November 14th, 1998
When diplomacy is exhausted, force is all that is left
IS HISTORY about to repeat itself, with tragic consequences, in Iraq? After more than seven years of cunningly exploiting the ceasefire that ended the Gulf war-and the growing divisions in the UN Security Council - Saddam Hussein looks set to snatch another military defeat from the jaws of what looked like a diplomatic victory in his battle over UN weapons inspections in Iraq. Defiantly ending all co-operation with Unscom, the special commission whose job it is to strip Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and the means of making or delivering them, Mr Hussein has thrown down his biggest challenge yet to the council. But patience with him, even among his erstwhile supporters, is all but exhausted.Despite his promises to disarm, Mr Hussein never really accepted that, having lost the battle over his occupation of Kuwait, he had also lost the right to hang on to his weapons of mass destruction. indeed, over the past year he has used the weariness in the Security Council, and the growing desire of Russia, France and China for an end to economic sanctions and a return to oil-business-as-usual, to wriggle slowly but surely out of the weapons hand-cuffs that Unscom's inspections had clamped on him. Yet his latest defiance has now united the Security Council against him.
So is diplomacy, backed by Unscom's inspections, now a spent force? And if so, would force itself be able to contain the threat that iraq's hidden chemical and biological weapons still pose to the outside world?Certainly diplomacy, Unscom-style, has achieved a lot. Tonnes of weapon-ready chemicals and thousands of gallons of deadly germ agents have been found and destroyed. So have the means to make them, and dozens of missiles and thousands of shells to carry them. Iraq's nuclear schemes have been dismantled by the international Atomic Energy Agency. Yet the job is unfinished, thanks to Mr Hussein's obstruction, evasion, threats and lies. Indeed his personal tribute to Unscom's effectiveness is that in the past year he has dug his heels in so hard-just as inspectors were closing in on his still largely hidden biological weapons complex.
And that is now the crux of the issue. Mr Hussein has no intention of letting Unscom disarm him. He does not put it that way. He insists that he has no more secrets to tell, and that Unscom's refusal to certify so is just an American-inspired plot-though weapons experts from many countries back Unscom in this, including those whose governments have been most prepared to give Mr Hussein the benefit of any doubt. Pointing to the admittedly sorry plight of many ordinary Iraqis (he himself and his entourage comfortably excepted) hurt by economic sanctions, despite UN efforts to help them, Mr Hussein demands a date for sanctions to end. But not even Russia, France and China are ready to give him that. Last month they won him a new deal: let Unscom inspections resume, in return for a "comprehensive" review of sanctions. By spurning that offer once he saw its details, Mr Hussein has both angered those trying hardest to help him and focused minds on the alternative to diplomacy: force.
No one should relish that idea. While force has been threatened in the past to back up Unscom in its disarming duties, this time its purpose would be different: once missiles started to fly, Unscom's role inside Iraq would be over. Nor could cruise missiles be certain to finish Unscom's job: factories that are damaged can be repaired, and no matter how much gets destroyed, the nuclear, chemical and biological know-how remains inside Iraq. Containing the Iraqi menace by force instead of by inspection would require constant vigilance-and repeated strikes at suspect activity. And though the targets would be military, there are bound to be civilian casualties this time and in future attacks - something that, quite rightly, will trouble outsiders.
An unwelcome option, but a necessary one
This is a grim prospect. So is the possible damage to the West's relationship with other Arab countries; and the longer military action goes on, the likelier it is that the Security Council will again be split. But there is a still grimmer one. With Unscom on his case, Mr Hussein cheated when he could. With Unscom now blocked, he can cheat at will. And he has used chemical weapons before, both against Iran and his own people. Although they do not say it in public, the chief concern of his neighbours is that containment by force, if it has to be done, should be done for as long as it takes.Mr Hussein still has a little time to change his mind. And if he will not? The dangers of letting him run amok go far wider than the Gulf iraq's defiance, if allowed to stand, will encourage other budding Saddams and badly undermine confidence in all the nuclear, chemical and biological arms control treaties that Iraq has broken and that were devised to help keep some order in a dangerous world. The Security Council is one of the few mechanisms for tackling such threats to world peace, and should do so. But if it will not or cannot respond to Iraqi belligerence, its divisions should not stop others - in this case America with as broad support as possible-from doing so. The worst outcome of all would be to let Iraq thumb its nose at the world and get away with it.
