring countries and possibly in some parts of Iraq. Such a multinational force, preferably under an American commander, should be mandated by the Security Council.

Any obstruction by Iraq should be met with immediate reaction. The head of the inspection team, the executive chairman of UNMOVIC, should be given the exclusive authority to call upon the military backup forces for support if inspectors are blocked. No prior approval by the Security Council should be required. The force commander would be responsible for military operations in each situation. The goal of such an arrangement would be to deter Iraq from a policy of obstruction and force it to give up its notorious efforts at intimidation.

President Bush is right to be concerned about Iraq. There are strong reasons to believe that Hussein has designs on the Persian Gulf's oil resources and that he seeks unchallenged leadership of the Arab world. The only way Hussein can fulfill his ambitions is to back them up with intimidation of his neighbors. For that, weapons of mass destruction are the preeminent tools.

President Bush is also right to be worried about what we don't know about Iraq's weapons. The status quo cannot be an option. All the more reason to turn to inspectors to eliminate these tools. If we live in fear of not knowing what Iraq possesses, this is the only alternative to an invasion of Iraq, which would carry high risks for innocent Iraqi civilians, American and other international forces and the stability of the region. But the United Nations must ensure high quality inspections, strengthening their presence and guaranteeing access by providing inspectors with robust military backup so they can carry out their mission in full.

* Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and former Swedish ambassador to the United States, served as executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997.

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