Global Policy Forum

By Patrick E. Tyler

Six weeks after allied armies ended the war against Iraq, the formal United Nations cease-fire in the Persian Gulf has done little to bring an end to the conflict between the Bush Administration and Saddam Hussein. And it already is clear that it will not end the suffering inside Iraq. As the refugee drama unfolds on the icy mountainsides of Kurdistan and in the southern Iraqi desert where American forces have begun their withdrawal, United States policy has entered a difficult period that was not clearly foreseen or planned for -- a time of daunting human crisis and the tenacious refusal of President Hussein to leave the scene despite defeat on the battlefield and the enmity of much of his population, his neighbors and the allied coalition. In the chaos of the war's aftermath, Administration officials appear to be adjusting their policy on almost a daily basis around three overriding principles: to disengage American military forces as soon as possible from the turmoil in Iraq, to turn over the Kurdish problem to international relief organizations after an initial infusion of American aid, and then to undertake a long-term pressure campaign to drive Mr. Hussein from power. Even as Administration officials were making plans this week to extract themselves from Iraq's internal strife, they were ordering the American military to get more deeply involved by setting up semi-permanent camps in northern Iraq and providing around-the-clock Air Force protection for thousands of Americans who have flown back to the region from Europe for the effort.

Gore Criticizes Bush

The difficulty for President Bush is that before he can extricate himself from Iraq, his postwar policy may become the centerpiece issue at the outset of the 1992 Presidential campaign season. One possible Democratic contender who supported Mr. Bush's decision to go to war, Senator Al Gore of Tennessee, said today that Mr. Bush's handling of the postwar insurrection in Iraq "revives the most bitter memories of humankind's worst moments." While the United States military is getting more involved in northern Iraq, its withdrawal from southern Iraq will be accomplished in a matter of weeks, if not days, as United Nations observers take up their posts. But the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are likely to press for a substantial American presence in the Persian Gulf as long as Mr. Hussein remains in power. Though few American ground forces will remain, the postwar security alliance that will contain Mr. Hussein and control his oil exports could require the continuing deployment of substantial naval forces, including aircraft carriers, and air forces around the Arabian peninsula. They will remain through the hot months of summer to enforce an uneasy peace. In the north, the flight of more than one million Kurds, an exodus that might have been predicted based on Mr. Hussein's campaigns of repression in 1975 and again in 1988, caught the Administration largely unprepared to begin a big, fast relief operation. Mr. Bush seemed to hesitate over the establishment of a de facto Kurdish refugee enclave in northern Iraq as Administration officials engaged in an awkward discussion with their allies about how best to carve out a piece of sovereign Iraq where the Kurds could be organized for the dispensing of humanitarian aid. This had to be done in a way that did not incite the Kurds to think of this zone as the first step toward Kurdish separatism or a Kurdish state.

Threat to Other Nations

For Turkey, Syria and Iran, the creation of any Kurdish entity that could stir the nationalist aspirations of millions of Kurds in the region represents a fundamental threat to stability. The Soviet Union, with its large ethnic minorities, might also feel threatened by creation of a Kurdish enclave. Even without Kurdish separatism, regional stability may be an elusive goal after the war, with Mr. Hussein still rampant on the political scene in Baghdad and, sooner or later, in Middle East leadership councils. Mr. Bush complained Thursday that his "severest critics" before the war -- those who favored sanctions and diplomacy instead of combat -- were now pushing him toward a messy and open-ended military intervention to topple Mr. Hussein by supporting civil war in Iraq. One of those critics, William Quandt, a former Carter Administration aide now at the Brookings Institution, said today, "I see a lot of people reassessing their thinking." That includes Mr. Quandt, who initially agreed with Mr. Bush's decision to end the war on Feb. 27. "I'm inclined to agree that we should have kept going to finish off the Saddam Hussein regime," Mr. Quandt said in an interview, "When we see the mess Iraq is in now, I can't help but think it would have been better." Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, elaborating today on Mr. Bush's sentiments, said that sending the United States military to finish the job violates a number of "basic principles" about setting clear-cut military objectives to support policy goals.

'What Kind of Government?'

"If you're going to go in and try to topple Saddam Husein, you have to go to Baghdad," Mr. Cheney said. "Once you've got Baghdad, it's not clear what you do with it. It's not clear what kind of government you would put in place of the one that's currently there now. Is it going to be a Shia regime, a Sunni regime or a Kurdish regime? Or one that tilts toward the Baathists, or one that tilts toward the Islamic fundementalists? How much credibility is that government going to have if it's set up by the United States military when it's there? How long does the United States military have to stay to protect the people that sign on for that government, and what happens to it once we leave?" A slightly different perspective from that sketched by Mr. Cheney emerged today in remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, who stopped in Geneva on his way back from his Middle East tour. He highlighted his view of the problem, telling reporters in Geneva that "in the medium and longer term" solving the refugee crisis in Iraq would depend on "the creation of conditions" that would lead to a desire on the part of a million or more Kurds to return to their homes. A reporter then asked Mr. Baker, "Isn't that tantamount to calling for a new government in Iraq?" Reflexively, Mr. Baker replied, "No," but then added that "we have said in the past -- many, many times -- and we have no hesitancy in continuing to say that we would not shed any tears" at that outcome.

Moral Questions Cited

The moral questions that influenced Mr. Bush's decision to end the war, when Iraqi divisions were in full flight and were being mauled by allied pilots, are now rising from the postwar anarchy. Anthony Cordesman, a policy analyst, summed up the current situation this way: "The truth of the matter is that this war had to end with one of two consequences: Saddam Hussein's overthrow or the designation of Iraq as a pariah state as long as Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party stay in power." "The action on behalf of the Kurds," he said, "puts even more pressure on the Iraqi Army and the elite to understand that we are talking about a process of being treated as a pariah state for years until Saddam goes." In large measure, Mr. Cordesman said, the already burdened people of Iraq will suffer more. "I think a people does have to pay the cost of the acts of its leadership when the leadership commits acts of war and aggression," he said.

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