Global Policy Forum

By Adam Wolfe

After 21 years of civil war, the black, animistic Christian Sudan People's Liberation Army (S.P.L.A.) and the Arab, Muslim Sudanese government in Khartoum are very close to signing a comprehensive peace accord. However, a conflict in the western Darfur region threatens to derail the negotiations at the last moment and, perhaps, could undermine any negotiated peace between the S.P.L.A. and the government. The uprising of the Sudan Liberation Movement (S.L.M.) and the Justice and Equality Movement (J.E.M.), both black, Muslim groups, has been brutally suppressed by the Sudanese government through the use of irregular militias, the Janjawid, and the aerial support from the government's military. Although a ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the two rebel groups, there is little evidence that the region will return to a level of stability in the near future. The Bush administration made a peace agreement in Sudan a high priority quickly after assuming office, and has used its leverage to push through a ceasefire in Darfur in an attempt to preserve these efforts, but these efforts may be for naught if the two conflicts cannot be negotiated to similar terms.

History of the Civil War

In 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. Shortly thereafter, in 1955, the Arab government in Khartoum reneged on promises to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers and sparked a 17 year civil war. The Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 was the foundation for a ten year ceasefire between the northern and southern forces, but in 1983 President Gaafer Muhammad Nimeiri began a process of incorporating Shari'a, or Islamic law, into the penal code. This was controversial within the largely Muslim North, and required the establishment of emergency courts to enforce the new laws. In the South this, and other power sharing issues, led to the resumption of the civil war that continues today.

The southern resistance began with the 1955 mutiny; the soldiers formed a loose coalition, the Anya Nya, of insurgents who developed contacts with outside countries. They received training from Israel, support from Uganda and Ethiopia and purchased weapons from Congolese rebels. After the Addis Ababa agreement, the Anya Nya's power waned, and the S.P.L.A. was formed after the 1983 uprising. Lieutenant Colonel John Garang was sent to quell a mutiny in Bor of 500 southern troops, but instead Garang encouraged mutinies in other garrisons and quickly became the leader of the rebellion.

The strength of the Sudanese government has ebbed and flowed since 1983, with various periods of military support and confrontation. In February 1989, the military presented then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi with an ultimatum: move towards peace with the southern forces or be thrown out. The period immediately following this ultimatum would prove to be the closest the two sides would come to a negotiated settlement.

On June 30, 1989, Colonel Omar Hassan al-Bashir, with support from the National Islamic Front, replaced the government with the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (R.C.C.). Al-Bashir remains as the executive power for the Khartoum government. The peace negotiations fell apart, and in 1991 a new penal code, the Criminal Act of 1991, effectively instituted Shari'a nationwide. In 1993, all non-Muslim judges from the southern region were transferred north in attempt to enforce the new code.

The southern rebellion has remained unified in its cause, but has become somewhat fragmented. In 1991, internal dissension within the S.P.L.A. led to the formation of the Nasir faction of the rebel army, and in 1993 a third faction was formed. This infighting led to a loss of much of their credibility in the West. In 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled opposition parties formed the National Democratic Alliance (N.D.A.), which opened a northeastern front in the civil war. Since then, the war has evolved from a North/ South confrontation to a center/ periphery conflict. The recent fighting in the western regions should be viewed as part of this new dynamic.

Foundations of the Current Peace Negotiations

The current negotiations grew out of a 1993 plan put forth by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Eritrea under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.). This produced the 1994 Declaration of Principles (D.O.P.) that identified the essential elements necessary for a comprehensive peace settlement, including the relationship between religion and the state and the right to self-determination for the south. After major battlefield losses to the S.P.L.A., the Sudanese government signed the D.O.P. in 1997. This was followed by a series of agreements with other regional rebel forces, but did not lead to a lasting settlement.

In July 2000, an Egyptian and Libyan joint initiative was offered, but the southern reaction was cool because the initiative did not adequately address the issues of religion and the state. These efforts quickly died because Washington began to assert its influence on the negotiations.

President Bush rapidly made a Sudanese peace deal a priority after assuming office for two reasons: Christian leaders in the U.S. pressured the new administration to defend the southern rebels because they view the S.P.L.A. as a Christian force and, in October 2000, large caches of oil were discovered in the southern region. In September 2001, former Senator John Danforth was designated Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, and by July 2002, the Sudanese government and the S.P.L.A. reached a basic agreement on the role of religion in the state. The Machakos Protocol, named after the region in Kenya where the negotiations are taking place, has led to negotiations on other power sharing agreements, but, as of yet, no comprehensive peace deal has been signed. The latest snag in the negotiations centers on the role of Shari'a in the capital, Khartoum.

However, a new conflict in the western region threatens to undermine the negotiations before a deal is reached, and Washington is using a heavier hand in an attempt to score a diplomatic victory before the opportunity disappears.

A New Conflict in the Darfur Region Threatens the Negotiations

In 2003, black Muslims began to revolt against the Arab, Muslim government. The rebels are led by two groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, which claim that the Khartoum-based government favors Arab settlements. The government argues that the rebels felt left out by the peace negotiations in Kenya, and have staged an uprising in an attempt to quickly gain concessions as the government ends its 21 year civil war.

The government has used irregular, Arab militias, the Janjawid, to squash the uprising. Although no international observers or humanitarian workers were in the area before the signing of the ceasefire agreement, a British journalist was able to record a conversation that demonstrates the use of government aircraft to bomb and destroy black villages. Ten years after the world turned its back to the brutal conflict in Rwanda, the international community is not hesitating to bring an end to this conflict. U.N. Security General Kofi Annan called on the Sudanese government to allow humanitarian access to the region or face "swift and appropriate action" and quickly tripled the U.N.'s aid appeal for Sudan to help end the conflict. The E.U.'s top military official, Gustav Hagglund, told the Financial Times that "Sudan is on the list of the U.N. [for a peacekeeping mission]."

A ceasefire agreement was signed in Chad by the Sudanese government and the two rebel groups on April 8. Humanitarian workers are cautiously making their way into the country to appraise the situation. Initial reports show that the situation is much worse than originally estimated. The ceasefire agreement commits all parties to meet again within 15 days for political negotiations. The Sudanese government fought for, and won, the exclusion of any explicit mention of the Janjawid in the agreement, and it is not known how much control the government has over the militia forces. The ceasefire appears to be holding as of now, but the situation could quickly turn.

World attention has quickly shifted from the stalled peace negotiations in Kenya to those in Chad, and this threatens to undermine the progress made in ending the 21 year civil war. Fearing this, Washington has turned up the pressure on both parties in Kenya to quickly resolve their differences and come to an agreement on the role of Shari'a in Khartoum. The U.S. provides Sudan with $100 million a year to prepare for peace. Under an act of Congress, President Bush must certify every six months that both parties are negotiating in good faith before the aid is dispensed. The current deadline is April 21, and the President has told both parties that if a deal is not reached by that date he will make a determination as to which party is to be held accountable, which will affect how the administration deals with the parties in the future.

The Sudanese government may see an opening in this deadline, and could attempt to exploit the U.S.' ultimatum as a way to cripple the S.P.L.A. If the government shows that it is willing to work towards a peaceful resolution to the western conflict, then it may be able to make the case that the S.P.L.A. is being intransigent in the negotiations. However, the S.P.L.A. enjoys some advantages that the government does not: they control the oil fields that contain the economic future of the country and they have the support of Christian organizations in the U.S. with great influence over the current U.S. administration. Should either side attempt to disregard the U.S.' deadline, it is likely that the negotiations would collapse. The international community is readying to take decisive action in the western region of Sudan, but if the negotiations in Kenya cave in, a much more robust reaction will be necessary to bring stability to the country that has seen so little peace in its history.