Global Policy Forum

By Faleh A. Jabar

Now that the United States and Iraq seem set on a collision course, the fate of the Ba'athist regime will be determined by how well the Iraqi army performs. The conventional US wisdom is that Iraq's regular army will readily lay down its arms, but the Republican Guard may put up a fierce fight. US experts say the Guard is better motivated, equipped and paid than regular units, and so more loyal and willing to fight. But it is misleading to compare the elite Guard with the regular army; this reduces the causes of cohesion or disintegration to important, but too general, military factors. It ignores the complex nature of politics and war, especially of this next war.

We need to recall the Ba'ath party's history. When its leaders returned to power in 1968, they were traumatised by a decade of military rule, incessantly threatened by coups and a disunited officer corps. The Eighth Ba'ath Party Congress of 1974 set two goals: to subsume the army under the party's control, purging its ranks of "suspicious, conspiratorial and adventurous elements", and fully indoctrinating its members - the army would be Ba'athised: and to restructure, modernise and expand the army. Ba'athisation of the army was necessary but insufficient. A far stronger guarantee of loyalty was added by incorporating kinship and clan groupings into the army. A dual system emerged: the party controlled the military; the clan controlled the party. The party provided the mass manpower for surveillance and control; the clan provided bonds of trust. Besides the general chief of staff, three other centres of control were created: the party's military bureau, the National Security Bureau (in charge of intelligence) and informal kinship networks.

This overlapping structure has given President Saddam Hussein a freer hand in supervision, control and management. The arrangement enables him to bypass the vertical chain of command and control any area of the military directly. During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88) there were complaints about this control from the military: this personalisation of control mechanisms serves the regime's security, but it is a handicap to operational capability in modern war.

The army already had a dual structure - regular and Republican - under the previous rule of the 'Arif brothers (1963-68). The Ba'ath regime maintained this dual structure, but developed the Republican Guard into a fully-fledged corps, then further expanded it to an army of two corps. The regime consciously dissociated national defence, in the hands of the army, from internal security, the domain of the Guard, even though the Guard played an active part in the war with Iran and the Gulf war.

This reconstruction led to a radical change in the social origins of the senior military commanders. The political role of the officer corps gradually declined and the army returned to barracks. The first Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which took power in 1968 and became Iraq's supreme ruling body, was entirely formed by the military. But by the time the second RCC was formed in 1971, only five of its 15 members were officers. When Saddam took over in 1979, there was not a single officer left on the RCC. In the words of the historian Majid Khadduri, "the Ba'ath was the first regime to bring the army under civilian control".

There has also been a gigantic increase in size. As the soldier-politician era ended, the era of the colossal army began. In just over a decade, the armed forces grew tenfold, from 50,000 in 1968 to 430,000 in 1980. Their ratio to the population rose from six per 1,000 to 31 per 1,000. This rapid growth showed the regime's stability and also its grand regional designs.

The Iraq-Iran war brought the nation, the military included, turmoil and change. Oil wealth, world and regional support, popular patriotism and official nationalism sustained the Iraqi war effort. The army grew to roughly a million, excluding the paramilitary organisations of the party militia (the Popular Army) or the 150,000 of the Kurdish tribal mercenary units, the Battalions of National Defence.

The war depleted Iraq's resources and plunged it into huge debts. The country became a military giant but an economic dwarf. War fatigue, economic hardships, and social dislocation caused by the regime's policies brought the war generation to the brink of rebellion. Party and kinship networks, once dense, grew thin. And the army risked turning into an uncontrollable Leviathan.

From 1988-90 cracks appeared in the former union of popular and official nationalism. The biggest dilemma was how to feed the million men in uniform or finance their dignified return to civilian life. Hailed as Saddam's heroes, they were feared by the ruling elite for their wild, insubordinate behaviour. The high military command were divided: some feared that angry, hungry, demobilised soldiers would disrupt civilian life causing crime and disorder; others feared the army would implode if kept under arms for any length of time. There was a desperate need for extra financial resources. Political reforms to ease tensions were also discussed. The invasion of Kuwait, a remedy of sorts, spectacularly backfired. The humiliating defeat and heavy losses turned the misadventure into a catalyst for disintegration and mutiny. The 1991 uprising, in which sections of the military were key players, ignited its first sparks, marked the first partial disintegration of the army.

THE DEFEAT LAST TIME

The Gulf war revealed three major but contradictory trends in the army: mutiny, capitulation and cohesion. These already existed. Desertion was already a problem before 1990. But during the ground war in February 1991, soldiers voted with their feet. Few units in the Kuwaiti theatre put up much of a fight, and 70,000 surrendered during the first day of fighting. After the ceasefire the levels of mutiny and desertion in the southern theatre led to total disintegration. In the northern sector, some 150,000 soldiers of the military units, laid down their arms, determined neither to rebel nor defend the regime. In the middle sector centring on Baghdad, there was far more cohesion and loyalty.

How can these differences be explained? First, there was a strong and generalised sense of apathy toward the Kuwait war, as the soldiers called it. There was still great war fatigue from the Iraq-Iran war. This destroyed the old union between official and popular nationalisms. Heavy casualties, poor logistics, meagre provisions, operational mismanagement, defeat and, finally, a disorganised withdrawal augmented the bitterness among the units stationed in the south. Party commissars and loyal kinship networks were sparsely represented in the units sent to the south and those left in Kuwait. The grip of the party and the clan over the army was weak.

Paradoxically, the devastating Allied coalition air campaign, which had initially triggered an angry reaction by the soldiers in the south, ultimately wiped out most of them. The Bush senior administration had decided in 1990 not to destroy the Iraqi army completely but to leave it enough power to balance that of Iran. With this quantitative approach the US failed to destroy the troops that were loyal to Saddam but wiped out the rebellious units instead, inadvertently helping Saddam Hussein deal with the threat from his routed army in the south. Soon after they withdrew, the scattered, disorganised units revolted. The first sign of the uprising was a retreating tank that fired at a colossal wall poster of Saddam when it reached Basra's city centre.

In the north there were mutinies both by the mustasharin, the leaders of the paramilitary Kurdish tribal battalions put in place by the regime in the 1980s, and the mobilised urban population. Sensing defeat and isolation, the military units in the northern sector took the bold step of surrendering to the Kurds. A task force of 150,000 soldiers and officers deserted their positions. The sight of thousands of unarmed men in uniform roaming the streets of Erbil, Suleimaniya and Duhuk was astounding. Kurdish families felt sympathy for these disillusioned soldiers and gave them food and money. Their commanders explained their position: Saddam's policies had wreaked havoc on the nation and humiliated the army.

But they had no sense of direction. They had been bold enough to defy military discipline but were too timid to march on Baghdad. In their hesitation, they deliberately rendered their weapons non-operational. Even in the south, the military insurrection was one of desperation rather than a movement with clearly defined political aims. The extent to which the military had been depoliticised was clear in both north and south.

The third segment of the army, in the middle sector, showed consistency and allegiance. Mainly composed of Republican Guard units, like the Madina and Hamourabi divisions, they became the regime's major strike force. They had been kept in reserve to launch a counter attack which never came. Unscathed, these divisions ultimately saved the regime. The section of the armed forces left intact by the first Bush administration for Iraq's national defence carried out their domestic security tasks almost to perfection.

There are many factors behind this cohesion: the high density of kinship and party networks in the Guard, compared to the main army; their sense of collective threat. This helped keep morale high and lent a sense of purpose to the government's campaign to prevent revolt. These high spirits were further enhanced by the relative safety of the Guard's positions during the war.

From 1991 on, the Iraqi regime restructured to put its ruling house and governmental institutions in order, reorganising the ruling household, which was beginning to show signs of disunity; arranging a smooth succession; forcing the re-tribalisation of society; and reorganising the military. Between 1968 and 1990 there had been four defence ministers. Between 1991 and 1996, there were four reshuffles of the defence portfolio. The president had always kept the ministry in the hands of the al-Majid clan. But in 1996 he opted for a veteran from the younger generation to satisfy the wider military establishment and tackle the problem of low morale. The present defence minister, Thabit Sultan, was the result of this, chosen to replace the notorious Ali Hassan al-Majid.

The most far-reaching change was the reduction in personnel. The armed forces were cut by a third (from 1m to 350,000). Armament was reduced to half its pre-1991 level. With the exception of air defence systems, there has been almost no improvement in military hardware. Downsizing helped the regime create an economically sustainable institution and raise the density of the kinship groups, which had become dangerously stretched in the pre-war army of a million men. The divide between the regular army and the elite formations was also enhanced. Numerically the Republican Guard matches the regular army in armed and mechanised divisions, lagging behind only in infantry divisions.

The forces are now organised in four integrated layers: the Special Republican Guard units, a fully-fledged corps with three divisions (other estimates put it at eight brigades); the Republican Guard, which includes three armoured divisions, two mechanised divisions and two infantry divisions; the regular army of four armoured divisions, three mechanised divisions and 15 infantry divisions; and a layer of armed tribal units, in charge of quelling civilian disorder, which may use considerable force in street combat. The density of Saddam's tribal kin among high and medium officer corps ranges from 35% to 85%, a formidable factor of cohesion.

The looming war is different from 1991 in political objectives, operational drive and battlefield zones. Politics will play a much larger part in shaping the attitude of the Iraqi military. As the US openly seeks regime change, it will require operations, direct or by proxy, to take the seat of power, Baghdad. If key Iraqi units are not won over or a coup successfully encouraged, the main objective will not be attainable except by full-scale invasion and occupation. The euphoria over the swift success in Afghanistan is misleading. Afghanistan does not prove the viability of enforced regime change in Iraq, rather the reverse. Breaking the unity of the ruling clan-class may prove very difficult. There is at present no sign that the coherence of the ruling elite has been targeted.

THE PLAN NEXT TIME

The regime in Baghdad is faced with two seemingly insurmountable problems. The nature of the conflict is quite different from 1990; it is now a war for survival, and the ruling class is painfully aware of the gulf between official nationalism and popular patriotism. There is also a grim awareness that the Iraqi army is no match for the US or a coalition of armies.

What can Baghdad do? It has tried to manipulate and accentuate the sense of collective threat posed by the US to all the ruling elite: the indiscriminate threat of elimination may unite them in a drive to fight to the end. This sense of collective vulnerability has been reinforced by the undifferentiated presentation of the objectives of the US campaign. To offset the inherent weakness of official nationalism, the regime has mobilised popular and institutional religion, both anti-Shi'ite communalism, and Shi'ite religious rulings (fatwa) against the Shi'ite opposition. This is new.

Baghdad is also trying to fortify the cities as the best fighting locations. This may increase civilian casualties, slow down or limit US operations, offset the weakness of the Iraq army, and help achieve the regime's intent to inflict as many US casualties as possible. There is a careful plan, too, to use the international media to pressure the attacking forces to stop short of Baghdad. In the desert there are few opportunities for sensational press stories. In the 1991 Gulf war, the coalition forces controlled the media. Now Iraq seems bent on reversing that and 10 media stations have been installed underground.

To ensure continuity, a bipolar system of political leadership has been created: Saddam and Qusay, his son, as the actual and reserve presidents. A third centre of power is also possible though it has not been announced: the commander of the Republican Army, General Kamal Mustafa. To stem any potential mutiny by the public, military commanders have replaced civilian governors across Iraq. Loyal tribal forces are also to be deployed in urban centres. These and other measures may reflect the extent to which the ruling elite is aware of its own weaknesses and of the limitations of the coalition camp.

Based on the 1991 experience, the military on both sides of the internal divide (mainstream army versus the Republican Guard) may fight, rebel or disintegrate. But these actions will differ in time and geography. The politics surrounding a possible coup are even more complicated. Compared to 1958, the military is today highly depoliticised. Then 10% of the armed forces took part in the coup while at least 80% were neutralised by the swift takeover. In present conditions, at least a fully-fledged corps (three or four armed divisions) would be required, provided that three other corps are politically neutralised. Without the co-operation of a considerable segment of the Beijat clan, that is unthinkable.

Whether or not the politics of the coalition campaign will succeed in attracting part of the ruling tribal alliance to their side is open to question. If a military coup fails, the possibilities of scattered, chaotic mutinies and the potential for a civil war will increase. In all cases, civilian loss will be dramatic, the tempo of the war will be slow and the rise of uncontrollable forces will defy our worst imaginings.

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