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From War to Peace

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By Tim Judah

London Times
June 26, 2001

The two provinces of Yugoslavia are finding it difficult to get back to normal after the Nato conflict.


Technically speaking, Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia. In fact it is run by the United Nations, is controlled by 42,500 Nato-led troops from Kfor and, except for small Serbian-dominated enclaves, has no real connection with Yugoslavia any more.

The dinar has been formally abolished, the UN collects customs duties and taxes and few believe that the territory will ever be linked in the same state with Serbia again.

It was because of the treatment of its majority ethnic Albanian population that Nato forces began their 78-day bombardment of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. This campaign ended after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which led to the withdrawal of Serbian forces, the entrance of Kfor and the setting up of the UN's interim administration mission in Kosovo which now runs the province.

Resolution 1244 said that Kosovo remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "pending a final settlement". That is to say it did not rule out independence, which is the almost universal demand of its 1.8 million ethnic Albanian inhabitants. Nor did it rule out an eventual settlement that would restore a real link between the province and Belgrade.

For almost two years after that, diplomats, politicians and analysts kicked around various ideas about its future. Then, on May 14, Hans Haekkerup, the former Danish defence minister who runs UNMIK, promulgated what is called the Constitutional Framework. It means that the citizens of Kosovo will vote in a general election on November 17.

They will elect a 120-seat assembly in which ten seats will be reserved for Kosovo's Serbs and ten for the province's other minorities. The assembly will elect a president who, in turn, will nominate a prime minister who will form a government.

The government will then take charge of the day-to-day running of Kosovo. But, justice, law and order and security will remain with UNMIK and Mr Haekkerup and his successors. The assembly and Parliament will not have complete freedom of action. They will not, for example, be able to declare independence, since that would prejudge any future talks on Kosovo's final status.

Mr Haekkerup would, therefore, declare such an act to be inadmissible, as it would be deemed to have strayed beyond the bounds of the interim self-government foreseen for Kosovo by Resolution 1244. According to Mr Haekkerup, the question of the territory's final status will now be determined at "an appropriate future stage".

Kosovo's Albanian leaders were angry that the framework did not include a provision for a future referendum on independence or set a time limit after which the question could be looked at. They did, however, say that they would participate in the November elections.

Shrewd Kosovar analysts, such as the publisher Veton Surroi, argue that Kosovars should use the post-election years to build the institutions that they will need to run any future independent state.

Kosovo's Serbs rejected the framework out of hand, saying that it took Kosovo further along the road towards independence. They have said that they will not take part in the elections. But the Yugoslav President, Vojislav Kostunica, has urged the 100,000 or so remaining Serbs to keep their options open by, at least, registering to vote.

The past two years have seen a dramatic fall from grace by Kosovo's Albanian leaders. Before Nato's intervention they were seen as standing up to Serbian oppression. Since then, however, they have made no credible stands against violence against Serbs and other minorities. Moreover, their connections with the leaders of ethnic Albanian insurgents in Macedonia and, in some cases, with mafia bosses, are believed to be too close for comfort.

For these reasons, among others, there are no leading countries in the world prepared to countenance the independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, Serbian leaders have no credible ideas about how to reintegrate 1.8 million Kosovo Albanians, who hate them, back into Serbia. For this reason, the Constitutional Framework is probably the only workable solution for the moment.

Serbs who remain in Kosovo live in a number of enclaves protected by Kfor. In the north, in the Serbian-dominated region that borders Serbia proper, however, UNMIK's presence is considerably weaker than elsewhere.

Some believe, and indeed some propose, that eventually Kosovo should be partitioned, with this northern tip going to Serbia and the rest being left for the Albanians.

This idea is vehemently rejected by foreign diplomats who believe it would inevitably lead to the division of Macedonia and the dissolution of the Bosnian state.

So, for the foreseeable future Kosovo will remain a UN protectorate, albeit, soon with its own parliament and government. In the long term it is far more likely to become independent than to be linked again in any concrete form with Belgrade.


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