Global Policy Forum

UK prime minister Mr Tony Blair on 24 Sep 2002 released a report on the so-called acquisition by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological).

The report was disputed by many governments as well as British sources for being a list of unsubstantiated assumptions and allegations or merely a propaganda sheet. Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs present this report to clarify the points misleadingly addressed in Mr Blair's report:

Blair's report, long awaited by the world opinion, contains not so much but a series of lies and empty propaganda which are totally inconsistent with the facts and reports made by the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) teams.

What asserts Blair's lies and fabrications is the fact that he has lost sight of Iraq's cooperation with these two international institutions (UNSCOM and IAEA). Indeed he failed to consider the events and activities which confirmed Iraq's full cooperation in the implementation of paragraphs 8,9,10,11,12 and 13 of SCR UN Security Council Resolution 687.

Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA from 1991 to 1998:

Following is a statement of the intensive effort made by Iraq in the fulfilment of its obligation as defined by SCR 687

Nuclear activity

What Iraq has achieved in this field, in application of SCR 687, is the product of the on-site operations which continued until an earlier time of the current year, through the annual periodic inspection carried out by the IAEA under the safeguards system (NPT), Document (QE / 002/009) dated 15 March 2002.

According to the well known facts, Iraq submitted all technical and scientific details about the sites involved the previous programme together with the quantities and types of nuclear materials, equipment and devices which were involved in the previous nuclear activity with full and precise details.

The nuclear file was officially closed by the IAEA in July 1995 and then reopened in Aug 1995. In Oct 1997, the Agency submitted its semi-annual report in which it indicated Iraq's implementation of its obligations as regards section (C) of SCR 687 of the nuclear file. The agency empowered the Security Council to take a resolution to move to the on-going monitoring of nuclear programme, Document (S/ 1997 / 779).

In April 1998, IAEA submitted another report in which it confirmed once again Iraq's commitments to this file, Document (S/1998/312). According to the realities and facts contained in the agency's reports, Iraq undertook to destroy all the buildings and laboratories at Al-Atheer, Al-Tarmiya, Al-Shirqat and Al-Tuwatha sites. Iraq also destroyed all machines and equipment involved in the previous nuclear programme including the dual use equipment. In addition other buildings and laboratories with areas of 270,000 square metres were destroyed.

Between 1993 and 1994, Iraq handed over to IAEA 127 kgs of enriched uranium used as nuclear fuel for the peaceful research reactor. The Agency transported this quantity outside Iraq. As for the remaining nuclear materials they are at present in the possession of IAEA.

According to IAEA reports, Iraq's declarations about its nuclear activity are correct, precise and credible. Iraq also submitted its Full, Final and Comprehensive Disclosure (FFCD), supported by documents.

Chemical activity

As regards the question of chemical weapons, Iraq, after the adoption of resolution SCR 687, made declarations about the quantities, types and the geographical sites of the filled and empty ammunitions, the produced chemical agents, the raw materials, the production facilities and the supporting facilities.

In September 1991, the UNSCOM supervised the destruction of all empty chemical ammunitions at Al-Muthana Establishment which included 12,500 pieces of artillery ammunitions and aerial bombs. In February 1992, the UNSCOM destroyed the chemical ammunitions at Al-Khamissiya area which included 400 (122mm) rockets filled with Sarin. From June 1992 to June 1994, the UNSCOM destroyed the empty and filled ammunitions, the production equipment, production sites, stores, liquid and solid materials at Al-Muthana Establishment which included 690 tons of the produced final agents and 38500 ammunition pieces, filled and empty, liquid amounted to 1,800 000 litres, solid intermediate materials, amounted to 1000 tons as well as 150 production equipment and four production sites and stores.

Iraq was cooperative in this matter. It provided all assistance for the destruction work at the shortest possible time and under the UNSCOM supervision which appreciated Iraq's cooperation. Iraq also submitted its FFCD in line with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM itself which contained full details of the chemical weapons programme.

Biological activity

Iraq, in June 1991, ratified the Biological Weapons Ban Treaty and asserted its commitments under Geneva protocol of 1925 under para 7, section (C) of SCR 687.

In 1995, Iraq submitted to UNSCOM the draft FFCD of the biological programme in the hope of submitting the final version in June 1996 which contained full information about the programme in all its details (date of programme, sites involved in the programme, research and development, production, weaponization, destruction damaging, material balance, procurements).

In this context Iraq fully cooperated with the UNSCOM in its work for the verification and destroying biological weapons, all remaining biological agents stock piles, equipment, devices, materials and culture media which were used in the process of research, development, production and storage, together with the destruction of equipment and material used for pure civilian purpose. The destruction also included the furniture, desks, cooling systems, refrigerators, science book and journals under the UNSCOM supervision.

The UNSCOM teams which undertook to follow up the biological file have used highly advanced scientific methods for the detection of any trace of a previous or present biological activity. Moreover, the active and strict monitoring system covered a very wide network of sites and through the surprise and daily inspections the UNSCOM did not find anything that ran contrary to SCRs 687 and 715. While Iraq reiterates this information in response to Blair's lies and fabrications, it asserts such information on the strength of the inspectors reports and the briefings presented to the Security Council as well as on the facts which have become well known to the international public opinion.

Ballistic missiles

Iraq had submitted all detailed information about the sites, quantities and types of missiles, launchers, key parts, missiles supporting devices, production and repair sites to UNSCOM. In the light of this information UNSCOM undertook to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers which were in possession of Iraq after 1991. It included 133 missiles and 14 combat launchers. The UNSCOM also verified their full destruction and the full accounting of the material balance through the documentary and material proofs. The UNSCOM admitted this fact in its report to the Security Council, Document (S/1997/774). In addition, 75 warheads of the missiles were destroyed, 30 of which were destroyed under the UNSCOM supervision and 45 were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. The UNSCOM was able to verify their destruction and admitted that in its report to the Security Council, Document (S/1998/920). The missile file was officially closed by UNSCOM in June 1995 (UNSCOM report to Security Council S/1995/para. 30) and was reopened in Aug 1995 when Iraq submitted its FFCD in accordance with the forms prepared by the UNSCOM in June 1996. It took three years for the UNSCOM to carry out its additional verification which eventually proved that Iraq's previous declarations were true, accurate and credible (UNSCOM report to Security Council S/1997/774).

A legal and objective reading of the procedures undertook by Iraq in its cooperation with the UNSCOM in implementing its obligations under SCR 687 relating to the question of disarmament in the missile field proves undoubtedly that Iraq has fall of its commitments under para 8, 9 and 10 of SCR 687.

Iraq's imports

The claim that Iraq has imported some materials proscribed by the Security Council resolutions and the allegation that Iraq has developed its programme of proscribed weapons through smuggling with foreign countries and companies, is a claim not supported by any fact. The truth of the matter is that Iraq, when it agreed to SCR 715, it started the application of a mechanism within the context of the resolution which put the country's imports and exports of dual use materials as defined by the Security Council to the monitoring mechanism by the IAEA and UNSCOM.

Both of them were assigned to specify materials covered by this mechanism. In Feb 1995 Iraq received the draft of import-export monitoring mechanism plan and implemented it despite remarks made by Iraq about them. Iraq's imports were subject to the UNSCOM monitoring system through checking Iraqi customs measures, visits to all entry points to the country (land, air and sea), as well as checking all documents and correspondence relating to this. The inspection teams made visits by helicopters and vehicles which covered Iraq from the north to the south and from the east to the west. On its part, Iraq gave every possible assistance in the performance of the tasks of those teams and in answering the questions relating to the commercial mechanism. The task of those teams was to collect information about the import to oversee Iraq's implementation of relative Security Council resolution and no violation was recorded against Iraq in this context whether from IAEA or UNSCOM. So, from where about does Blair get such deceiving information which says that Iraq has imported some prohibited materials? How did he include countries in this file when he knows that Iraq has not imported any material prohibited by the Security Council resolution?

The UNSCOM, from 1991 until its withdrawal on 15 Dec 1998 has sent dozens of teams but they were not able to observe a violation in this regard. Similarly, the import monitoring mechanism, which is in operation since June 1996 under SCR 1051 up to its halting on 15 Dec. 1998 did not indicate any single violation of the resolution.

Facts about Iraq's cooperation

The essential question which must be asked is that why have the work of UNSCOM and IAEA is ignored what Iraq has so far achieved sentence as published ? Iraq, since 1994, and as Rolf Ekeus admitted, has implemented 95 per cent of its due obligations under the proscribed weapons file. Another question that has to be posed is that what the inspection teams had done from 1991 up to 15 Dec 1998 sentence as published ? The total number of the inspection teams was 276 distributed according to the following table:

- 83 Missile inspection teams. - 62 Chemical inspection teams. - 74 Biological inspection teams. - 40 Nuclear inspection teams. - 5 Import / Export inspection teams.

As for the special missions, 12 teams were assigned to them. The number of inspectors was 3845 and the number of inspections carried out by those teams for the sites, covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, was 3392. Iraq extended full cooperation to the discussion and verification teams whose number amounted to 94 out of the total number of the inspection teams. They interviewed 1378 persons. In addition, Iraq worked and cooperated with the monitoring groups whose number was 192 and whose inspectors were 1232. They carried out 10,256 inspections. As regards the aerial reconnaissance, transportation and logistic affairs, 1306 sites, covered and uncovered by the monitoring system, were surveyed while the number of sorties was 908. In addition, US spy planes (U-2) carried out 434 sorties with a total flying hours amounted to 1800 hours.

The above mentioned facts can never be called in question. They are solid facts contained in the UNSCOM and IAEA reports.

The number of the reports written by the UNSCOM from 1991 to 1998 was 24 and the number of the reports made by IAEA from 1991 to 1995 was eight. After 1995 and up to 1998, the IAEA reports were incorporated with the UNSCOM reports within the framework of the unified semi-annual reports issued by the UNSCOM.

It is important that we refer here to the information contained in a number of the documents of the UNSCOM, and of its reports to the Security Council Document (S/1993/26910) issued on December 1993 states: "The Iraqi authorities were keen to ensure that the inspection proceeded without incident: Iraq provided all the support requested by the inspection teams, access to all sites and areas to be inspected was guaranteed; no problems were encountered by the team in execution of its operational plan"

Document S/1994/490 issued by the IAEA states:

"A marked improvement has occurred in the working relationship with the Iraqi side. An evident effort is now deployed by the Iraqi authorities to provide promptly the information needed to fulfil the requirements of the different resolutions to remove remaining gabs or uncertainties ".

(Document S/1994/1138) states:

"The Commission has received considerable assistance and support from Iraq in its efforts to install sensor and tags."

(Document S/1994/1151) issued by the IAEA states:

"The Iraqi attitude has enabled the inspector's work to be conducted effectively and has contributed significantly to expediting the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification, as called for in the Security Council Resolutions."

(Document S/1995/494) the UNSCOM Executive Chairman says:

"Much had been achieved in the implementation of paragraphs 8 -10 of Security Council Resolution 687(1991) - indeed, the bulk of what was required."

The same document also says that "Iraq, at the commission's request, has provided accurate information about the VX project and has fulfilled its promise as required by the commission." The document also says: "The commission is satisfied that Iraqi's cooperation in carrying out the monitoring plan has been of a degree that satisfies the provisions of paragraph 5 of Scrutiny Council Resolution 715."

(Document S/1995/844) of IAEA says:

"The level of practical cooperation by Iraqi counterparts in facilitating and expediting IAEA field work continues to be high."

(Document S/1995/864) states that:

"Iraq has continued to provide the support requested by the Commission in the conduct of inspection and verification." The Commission Chairman welcomes this approach by Iraq and of providing the necessary documents.

(Document S/1995/1038) says:

"The Iraqi side accepted all the comments and recommendations made by the commission experts concerning the additional information to be included in the final version of the Full, Final and Complete Disclosures."

Claims about alleged activities after 1998:

Proceeding from above and in order to put before the British and world public opinion all the facts that refute the file of lies contained in Blair's report, we shall tackle this in detail through our reply supported by facts.

Nuclear activity

Blair, in paragraph 19 and 21 of his report claimed that Iraq tries to acquire a local capability for uranium enrichment by centrifuge. In fact the centrifuge constituents consist of dozens of parts including pumps, rotaries and maraging steel but they exclude aluminium.

Blair in his file attempted to misrepresent this paragraph by saying that there is information which indicates that the purpose of this aluminium is for a nuclear programme. The aluminium pipes exist in Iraq and the IAEA and UNSCOM check them and they are subject to the monitoring under SCR 715.

As for Blair's allegation that Iraq tried to acquire quantities of uranium from South Africa, this is basically a bogus lie... what indicates this is that he attributed it to an intelligence information without even giving a proof that supports his claim. If we add to this South Africa's denial of Blair's claims in this regard, Iraq's credibility has thus been asserted. IAEA stated that all nuclear materials in South Africa are subject to its safeguards and inventory system and it has never found any shortage in their number. In the same way, nuclear (?material) in Iraq are also subject to the same safeguards conditions and are checked every year and this could invalidate Blair's claim. IAEA's Document (QE/002/009) of 15 Feb 2002 substantiates our argument.

Blair concluded, according to his own assumptions, that Iraq needs (5) years to produce a nuclear weapon if sanctions remained imposed on it. As a consequence Blair went on his fabricated assumption, stating that if Iraq manages to acquire fissile material and other necessary materials from foreign sources, it can produce a nuclear weapon in a course of one or two years.

Blair assumptions are groundless due to the monitoring imposed on importations according to Security Council Resolution (1051) and the strict monitoring on importations implemented through the MOU, and due to periodical inspection implemented by IAEA annually under the safeguards system.

Chemical activity

Blair has repeated flimsy and deceptive claims in this area, and for the sake of truth we state the following:

1-There are no toxic chemical agents, precursors or chemical weapons. All that stated by Blair were destroyed by the Iraqi side under the supervision of the Special Commission. In addition, there is a protocol signed by both parties in this concern (protocol of handing over Al-Muthana site to the Iraqi side in June 1994) and as stated in the Special Commission semi-annual report, the seventh report of the Special Commission executive chairman in June 1994 Doc S/1994/750.

Since 1991, the Special Commissions recovered all that related to the past chemical programme. The Special Commission inspection team (UNSCOM-17) had made a full inventory at the toxic chemical agents, precursors, chemical, raw materials, filled and empty munitions.

All the above mentioned items and all materials related to chemical weapons were destroyed during the period 1991 - 1994.

2-There are no capabilities to produce chemical or biological agents since the specialized equipment required for the production of chemical and biological agents are not available. Iraq's capabilities to produce biological and chemical agents were destroyed during the aggression of 1991.

The destruction was extended by the Special Commission inspection teams, to cover all Iraq's stock of toxic agents, filled and empty munitions, precursors and production equipment. The Iraqi declarations concerning dual use materials, equipment and various chemical sites, in addition to the activities of the monitoring teams which operated since 1994 till the end of 1998, prove that there are no any prohibited items at these site, which is a certain evidence that there are no capabilities to produce these materials whatsoever.

VX agent production require an advanced technology which is not available in Iraq.... All the production equipment possessed by Iraq to develop the VX agent were tested by the Special Commission before destruction in 1997 and it found that those equipment were never used. This confirms that Iraq was not able to use them, and subsequently it did not obtain any large scale or significant production of VX agent.

3-The Special Commission is fully aware that the chemical agents production was in crude form and there was no chemical agent produced by distillation and purity more than 90 per cent. This aspect was clarified in chemical weapons "Full and Final and Comprehensive Declaration" submitted to the Special Commission in June 1996. That means these agent will be expired and disposed of after a short course of time.

4-Al-Muthana Establishment was destroyed totally during the thirty state aggression in 1991, then the Special Commission completed this destruction. The site is now abandoned, and the commission is fully aware of that. The chlorine and phenol plant at Falluja /2 site was reconstructed after the aggression to produce the chlorine which is used for civil purposes (water treatment).

This site was covered by monitoring since 1994. After UNSCOM departure in December 1998 the site was raided and destroyed. The aerial bombing had also destroyed the monitoring system's cameras and sensors. It is worth mentioning that the phenol is not a dual use material and was not stated in the second annex which is covered by the chemical monitoring plan.

On the other hand, Iraq had included chlorine in its semi-annual declarations, but lately the Special Commission omitted the chlorine from the dual use materials in June 2001, (Doc S/2001/860) enabling Iraq of using chlorine without being subject to export - import monitoring.

5-Ibn Sina company has no relation whatsoever to the past chemical programme and its absolutely not specialized in producing any chemical agent. The reconstruction of Ibn-Sina company was carried out according to the IAEA's approval as an industrial site for the production of researches of primary chemical materials which enter in civilian industries, and there are no sites constructed with forgone assistance.

Ibn-Sina site is well known for IAEA and UNSCOM. It was subject to the on going monitoring since 1994. The site was periodically visited by monitoring groups to be acquainted with its activities since it contains equipment tagged by UNSCOM. The site, also presenting semi-annual declarations according to the monitoring system.

Blair's claim on this site is nothing but exaggeration and distortion of world community opinion against Iraq.

6-Al-Qaqa state company was reconstructed after the destruction caused by the 1991 aggression. This company is specialized in the production of chemical materials and conventional explosives unrelated to the chemical programme, and it has no plant to produce phosgene.

The Special Commission had investigated this issue and monitoring groups were inspecting this company on systematic basis. Moreover, Al-Qaqa company has tagged equipment and submitting semi-annual declarations. Hence, Blair's claim that this company was dismantled by UNSCOM is only a false claim because it was under monitoring and had never been dismantled.

Blair has referred to the experts and staff working in the chemical industries claiming that Iraq can re-collect them to restore the chemical programme. Actually those Iraqis are working in civilian industries ... and if we put in consideration that Iraq has no raw material or sites specialized in chemical weapons production, how it could then be possible for Iraq to utilize the expertise of those people in such field?

Biological activity

With reference to what Blair has stated concerning the biological area, Iraq is completely clear of all biological weapons and agents since 1991. Iraq does not keep any quantity of those agents. Furthermore, all the biological experts are sure of the fact that the biological agents, being of a limited shelf life, could not be effective or of high toxicity or effect after such a long period. For instance the botulinum protein converted to non toxic substance after three years even if it stored in ideal storing conditions.

The anthrax spores converted within two years to ineffective vegetative cells also even if it stored under ideal storing conditions, particularly the biological agents produced by Iraq were in slurry state and Iraqi production method made the final product containing a lot of impurities and of a short shelf life. This fact is clearly known by UNSCOM and its experts.

The Special Commission, in addition, had severely investigated the issue of biological agents and weapons destruction and disposal by taking samples and swaps and through the supporting documents presented by the Iraqi side.

The Special Commission had also destroyed the remaining quantities of culture media imported for the past programme purposes, that the destroyed quantities were totalled to (30 tons). The claim contained in Blair's report that UNSCOM had destroyed only the equipment which directly connected to the biological agents production is untrue, because UNSCOM destroyed in addition to the production equipment others which were not directly related to the past programme that the destroyed equipment were totalled to 926 as published .

The produced quantities which Blair claims that they are more than what Iraqi side had declared by 2 times because he constructed his account on the Special Commission's assumptions that there are undeclared importations of culture media without having any evidence of practical proof as published . For example, the yeast extract which UNSCOM claimed that there are some undeclared importations of this material, but, factually that quantity was imported for the drugs production plant, later on UNSCOM acknowledged that the other quantity was not imported for the past biological programme after verifying the issue with full cooperation from the Iraqi side.

The Iraqi side had illustrated the full material balance for the culture media including the imported quantities, and that which were obtained locally and the consumed quantity in addition to the remaining media destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.

The allegation stated in the report which indicated according to intelligence information, that Iraq has started producing biological agents using mobile production sites is much to anybody's astonishment. It seems that those who prepare Blair's report seek to mislead the world community opinion, simply because the production process requirement and complicated services are not available.

Claiming that planning for a project for a mobile biological production site started in 1995 (during the presence of the Special Commission). If it is so, then the Special Commission should have raised this issue at that time and not Blair in 2002. The allegations that Iraq has reconstructed and renewed the sites which were previously used in producing biological agents is a groundless and false claim. Because the Special Commission supervised in 1996 on the destruction at Al-Hakam site totally and turned it to a desolate land.

The site is currently abandoned as it is, and there is no construction took place in it whatsoever. The FMD site no further clarification is also abandoned since 1996, when UNSCOM destroyed some of its equipment and the ventilation system. The site was visited many times by Arab and foreign press delegations who witnessed that the site is not renewed or rehabilitated or annexed by any new building.

Al-Falluja site (brake fluid production plant) is designated to produce brake fluid and definitely not raisin as the report claims. Vaccine and sera institute which Blair's reports referred as a store for biological agents and its storing capacity had been increased. This statement is also a lie because the vaccine and sera institute never used for storing biological agents and it's a site for the production of human vaccines in addition to be a storing site for imported human vaccine through MEMO. The site was visited by press media delegations and saw the vaccine stores, noting that the site is regularly visited by UN representatives to check the vaccines. The site also visited by UNICEF and WHO organizations representatives.

Missile activity

The missile area is what Blair has beaten the drum for it. Actually Iraq does not possess any missile with a range more than 150 km, since summer 1991. Because all remaining missiles were destroyed either by UNSCOM or unilaterally by Iraq according to SCR 687 requirements.

The Special Commission itself reached this fact through verifying the total quantity of missile imported from former USSR and those which consumed during the Iraq - Iran war, the aggression of 1991, and R and D research and development activity and tests. Accordingly, UNSCOM reached what so-called material balance of missiles, depending on a long strict and concentrated investigation. Finally UNSCOM admitted to the Security Council in its report (S/1997/774) the fact which indicate that 817 of 819 missiles have been accounted for "The Commission is now in a position to be able to account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missiles force". The Commission has also account for all declared operational missile launchers, both imported and indigenously produced.

Actually Iraq also had behaved in high transparency in dealing with the Special Commission concerning missiles permitted under the SCRs 687 and 715 and any claims which state that Iraq is exceeding the permitted limitation according to these resolutions are a misleading aim fallacies. Since the effective and efficient operation of monitoring system in 1994 UNSCOM inspection were verifying the missiles which were under research and development through inspection, the cameras installed at the key sites for 24 hr monitoring, the sites concerned with missile activity including key and supporting sites, monthly status for the produced parts at those sites (parts of the produced missiles).

Moreover, UNSCOM inspectors were always present at the flight test and static tests for the missiles under development to make sure that none is exceeding the permitted range through recording the coordinates for the firing site and falling site, calculating the range accordingly.

The strict monitoring continued at increasing levels until 16 December 1998 when the UNSCOM left Iraq. The sites involved in missile activity were targeted, among other sites, during the aggression which took place on same day. As regards Blair's claim that Iraq has built a new test station for the development of missiles that could reach areas indicated by site (A), they are used for the purpose of Al-Sumud missile within the range allowed by SCR 715 and which followed up by the Special Commission to meet the requirements of engine static tests. The strong technical evidence that could not be called in question is that the station is not for the purposes of engines larger than Al-Sumud engine. It is a station for horizontal testing, that is, it is so designed to embrace the horizontally tested engine. Experts who are well grounded in this field know that this kind of connection can not be used for engines larger than Al-Sumud engine with its known size, and unlike the vertical test stations which can be used for the testing of missile engine of larger sizes. As regard the issue of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) project raised by Blair, it is clear that he does not depend on his intelligence but on information disclosed by Iraq with transparency to the Special Commission in the fulfilment of the requirements of SCR 715 related to the ongoing monitoring.

The aim of this essential project is to maintain the scientific and research activity through the reliance on local capabilities for the purpose of aerial reconnaissance. The UNSCOM had carried out intensive and strict inspection for this project through a specialized inspection team. That process was accompanied by checking all document relating to that project... The team concluded that the purpose of the project was an aerial reconnaissance and had nothing to do with the requirements of SCRs 687 and 715..

As for Al Mamun plant, this plant, like other sites concerned with missile activities, was covered by the ongoing monitoring. Cameras were installed to transmit pictures for 24 hours for several workshops in plant. The (APC) project was declared to UNSCOM since its design stages and was followed up by the Commission in a strict manner up to its departure on 16 December 1998.

The item relative to the previous activity and which were not destroyed during the aerial bombardment of 1991 aggression were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision and were not dismantled as Blair claims. The sever damage done to the equipment has made it impossible for their reconstruction to carry out the manufacturing purposes for which they are made, specially that the solid missile fuel industry requires higher degrees of accuracy.

In addition, Iraq was keen to apply the so called import-export mechanism by providing the necessary notifications about the importation of dual use items that is those contained in the technical annexes of SCR 715 until the departure of UNSCOM on 16 Dec 1998.

Now Tony Blair has released his report, which is full of lies, fabrications and fallacies, it has become quite clear why has the British prime minister turned down Iraq's invitation to send a delegation of British experts whose number, timing of entry into Iraq and the sites to be inspected, may be chosen by him, so that the British media and other international opinion get acquainted themselves with the facts as they really are.

Should Blair had accepted Iraq's offer he could have entangled himself in a big political and procedural trap and then those who wrote the report for him could not promote those lies and fabrications. This also applies to the offer presented by Iraq's National Assembly to the US Congress and the US administration which may fall in it.

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