Global Policy Forum

By Zoran Kusovac

Conflict between Macedonian security forces and armed ethnic Albanians has raised fears that the former Yugoslav republic could be descending towards civil war. Zoran Kusovac assesses the current situation and the prospects for the republic's future.

Macedonia, the only former Yugoslav republic so far spared from bloodshed, suddenly turned into another Balkans hot spot as ethnic Albanian insurgents clashed with government forces in early spring.

The international community was again caught unaware, but it quickly regained its composure and tried to act decisively to prevent the country from plunging into a full-scale war.

The initial isolated clashes, which started in late February, quickly intensified and spread to several parts of the country, leading to a serious deterioration of the overall security situation.

The government sounded the alarm after three members of the Macedonian Army (Armija na Republika Makedonija - ARM) were killed in action on 4 March. The authorities in the capital Skopje, located less than 25km south from the combat area, summoned parliament and demanded an urgent session of the UN Security Council, but it only reacted when fighting threatened to engulf Tetovo. On 21 March it adopted Resolution 1345 condemning violence and asking for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

Despite efforts by Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) officials to portray the security forces as competent, their initial operations were little more than a series of blunders. First a police convoy sent to reinforce the FYROM Interior Ministry (Ministerstvo na vnatresnji raboti - MVR) teams around Tanusevci ran into an ambush from which it only managed to extricate itself after 24 hours. Allegedly, the head of uniformed police, General Aleksandar Doncev, left his forces and either found his way out, or negotiated it with the help of a high-ranking ethnic Albanian MVR officer. Doncev was removed from his post on 11 April.

Under pressure from three sides, Albanian fighters seeped out of Tanusevci, and while FYROM officials believed all had gone to the east, towards the hillside villages of Brest and Malina, one group headed southwest for Mount Sar overlooking Tetovo.

The extension of the conflict to the hills above Tetovo caught everybody by surprise including the members of the Albanian community. Calling themselves the National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare - UCK, which shares the Albanian language acronym with the officially disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army), they claimed to be fighting for the equal rights and better political status of Albanians in Macedonia.

At Tetovo the government forces were virtually leaderless for a week. The MVR did quickly secure positions in the town but co- ordination with the ARM was virtually non-existent. Although it was first on the scene, the MVR was told that for political reasons the army would lead the 'counter-terrorist' operation.

The ARM took a long time to become organised. The general staff and MoD suddenly realised they hardly had an officer capable and willing enough to lead a combined operation. General Janakije Manasijevski, widely regarded as the most capable in operational and tactical terms, died suddenly in late 2000. The other generals were either inexperienced or unwilling to lead the men, apparently including the Chief of Staff General Jovan Andrevski. It was decided to bring back from retirement General Pande Petrovski, who commanded an armoured brigade in Pristina in the 1980s. He was pensioned off in 2000 before reaching the statutory retirement age of 60, along with other generals whom, as is reputed by insiders at the FYROM MoD, foreign military consultants found 'too rigid and unsuitable for a military under democratic control'.

Petrovski assembled a force of over 2,000, including several hundred reservists who had never trained for such an operation. When the ARM finally moved towards the suspected rebel headquarters, the UCK - believed to never have exceeded 250 men at one time in both theatres of operation - had gone. Some of the fighters changed into civilian clothes and mingled with the population, others retreated to Kosovo over Mount Sar where a few dozen were eventually apprehended by KFOR troops.

The Origins of Conflict

Favourable international perceptions of Macedonia were reinforced by the republic's multiethnic character. The majority, Slav Macedonians, constitute over 60% of the population while ethnic Albanians, the largest minority group, comprise at least 22% (and very likely above 30%). However, many western observers have grossly underestimated or failed to understand the tensions within Macedonian society.

The Slav majority has been bitterly split between the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia (Socijal Demokratski Sojuz na Makedonija - SDSM) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (Vnatresna Makedonska Revoluciona Organizacija - VMRO). In order to create a government, they were forced to form 'grand coaltions' with ethnic Albanians.

Ethnic Albanians were also split into two parties - the Albanian Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare - PDSh) led by Arben Xhaferi, and the Party of Democratic Prosperity (Partia per Prosperiteti Demokratike - PPD) under Imer Imeri. In the 1998 elections VMRO, considered the more nationalist of the two ethnic Macedonian parties, formed a coalition with the PDSh and won.

These 'grand coalitions' have greatly contributed to the republic's present troubles. The two ethnic groups had a tacit understanding that they would not interfere in each other's business - they simply divided the country into spheres of interest and ran them separately. With immense power concentrated in the hands of civil servants and as an outlet for Serbia's sanctions busting, this created many millionaires overnight.

When the VMRO assumed power in December 1998, it quickly purged all the SDSM appointees, replacing them with their own party faithful. These purges, which are to this day considered 'normal' in Macedonia's political life, encompassed all the public services, state monopolies and ministries. Most significantly, with regard to the latest developments in Macedonia, they also included the security apparatus.

The Security Services

The Macedonian Army was created from scratch after the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija - JNA) took away virtually everything stationed in the country. This ranged from 55 combat aircraft to over 450 armoured vehicles and even light fittings from the barracks. The ARM started with 40,000 repeating rifles and only 5,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles that officially belonged to the Territorial Defence. Its heaviest equipment included 120mm mortars and five T-34 tanks of Second World War-vintage that were left behind as unserviceable. The ARM faced innumerable problems and its organisation and doctrine remained a carbon copy of the old-style JNA. It somehow managed to slowly acquire very basic equipment but never in quantities sufficient to make it a realistic fighting army, at least not until the Albanian and Kosovo crises prompted the West to start sending in military aid.

The original plan for an army of 60,000 was quickly abandoned on cost grounds. The admission into NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1995 signalled a slow and painful transition. The ARM was reduced to 24,000, with 60,000 reservists, but NATO managed to persuade Skopje to cut back the army further, to a more realistic active strength of 15,000. However, while PfP and the consulting services of the Virginia-based Military Professional Services Incorporated (MPRI) consultancy, did influence a number of subalterns and professionals inside the ministry, the ARM itself remained top-heavy and cumbersome, with only two small professional units while others relied almost exclusively on nine-month national service conscripts.

According to insider MoD sources, the number of colonels exceeds NATO standards by at least 40%, probably even by 60%. In 2000, the ARM announced the formation of a new organisation with rapid reaction units. The first brigade within this new structure is due to become operational by the end of 2001. Despite these advances there is still no new doctrine and troop officers have to make do with their old JNA knowledge. With the exception of four Mi-17 'Hip' helicopters, 12 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers and a battery each of 105mm howitzers and 128mm multiple rocket launchers, equipment has been largely donated.

Much more than by any lack of equipment, the ARM's performance is seriously hampered by political interference and the lack of any coherent plans as evinced by its current operations. Both at Tetovo and Vaksince the ARM challenged the guerrillas from afar, pounding them with heavy artillery and tank fire and being very reluctant to move in with infantry. Even units designated 'specialist' proved to have little knowledge in counterinsurgency operations.

ARM's organisation also seems to be suffering from infighting. It seems that the army for all practical purposes has been taken over by 'the victor of Tetovo,' Gen Petrovski, although rumours that he has set his sights on Gen Andrevski's post were officially denied on 12 April. Under his influence the ARM went on a shopping spree. Four Mi-8MTV 'Hip C' transport helicopters and two Mi-24D 'Hind D' attack helicopters were delivered by Ukraine to the ARM's air wing on 23 March 2001, and later deliveries brought the inventory to six of each type. The helicopters are the ARM's first purchase in many years. The army is reportedly seeking to acquire further artillery and ammunition, even announcing its intent to procure more than 40 light tanks. Several western countries have donated non-combat equipment.

In common with the ARM, the MVR was also incapacitated by merciless political interference. The VMRO-led government proved particularly vindictive to the MVR, which it perceived as one of the tools of its own political persecution during its time in opposition. The ministry was reorganised and a number of officers were replaced.

However, the VMRO simply did not have enough capable people to fill the professional posts and made a number of appointments which directly contributed to Macedonia's inept handling of the latest crisis. Insiders from the security community particularly doubt the capabilities of the newly appointed 25-year old Aleksandar Mihajlovski to head the MVR's analytical department, although not his party loyalty.

The number of decisions that defy logic is unbelievable. It appears the decision to release old Yugoslav-era secret service files in the autumn of 2000 was so clumsily implemented that hundreds of records with details of active agents and collaborators were also released to the public, rendering those agents useless overnight and potentially endangering their lives. In addition, Macedonia's intelligence-gathering capacity has been eroded by the discovery of a major bugging scandal, in which there was little doubt that the new government was involved.

However, by far the greatest damage to the country's security was done by the very nature in which the VMRO-PDSh coalition operates: by mutual understanding that there are exclusive domains of influence in which the other partner will not interfere. This in practice means that officers of the Directorate for Security and Counter-Intelligence (Uprava za Bezbednost i Kontrarazuznavanje - UBK) can, and do, run their own ethnic networks without the other partner being aware of the details. This paralyses all meaningful fieldwork and allows for immense manipulation.

The Outlook

In trying to help, the international community applied its own logic, rather than the Balkan one which guides the local population. It tried to measure the degree to which ethnic Albanians may realistically be disadvantaged and met with a stonewall. Moderate Albanian leaders, foremostly Arben Xhaferi whose influence over Albanians extends far beyond Macedonia's borders, tried for a long time to redress their perceived underdog status, and made several important, if slow, advances. However, almost all Albanians see the root of their problems in the FYROM constitution which defines the republic as 'the country of the Macedonian people' while it awards Albanians the status of national minority. The second, strongly emotional, bone of contention for both communities is the question of the official language. Macedonians insist on their own language being officially used for all official and educational purposes, while Albanians want to use their mother tongue in universities and parliament.

To an outsider these differences may not seem insurmountable, but Macedonian society is sharply divided along ethnic lines. With both sides intransigent, the radicals saw an opening and decided to take up arms. Under its new commander Gezim Ostreni, a former JNA officer, the UCK applied a new tactic at Vakcince and Slupcane by moving into villages with a combined population of over 1,000. The UCK's reasoning that villagers will join the guerrillas when they come under ARM fire may prove correct. Another strong argument for the radicalisation of the situation has been the Selce ambush which radicalised ethnic Macedonians and led to attacks on ethnic Albanian property which in turn bred more radicalisation.

The West dispatched NATO secretary general, Lord Robertson, and EU foreign policy supremo, Javier Solana, to appeal to Macedonian politicians. While the government of Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski originally wanted to impose a state of war which would practically give the ARM and MVR a free hand and inevitably cause a reaction leading to a downward spiral, the West twisted many arms to secure what would look as a logical measure: bring all major political parties into government. After lengthy negotiations, the government of national unity, comprising members from all relevant parties, was formed on 13 May.

It is the very nature of Macedonian system which will determine whether the West's logical approach will work. By Macedonian logic all parties currently in the government are likely to demand their share of civil servants and public offices including those in the ARM and MVR. If those demands are accepted, the system will be further fragmented to the point where party allegiances would preclude any efficient action against the UCK. Should the army, encouraged by its newly acquired prominence in society, decide to act on its own agenda that would almost certainly split the current coalition despite any pressure the West would exert.

Macedonia remains on a razor edge. Its fate is being decided outside Vaksince and Slupcane where the ARM declared a ceasefire of sorts, after the appointment of the new government. However, that situation cannot last forever and one side is likely to make a move. The ARM, unsubtle and untrained in guerrilla warfare, can only take those villages if it reduces them to rubble, but such an outcome would sound the death knell for the fledgling government of national unity. Still, the ARM cannot afford to maintain a stalemate, as that would risk the UCK opening up a new front in some part of FYROM hitherto unaffected by fighting, probably around Debar on the Albanian border.

The least painful outcome of the current crisis would be a quick political solution. An all-party agreement to modify the constitution would not be popular among Macedonian Slavs and would require the West to offer some kind of economic sweeteners to make it acceptable, but it would at least remove the UCK's claim of second-class status and prevent them from growing and threatening to spread the fighting. In the long term, the improvement of the economic situation and the reduction of rampant unemployment, currently running over 30%, would help, but Macedonia does not have enough time for that. Its fate will most probably be decided in the next couple of months.