Global Policy Forum

By Ali Ezzatyar*

As the August 15 deadline for a draft constitution approaches, Iraq's Kurds are locked in an uneasy power struggle with the Shiite majority that could be the precursor to a Kurdish falling out with the Iraqi political process. The influence of the United States over the constitutional drafting process, which has been considerable, despite American and Iraqi government rhetoric suggesting the contrary, has thus far been unfavorable to the Kurds. One of the chief demands of Kurdish negotiators has been that there should be regional rather than national control over natural resources. This would give Kurds authority over oil-rich Kirkuk, the so-called "heart" of Kurdistan. This is seen as essential by the Kurds, mainly because of their unwillingness to be beholden again to the Iraqi central government for funds. Kurdish supremacy in Kirkuk is also an essential contingency in case Iraq's current instability worsens.

The Americans, on the other hand, are worried that integrating acceptance of regional control over resources into the constitution will encourage those who want to secede in the north, and those who want to ally themselves with Iran in the south. Iran-leaning Iraqi Shiites, like the Sunni Arabs, continue to be unfavorably disposed to American influence over the Iraqi political process, while the U.S. fears that allowing some form of regional autonomy in the south will be to its disadvantage as it seeks to turn Iraq into a stable source of oil.

While the U.S. has made its preference clear on oil-related issues, it has also, much to the dismay of the Kurds, decided to steer clear of other social and political complexities that could plague the nascent Iraqi constitution. Both Kurds and non-Shiite Arabs are alarmed by the supposed desire of the majority to include Iranian-style Islamic features in the constitution. There has even been talk of including a (mostly ceremonial) post of "supreme guide," an idea which makes Iraq's non-Shiites cringe. While it is debatable whether or not the Kurds genuinely have a problem with an Islamic civil code, they do have more difficulties with the use of Islam in the constitution than do the other parties, and this puts them at a disadvantage.

The Kurds have also put forth highly controversial demands. Many of these can be interpreted as part of a Kurdish bargaining technique to secure things such as veto power over legislation. The Kurds, for example, have suggested that they be entitled to a regional referendum in eight years' time to determine whether or not they approve of independence. While this is unlikely to be allowed by any Iraqi government, even if it is written into the constitution, it would be a justification for Kurdish independence down the road if things turned sour in the rest of the country. Understandably, the "I" word is not being taken well by the other parties at the table, who are already suspicious of Kurdish intentions.

The current negotiations are tough and complicated, and the Kurds are also the only ones who seem to be going at them alone. Kurdish leaders were the most ardent Iraqi supporters of the U.S. invasion, and Kurdistan is still the only part of Iraq considered safe for American troops. The Kurds put their Peshmerga militia at the service of the U.S. to secure a number of key areas near the north, and almost everyone suspects that the Kurds were the real captors of Saddam Hussein, at least in terms of providing the intelligence that led to his discovery.

Yet despite all of this, the U.S. is concerned about the image a strong U.S.-Kurdish alliance sends to the Arab world, and has failed to provide rewards for Kurdish cooperation. Complicating the issue further is the fact that Turkey remains very uneasy with Kurdish moves.

The Sunni Arabs on the other hand - many of whose active representatives today were once aligned with Baath - have been courted incessantly by the U.S. Their very place in the Iraqi constitutional drafting process is a direct result of this American desire to be accommodating: the parties at the table, at the firm request of the Bush administration, were asked to ignore the fact that very few Sunni Arabs turned out to vote in the Iraqi elections, hence ensuring far fewer representatives in the constitutional negotiations.

The Americans have also sought to appease the majority Shiites. However, conspicuously less talk is heard about the integral advisory role that Iran is playing in support of the Iraqi Shiites. Tehran has behaved as a sophisticated big brother to the Shiites, and seeks to ultimately ensure that the community gets all that the constitutional drafting process can offer them.

In all likelihood, the Kurds will be the party forced to settle for less. Their minimal package of demands does not square with the maximal concessions the other Iraqi communities are willing to offer. The constitution itself will be drafted shortly, but its repercussions will be more evident in about a year's time, when the Kurds will have had time to work within a structure they find problematic. A Kurdish backlash, requesting revisions to the constitution or something more serious, will be very likely then.

About the Author: Ali Ezzatyar is a doctoral candidate in law at the University of California, Berkeley. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star.