Global Policy Forum

By Erich Marquardt

The capture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on December 13 offered a glimmer of hope for the U.S.-led coalition that the insurgency against their occupation would soon begin to crumble and possibly even spontaneously implode. Now, three weeks later, it is clear that the insurgency is plowing ahead, apparently unaffected by the capture of Iraq's former strongman.

Insurgents continued their attacks only hours after the capture of Saddam, unleashing a powerful car bomb outside an Iraqi police station in Khaldiyah, killing more than 15 people and wounding some 30 more. The next day, two almost simultaneous car bombs exploded outside two Iraqi police stations, one north of Baghdad and the other in the western Baghdad district of Ameriyah.

On December 24, a car bomb exploded outside the gates of the Interior Ministry in the Kurdish city of Arbil in northern Iraq; the explosion killed four people and wounded more than 20. On December 25, insurgents launched rockets at the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel in central Baghdad, close to coalition military headquarters; though at least two rockets smashed into the hotel, there were no major casualties from this guerrilla strike.

On December 27, insurgents struck three separate targets in the city of Karbala, killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army engineers, six civilians, and wounding dozens more troops and civilians. Then, most ominously, on December 31 a car bomb ripped through a restaurant in the center of Baghdad killing at least a handful of people who were celebrating the coming of the new year. The restaurant was popular among Westerners, and the attack marked the first time that insurgents were willing to attack a purely civilian target.

In addition to the aforementioned major attacks, troops from the U.S.-led coalition have been coming under constant fire while undertaking their duties in Iraq. Therefore, these separate attacks indicate that insurgents still retain the operational capability to launch coordinated attacks against U.S. forces, troops from countries part of the U.S.-led coalition, and civilian targets.

The occupation of Iraq seems to be entering yet another critical phase. While Saddam Hussein has been captured, this result does not affect key issues of transition that Iraq must at some point address. For example, the Bush administration hoped to train some 40,000 soldiers by next October for use in Iraq's new light infantry battalions. Yet half of the initial recruits have already deserted, citing lack of adequate pay and fear of reprisals from insurgents. This, in turn, is linked to the amount of attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, as there will be a less developed indigenous security and military apparatus to gradually replace coalition members.

Because of this, the administration has tried a new hard-line approach in Iraq, launching Operation Iron Hammer. While the new approach brought immediate results, the insurgency soon learned to adapt and slightly altered their tactics as coalition casualties continued unabated.

Various American politicians have come out criticizing the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, including former Central Command chief General Anthony Zinni, who was involved in overseeing the enforcement of the two no-fly zones in Iraq, in addition to being a part of the Clinton administration's campaign of air strikes against the desert country in 1998.

Zinni, who also served as the Bush administration's special envoy to the Middle East, was recently quoted as saying, "Iraq is in serious danger of coming apart because of lack of planning, underestimating the task and buying into a flawed strategy." Zinni continued, "The longer we stubbornly resist admitting the mistakes and not altering our approach, the harder it will be to pull this chestnut out of the fire." When questioned on the capture of Saddam, Zinni argued, "I believe the only way (U.S. involvement in Iraq) will work now is for the Iraqis themselves to somehow take charge and turn things around. Our policy, strategy, tactics, etc., are still screwed up."

The danger for the Bush administration is the potential for the capture of Saddam Hussein to turn sour. Immediately following the announcement of Saddam's capture, many felt that it was a turning point in the conflict and even in the "war on terrorism." But as time goes by, and the longer that conditions in Iraq stay the same, the better the chances that Saddam's capture will become a liability for the U.S. leadership, demonstrating just how little impact Saddam was having on the happenings and mood in post-Ba'athist Iraq.

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.