Global Policy Forum

By Erich Marquardt

In the 16th century, the territory that now forms modern-day Iraq was forcefully overrun by the Ottoman Turks and came under direct Ottoman administration in the 19th century when it was organized into three provinces: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire fell to British forces and these three Turkish provinces were placed under British control. In 1921, Britain transformed the provinces into a new Iraqi kingdom, headed by King Faisal I. This British decision is one of the most hotly debated issues today, as much attention is being drawn to the animosity held between Iraq's Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shi'a Arabs.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist establishment, many of the ethnic differences in Iraq became accentuated, especially since Washington blamed much of the violence and instability on the country's Sunni Arab population, mainly residing in central Iraq, or what used to be the Turkish province of Baghdad. The difficulty in containing this area of Iraq has fueled the debate on the proposed solution of dividing Iraq into three separate states, oriented in the north, center and south of the country. This solution, dubbed the "Three State Solution," has as its main goal the opportunity to isolate the violence-plagued Baghdad region and spend time and money on rebuilding the relatively stable Basra and Mosul areas of Iraq.

On the face of it, this solution looks practical. Since Iraq's diverse population does not fit the characteristics of a modern day nation-state, there is certainly some credibility in the argument of breaking apart Iraq into three separate nation-states, rather than one massive piece of territory made up of diverse ethnic groups, as Iraq is today.

Yet, after undertaking a deeper analysis, dividing Iraq into three separate states would not bring stability to the region. For one, the Iraqi population is not completely divided by ethnicity; indeed, most of Iraq's former leaders have been nationalists, emphasizing the country's national Iraqi heritage, rather than focusing on their religious differences. Furthermore, the division of Iraq would cause a massive clash of interests between the country's neighboring states.

Iraqi Nationalism

From its creation, Iraq has long been a nationalistic country. After the British took control of Iraq from the Ottoman Turks, London was quickly forced to squash its first nationalist uprising, in 1920. After putting down the revolt, the British hurried the creation of the new Iraqi state, giving control to their handpicked leader, King Faisal I.

Faisal's history, compounded with his pro-British policies, never resonated with the nationalist elements of the Iraqi population. After the end of WWI, Faisal hoped to be king over all the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire; instead, he was proclaimed the king of Syria in 1920, but was quickly removed from power by the French, who held a mandate over Damascus. Available to rule again, the British placed him on the throne in Iraq in 1921.

In the coming decades, a series of nationalist coups would plague Iraq. Throughout this time period, up until the U.S. invasion of 2003, the ethnic differences inside the Iraqi population were somewhat superseded by their national heritage. Various Iraqi leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, stressed pan-Arabism, and attempted to unite the Sunni and Shi'a Arab populations in Iraq with this common future. At the same time, any individuals who attempted to stress division would be quickly subdued through violence.

Nevertheless, despite this marginal unity, the one ethnicity that did not always follow this trend was Iraq's Kurdish population. At the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds, populated in the region of southern Turkey, eastern Syria, northern Iraq and western Iran, found their people divided by four national boundaries. The Kurds of southern Turkey and northern Iraq never truly assimilated into their respective national populations, which resulted in a series of Kurdish revolts. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire with the Treaty of Sí¨vres, an independent Kurdish state was to be established. Instead, in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was passed, superseding Sí¨vres. Lausanne ignored the Kurdish issue, leading to rebellion among the Kurds in southern Turkey; this rebellion was brutally crushed by the Turks through the reported use of aerial bombings and poison gas.

The Kurds of Iraq also rebelled, especially in the 1960s when Mustafa al-Barzani led a pack of Kurdish tribes in a revolt against Baghdad. In 1975, with the support of Iran, the Kurds tried to free themselves from Iraqi control and establish autonomy. This attempt, like the others, failed when Baghdad refused to accept their demands and when their former allies, the Iranians, withdrew their support and instead began assassinating Kurdish leaders in the hopes of weakening the Kurdish nationalist movement.

The Kurdish push for independence has continued till this day, and has gained momentum since the fall of Saddam. Iraqi Kurds, protected since the Gulf War by U.S. patrolled "No Fly Zones," have been largely governing their own affairs for the past decade. Now, with the power vacuum still plaguing Baghdad, their opportunity for autonomy has been greatly improved.

It is this same power vacuum that risks the danger of forming ethnic fissures in Iraq between the country's Sunni and Shi'a Arab populations. While since the creation of the Iraqi state these two different ethnic groups have been somewhat integrated into the Iraqi national culture, since the fall of Saddam this culture has been deteriorating, leading Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a Arab populations to resonate more with their separate religions, rather than with their nationality.

Regional Instability

Additionally, if Iraq were divided into three states, it would spark regional instability, as Iraq's neighbors would vie for control over the three new Iraqi states. Since its creation, Iraq's unity and power prevented its five strong surrounding states -- Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran -- from breaking down into serious hostilities. Other than the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s -- which, at its conclusion, did little to change the balance of power in the region -- Iraq's five neighboring countries have been squashed together in stability. A divided Iraq would remove this power obstacle and create conditions of lasting conflict.

A weak Iraq would offer no significant resistance to interventions from strong neighboring powers, an outcome likely to happen due to the country's massive quantity of oil reserves. In addition to economic reasons, surrounding states would also intervene in Iraq due to security issues -- specifically, Turkey and Iran.

Turkey has been combating its Kurdish population for decades, using harsh tactics to prevent independent Kurdish statehood. Ankara fears that if Kurds in northern Iraq achieve statehood or autonomy, it will incite its own Kurdish population to revolt and attempt to cede off territories of southern Turkey to join the new Kurdish state. If Iraq were separated into three states, then this outcome would come to fruition, with the northern Iraqi state being a Kurdish state.

If southern Iraq were turned into a Shi'a state, Iran could easily become heavily involved in its affairs. Since both states would theoretically share a special religious affinity, Iran's relations with the new Iraqi southern state would likely be positive.

Washington's Response

Washington would likely oppose both of these outcomes. Involvement by Turkey in northern Iraq would be sure to lead to intense hostilities between Kurdish militants and the Turkish military. This kind of open-ended conflict would add instability to the oil supply in northern Iraq as long as Kurdish militants reject Turkish rule.

Iranian unity with southern Iraq would also work contrary to U.S. interests since it would increase Tehran's bargaining power with its neighbors and the United States. Indeed, this explains why for part of the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. supported Baghdad, and why Washington tacitly approved of Saddam's act of quelling the Shi'a uprising following the Gulf War. Like northern Iraq, southern Iraq contains large oil fields; if these fields were to fall into Iranian hands, it would greatly improve Tehran's foreign policy leverage and bargaining power.

Finally, the division of Iraq into three separate states fails to take into account what to do with central Iraq. Central Iraq has always been short of resources, which explains why successive Iraqi governments have redistributed wealth earned from the oil fields in northern and southern Iraq to the center of Iraq. Deprived of these resources, central Iraq would be an economically poor and militarily weak state that would be easily manipulated by its neighbors.

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