Global Policy Forum

By Val Percival and James Lyon

If there is war from Iraq, there are many lessons about post-war reconstruction from the west's experience in Kosovo. But the current crisis also means we risk overlooking unfinished business elsewhere, say Val Percival and James Lyon of the International Crisis Group

As the United States and its allies prepare for possible military intervention in Iraq, they should bear in mind the lessons of their intervention in Kosovo - perhaps the most ambitious experiment in post-war reconstruction that the international community has undertaken.

Since 1999 the donor community has contributed billions of dollars in humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance. Tens of thousands of peacekeepers and thousands of civilians worked to rebuild Kosovo into a democratic 'autonomous' society.

Although the international community has much to be proud of in Kosovo, two key weaknesses have hampered their efforts: failure to get full control of the security situation, and failure to develop a realistic exit strategy in partnership with the local actors. Both of these are also risks for any future international intervention elsewhere, and while Kosovo's specific circumstances are of course unique, the situation there illustrates the problems that will arise elsewhere.

When the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) rolled into the province on 11 June 1999, they feared resistance from remaining Yugoslav army and paramilitary forces, as well as retaliation attacks against KFOR from the local Serb population.

In fact (as should have been anticipated) the problems of those first few months were completely different - a complete security vacuum, with horrific crimes of revenge perpetrated against the Serb civilian population by Albanian extremists. NATO and the UN were shown to be impotent, and they - and Kosovo's population - are still paying for that early failure. The international community cannot afford to make that mistake elsewhere.

NATO also failed to effectively neutralize its former allies from the 1999 conflict, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In the immediate aftermath, KLA members were able to gain control of local institutions, involve themselves in organised crime, and engage in extortion and intimidation. Although the international community tried to occupy former KLA members through recruitment to a new Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Police Service, former KLA fighters were still able to exacerbate armed conflicts in South Serbia in 2000 and Macedonia in 2001. It is not sufficient to disarm the enemy - to get a peaceful environment, you have to disarm your allies as well.

Under Security Council Resolution 1244 the UN must develop "autonomous" government institutions for Kosovo pending the resolution of the province's final status. Kosovo is thus in a sort of international twilight zone: a de jure part of Yugoslavia (now renamed "Serbia and Montenegro"), yet simultaneously a de facto UN protectorate under international administration, which may well be on the road towards independence.

The UN at first found it difficult to attract sufficiently skilled international recruits to work in a difficult post-conflict setting. Many internationals found themselves running municipal administrations, or even government ministries, for which they had no experience or training.

Three and a half years down the line, Kosovo now has a President, a Prime Minister, and a functioning government. However international administrators are finding it hard to let go. Consultation mechanisms with local leaders have not been institutionalized, and critical information is kept in the hands of internationals. While local politicians lobby the international community for more authority, it is often a cry for inclusion in the process of governing rather than a desire to be at the helm.

While UNMIK has outlined "benchmarks" to assess Kosovo's institutional development, the process has not gone much beyond describing these objectives. There is no implementation strategy, no assessment of how close (or far) Kosovo is from meeting these benchmarks, what resources are needed, and what further action. At the same time there is mission fatigue, resources are running low, and the world's attention is focused on the Middle East. UNMIK is planning to transfer as much responsibility as possible in the next twelve months to minimize the costs and to minimize its responsibility for governing Kosovo.

Yet Kosovo is at a critical phase. Institutions are not yet fully developed, the civil service has not yet been completely recruited, and there is no transition strategy. Moreover, too early a transfer of power would put the three billion dollar investment to date at risk. What is lacking is a careful transition strategy - to build local counterparts who will be able to take over responsibility gradually from UNMIK.

On the ground, Serbian areas of Kosovo still function as if they were part of Serbia, outside the framework of government established by UNMIK, in terms of courts, schools, health care, pensions, telecommunications and most importantly security forces. Zoran Djindjic, the Prime Minister of Serbia, has appealed to the international community to start talks on Kosovo's final status sooner rather than later. Rather than repeat the traditional mantras of returning the whole province to Belgrade rule, he takes the line that independence for Kosovo is not a taboo topic; but he also has begun to hint about partition of the province as part of an independence deal.

The overwhelming majority of Albanians will accept nothing less than the independence that they proclaimed over ten years ago, while the vast majority of Serbs want to remain part of Serbia. Until this question is addressed, insecurity among both populations about the future will remain high, impeding important aspects of Kosovo's rebuilding effort, including privatization, trade relations, economic development, and the willingness of displaced Serbs to return to the province.

But the UN Security Council (mindful perhaps of possible parallels in Tibet or Chechnya) was, and is, unwilling to move in that direction. Michael Steiner, who as UN Special Representative runs Kosovo on behalf of the international community, has declared that any resolution of the issue must wait until the UN's benchmarks have been met - his slogan is "standards before status". Meanwhile there is a Kosovo parliament with 120 members, all of whom were elected because of their views on the one subject - Kosovo's future status - which they are forbidden to discuss.

Any partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines would raise very uncomfortable issues elsewhere in the Balkans - not least in Bosnia, and in neighbouring Macedonia. But if the international community continues to stonewall on the question of final status, the existing soft partition on the ground will become harder, and the ability of the UN or its members to have a positive influence on the outcome will be correspondingly less. These are indeed difficult issues - and there will be similar difficult issues in planning the future of Iraq - but that is no reason not to address them.

For, while international attention will focus still more sharply on Iraq in the coming weeks, the lengthy process of clearing up earlier crises, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and indeed Bosnia, remains incomplete. Rather than allow them to slip off the agenda in favour of the hot issue of 2003, we should remember that those who do not learn from past mistakes are doomed to repeat them.

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