Global Policy Forum

By Menzies Campbell

Just what was the intelligence that led us into conflict? Only an independent judicial inquiry can get answers, argues Menzies Campbell

The parallel inquiries of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee have inevitably assumed a higher profile against the backdrop of continuing unrest and violence in Iraq. But is their scrutiny enough to assuage concerns over why Britain went to war with Iraq? Will they be enough to rebuild the fractured trust between the Government and so many of the British people?

There are rumours that the Foreign Affairs Committee may split along party lines on the issues which have engaged Alastair Campbell and the BBC. If it does so, it will inevitably undermine the effectiveness of its report and its conclusions but the whole process of scrutiny will be even more damaged if the committee has allowed itself to be diverted from its proper task.

Long before the publication of the September document, members of the intelligence services were letting it be known to friendly journalists of their discomfort about the way in which they believed their product was being handled by the Government. Intelligence is rarely unequivocal. It comes with qualifications and health warnings. It is not the stuff of soundbites. Its value depends on the patterns which it creates and the way in which it is analysed and interpreted.

The Government now admits that its February document was a mistake, a 'Horlicks' in the Foreign Secretary's dismissive description. But this was no mere error of process to be easily explained away. It was an issue of substance at a time when military action to some at least had become inevitable. It was influential. It was designed to be influential. Why else was it published?

The Government has held up its hands in surrender but the Foreign Affairs Committee should be slow to accept its plea in mitigation. It was not at the time a matter of life and death but the actions which followed it rapidly became so. The Prime Minister relied upon it in the House of Commons. Any division of opinion or complacency by the Foreign Affairs Committee on this matter would be inexplicable.

The real question about the 45-minute claim in the September document is not when or by whom it was inserted but rather was it true? Ministers are being disingenuous in downplaying the 45 minutes as unimportant. It was for example clearly relevant to the claim that United Kingdom forces in Cyprus might be at risk from Saddam's chemical or biological weapons which Ministers made at the time. It was part of a tapestry of information designed to demonstrate that containment and deterrent were no longer enough. It went right to the heart of the Government's case that urgency with dealing with Saddam Hussein was essential.

If the Foreign Affairs Committee has not had access to all the material from which this detailed assertion of a 45-minute deployment was derived it will have been prevented from making an informed judgment. If it has not been given unfettered access to material in general, it is hard to see how it can have come to any realistic answer to the central question of whether the intelligence justified the war.

Some are now pinning their hopes on the Intelligence and Security Committee, whose annual report was debated in the Commons on Thursday. Collectively and individually its members enjoy higher security clearance than anyone else. They have not been slow to criticise the Government over the quality of Foreign Office warnings before the explosion in Bali. Their individual independence is not in doubt. But they are constrained in what they can publish by having to submit their report to Number 10 for approval.

The Intelligence and Security Committee is perfectly capable of normal scrutiny of the security services. But these are not normal times. Going to war is not normal. Going to war on controversial intelligence is not normal. More than a million people from all political parties and from none on the streets of London was not normal.

What is needed of the inquiry answerable not to Parliament and the Prime Minister but to the public, an inquiry which has unfettered access, an inquiry which will concentrate on sources - not those of Mr Andrew Gilligan but the sources which persuaded Mr Blair and his Government that war against Iraq was not only 'the right thing to do' but the only thing to do - an inquiry headed by a senior member of the judiciary and independent of politics and politicians, is the best way to resolve what are rapidly becoming issues of trust.

It looks as if we are in for a long haul in Iraq. There will be costs to be met in both financial and human terms for years to come. Shouldn't we know whether the decision to become so deeply engaged was justified?

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.