Global Policy Forum

By Stephen Zunes*

"And I analyzed a thorough body of intelligence--good, solid, sound intelligence--that led me to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power."We gave the world a chance to do it. Twelve times the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions in recognition of the threat that he posed. And the difference was, is that some were not willing to act on those resolutions. We were--along with a lot of other countries--because he posed a threat."

--President George W. Bush, July 30, 2003

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the intelligence cited by President Bush regarding Iraqi military capabilities in the months leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq was in fact neither good, nor solid, nor sound and that the Iraqi regime--while, like a number of Middle East governments, was undeniably repressive--was not a threat to the United States or any other country.

Perhaps of even greater significance, however, is that the president's statements grossly distort the role of the United Nations and the international community.

First of all, there was nothing in those twelve resolutions that implied that the Iraqi government had to be overthrown. While warning Iraq of "serious consequences" for noncompliance, the resolutions simply demanded that the Iraqi government needed to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related programs, and to have its disarmament verified by UN inspectors.

Secondly, the United Nations was already acting on alleged Iraqi noncompliance with these resolutions by targeting Iraq with the most rigorous international military and economic sanctions and the most invasive inspections regime in world history.

Thirdly, UN Security Council resolution 1441, the most important resolution dealing with Iraq in recent years, declared that only the weapons inspectors--not UN member states--have the authority to report Iraqi violations. The inspectors did not report any violations of serious consequence. Furthermore, the resolution stated that the Security Council "remains seized of the matter," meaning that it alone has the authority to approve the use of force. The 1990 Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq applied only to the enforcement of previous resolutions calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (which were fully met by the end of February 1991), nothing more. The United Nations never authorized the use of force to enforce any subsequent resolutions. According to the UN Charter, of which the United States is a signatory and is therefore bound by its provisions, UN resolutions cannot be enforced militarily without the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council.

Fourthly, the centerpiece of U.S. accusations that Iraq was violating these resolutions was the Bush administration's claims that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and development programs. So far, however, the United States has failed to show any evidence that Iraq actually had any of the proscribed materials or development programs since the mid-1990s. Once the Iraqi government allowed UN inspectors to return in the fall of 2002, one could make the case that Iraq was no longer in violation of these resolutions.

Finally, it is important to remember that there are over ninety UN Security Council resolutions currently being violated by countries other than Iraq, most of which receive U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic support, raising serious questions regarding the Bush administration's actual commitment to the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions.

The distortions do not end here, however. At the same press conference, in response to the failure of UN inspectors and subsequent U.S. occupation forces to find evidence of an ongoing WMD program, President Bush stated that "I'm confident that our search will yield that which I strongly believe, that Saddam had a weapons program. I want to remind you, he actually used his weapons program on his own people at one point in time, which is pretty tangible evidence."

No one, however, questions that Iraq had an active biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons program during the 1980s, the period when Saddam Hussein's regime used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq. This is why the UN Security Council demanded Iraqi disarmament in 1991 under resolution 687. However, there is no evidence that Iraq maintained any weapons of mass destruction or related programs subsequent to the mid-1990s, which is the period in question. Ironically, the United States quietly supported Saddam Hussein's regime during this earlier period when the regime actually had active WMD programs.

President Bush concluded by stating that "I'm confident history will prove the decision we made to be the right decision." That may only be possible however, if he continues to distort history and a compliant news media allows him to get away with it.

About the Author: Stephen Zunes ( This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ) is Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project and serves as an associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (available online at www.commoncouragepress.com).

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