Global Policy Forum

By Robin Wright

The Bush administration has outlined two strikingly different plans to run oil-rich but volatile Iraq if President Saddam Hussein's regime is toppled, according to U.S. officials. One plan is a go-it-alone strategy that would force the United States to remain longer in Iraq to ensure that its stated goals of disarmament and democracy are fulfilled. While that plan would give Washington more control over what happens, it would almost certainly cost far more and make a larger U.S. military and diplomatic presence more vulnerable to backlash.

The other plan would share the burden of rebuilding Iraq, from purging police and army units to helping write a new constitution. Under the second plan, the United States would transfer much of the authority and other responsibilities to the international community after an initial U.S.-run administration lasting as briefly as three or four months. Washington has no model in mind, the sources said, although the possibilities include the type of arrangements in the ongoing political transitions in Kosovo and East Timor.

The administration strongly prefers the international burden-sharing option. In a speech Wednesday outlining the broader stakes in dealing with Iraq, President Bush said, "Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations." There are still so many unknowns that the administration is unsure which strategy is more likely to be used, although most planners have a strong preference for a major international component. But that may prove unattainable, especially if the war becomes particularly messy or protracted and other countries are loath to get involved in a post-invasion Iraq.

The United States is in the early stages of probing world interest. During his weekend swing through Asia, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell approached Japan about contributing to postwar reconstruction and told reporters that the Japanese response had been positive. The administration has held similar discussions with other nations, hoping to defray the steep costs.

But the scope of international involvement — and what countries might be included — could be heavily influenced by the outcome of a proposed U.N. resolution that would back the use of force to disarm Baghdad, U.S. officials say.

If the resolution passes when it comes up for a vote in mid-March, then virtually any country willing to provide financial, humanitarian, reconstruction, technical or political assistance is likely to be welcomed, U.S. officials suggested Thursday. But if the resolution is vetoed or doesn't win the required nine votes for passage, then the international involvement could well be at least initially limited to the countries that become part of the so-called "coalition of the willing" to back the United States in forcibly disarming Iraq.

"There will be a variety of different missions for different nations" in that coalition, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Thursday. Some administration officials have argued that any country wanting to participate in the potentially lucrative reconstruction process, notably oil sector development, should back the United States on the use of force to oust Hussein — in effect using postwar perks as either a financial incentive or political blackmail to win eventual backing.

But many officials, particularly in the State Department, intelligence community and the U.S. military, argue that the United States should welcome a wide international role even from countries that did not support Washington, both for the sake of Iraq and to ease the American burden. "Regardless of the war, other nations will want a seat at the table when it comes time to rebuild. We might even have more leverage after the dirty work is done to point out that we should set aside differences about how we got there and look at the constructive goals we then all share," a State Department official said.

The two postwar plans differ mainly in the number of stages of the process: In the first, two-stage scenario, the U.S. would be entirely responsible for orchestrating the transformation of Iraq. In the other, three-stage scenario, Washington would run the immediate postwar transition until an international arrangement takes over the longer process of overhauling Iraq. The final stage in both plans is the restoration of Iraqi rule. The go-it-alone strategy, which envisions a prolonged first stage run by a U.S. civilian administrator — probably backed by hundreds of thousands of American troops to provide security and to keep Iraq's rival ethnic, religious and tribal factions from destabilizing the country — would be significantly more difficult, U.S. planners say. "There's going to be greater domestic and international pressure to ensure we've achieved our objectives," the State Department official said. "And we'll be the only ones there if it fails."

The list of U.S. objectives is long, and achieving each will be a time-consuming process:

• Tracking down any hidden nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and destroying them, followed by setting up verification and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that Baghdad remains disarmed.

• Stabilizing assorted humanitarian crises after a war and a dozen years of an international economic embargo.

• Unraveling any links the Baghdad regime may have to terrorism and dismantling the infrastructure.

• Reconstructing Iraq after the war and rebuilding the long-troubled oil sector to generate new income.

Added to these urgent needs will be the herculean task of the country's political transformation, from purging Iraqi institutions of key officials from the ruling Arab Baath Socialist Party and organizing a judicial process for war crimes to building democracy from the bottom up and holding local and national elections for new leadership.

"Each one of these is a very tall order," the official added. "And if it's just us, or mainly us, running this, then there will be a widespread expectation that all these things will not only have to be headed in the right direction but actually have to be achieved before we will be in a position to leave. We'll have to be there for a long time to ensure that nothing goes off track." But even as it lays plans, the administration is fretting about the time frame for U.S. involvement, notably the danger a stay of more than a few months could make the United States a target of international political criticism or attacks from disgruntled Iraqis or Middle East extremists.

In recent weeks, Bush and other top officials have pointedly repeated a pledge to stay in Iraq only as long as necessary, and not a day longer. "If we're the only sheriff in town, there's a real danger that any resentment — for any reason — will be taken out on us," said a well-placed U.S. official who requested anonymity.

In stark contrast, the second plan allows a more flexible and less costly process if the full international community is involved. Not only would Iraq receive greater attention, but more parties would be likely to have a stake in achieving a common goal. The length of the war, if it comes to that, is one of the wild cards. The shorter and neater a war is, the more latitude and time the U.S. may have to organize the immediate postwar period without facing backlash, U.S. officials say. That is a scenario that is also more likely to trigger international interest in participating, U.S. officials say.

But if the war is messy and lasts longer, with high civilian casualties and widespread destruction, Washington is likely to have a "smaller political space" and a shorter time span "before the lid comes off" — and discourages any other nation from wanting to be associated with the Iraq war aftermath, said the well-placed source.

The decision about which of the two broad alternatives ends up as the model for postwar Iraq may well wait until just that moment, U.S. officials predict. "An awful lot can happen," the well-placed source said, "between now and then."

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