Global Policy Forum

By James Dobbins*

The recent outbreak of ethnic violence in Kosovo has led to a good deal of soul-searching within the international community. A noble experiment in building a multi-ethnic Kosovo seems to have ended in failure. European governments are rethinking their approach. Talk of partition is gaining currency.

Such a reappraisal is indeed in order, but not because a poorly conceived strategy for Kosovo has failed. Rather the time has come to reevaluate, in the light of changing circumstances, a policy based upon calculated risk that has so far yielded largely positive results.

The decision made by international community in 1999, at the end of the Kosovo conflict, to postpone indefinitely any decision regarding Kosovo's status was not made in the naí¯ve belief that prolonged uncertainty would promote ethnic reconciliation in that society.

It was as clear in 1999 as it is today that the Kosovars would never again allow themselves to be governed from Belgrade. It was as clear then as it is today that the international community's failure to formally recognize this fact could only exacerbate ethnic tensions inside Kosovo, allowing Serb residents to harbor the hope of again becoming the dominant nationality, and causing Albanian residents to regard every remaining Serb enclave as a beachhead for the next invasion.

Once having liberated Kosovo from Serb oppression, the United States and its European allies were less worried about ethnic tensions in Kosovo, however, than they were by those outside it. They were worried about the breakup of Macedonia, of Bosnia and what was left of Yugoslavia. Recognition of Kosovo's independence would, it was feared, encourage separatist tendencies in all those three countries, further enflame Serb nationalism and reduce the prospect for a democratic revolution in Serbia.

In the event, Macedonia, Bosnia and the remainder of Yugoslavia have held together, if only just. Serbia did experience a democratic revolution, if incomplete. A start has been made at integrating this entire region into the European and Atlantic communities, employing the lure of EU and NATO membership to moderate traditional hostilities and resolve outstanding disputes.

By keeping the lid on Kosovo, by holding any decision on its future status in abeyance, by postponing any meaningful start to ethnic reconciliation in that society, the international community has bought itself five years of peace in the Balkans.

In sum, the gamble has largely paid off. Like any calculated risk, however, this one needs to be recalculated when circumstances change. The recent violence in Kosovo, where 30 Serbs and Kosovars lost their lives and hundreds of Serbs lost their homes, suggests the need to make such a recalculation now.

The Balkans, while still fragile, are less so than half a decade ago. The passage of time has also diminished the capacity of the United States and the EU to keep the lid on Kosovo. NATO troop levels are less than half what they were in 1999. American attention is focused on Iraq, Afghanistan and even Haiti. Kosovar patience with the international community's go-slow approach to final status is wearing thin. Rising ethnic violence in Kosovo could destabilize neighboring societies.

Other than continued delay, there are really only two viable options for Kosovo, both involving independence. The first would give independence to the entire province, but with protected havens for the Serb population. These sanctuaries would need to be guarded by NATO troops for some years to come. Alternatively, the province could be partitioned, with at least some of the current Serb populated areas returned to Serbia. For this partition to be even minimally acceptable to the Kosovars, however, the dominantly Albanian areas of Southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo - in particular the Presevo Valley - would need to be ceded to Kosovo.

Either outcome would encourage separatist tendencies in Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro. Of the two, the option that preserves Kosovo's territorial integrity and uses the old Yugoslav provincial boundary as the new international border is most consistent with existing U.S. and EU policies in the region, and provides the less bad precedent.

Multi-ethnicity in Kosovo is a distant prospect, but one toward which movement can begin only once Kosovo's final status is fixed. The benefits for Kosovo's people, both Albanian and Serb, of moving ahead to determine that status must still be weighed by the international community against the costs to the region as a whole.

Today the balance is different than it was in 1999. Kosovo is somewhat better prepared for self-government. The region is somewhat better prepared to cope with that development. The United States and Europe are less able to keep the lid on Kosovo. It is against today's realities that the new cost-benefit calculation needs to be run.

About the author: James Dobbins heads the International Security and Defense Center at the RAND Corporation. He held senior White House and State Department positions under four presidents, including special envoy for Kosovo during the Clinton administration.