Global Policy Forum

By Ewen MacAskill *

The cry of "something must be done" is becoming louder. Each new report on the plight of the Sudanese refugees, such as that which led the BBC 10 O'Clock News, evokes fresh sympathy. More than 1 million have been forced out of their villages in Darfur. Thousands are dying and thousands more are set to die over the next three months as the rainy season begins, reducing their camps to squalor and cutting many of them off from aid.

The Sudanese government has been complicit in this, arming the Arab militia, the Janjaweed, which is responsible for terrorising the villagers and driving them out.

At the UN, at the EU and in parliament, voices are demanding action. The UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, who is to visit Sudan in the next few weeks, made a speech in May saying he did not want a repeat of the Rwanda genocide and hinted at a series of steps for Sudan, including military action. An argument among those favouring intervention is that if it was right for the US and Britain to intervene in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the case for Sudan is more clear-cut, both morally and in terms of numbers at risk.

In the Times last Friday, James Smith, director of the Aegis Trust, an organisation aimed at prevention of genocide, called for a UN resolution to impose a no-fly zone to stop the Sudanese government bombing its own citizens; introduce economic and political sanctions; and reserve the right to send in a peacekeeping force.

British government policy is to resist such calls and instead concentrate on diplomacy, maintaining dialogue with the Sudanese government and trying to win concessions through persuasion or pressure. On this issue, the British government may well be right.

As Iraq demonstrated, diplomacy - however flawed - is preferable to the uncertainty of military intervention. Smith calls for a no-fly zone in Darfur, but it is too late for that. The Janjaweed, supported by Sudanese bombing raids, have completed their work over the last year. The villages are empty. Nor does military action appear necessary to ensure the supply of humanitarian aid. The Sudanese government had been blocking access by humanitarian agencies to Darfur and delaying the distribution of food and medical supplies. But diplomacy has succeeded in persuading the Sudanese government to ease these restrictions.

The other cry of those who feel something must be done is that international sanctions should be imposed against Sudan, another strategy largely discredited by the Iraq experience. The US, mindful that Sudan harboured Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, still maintains trade sanctions against it. Blanket sanctions by the international community would add to the suffering of an already impoverished population, as happened in Iraq after the first Gulf war.

The final logic of intervention is the overthrow of the government. That would provide the UN with a problem comparable to Iraq. Separate from Darfur, the Sudanese government has been engaged for over 20 years in a civil war with the south of the country. An agreement to end that war is close to completion, but remove the government and that would be in jeopardy.

The better approach is to try to work with the Sudanese government, no matter how cynical it is. Diplomatic pressure has to be increased on the Sudanese government to begin policing Darfur, in the first case by protecting the camps. On the face of it, that seems like asking a cat to protect the mice. But the Sudanese government is showing signs of embarrassment over what is happening in Darfur and could yet be forced to rein in the Janjaweed.

The African Union, the pan-continental political body, this month sent the first of 120 monitors, a combination of African and EU soldiers, into Darfur. That is a tiny force, but it could have an impact beyond its size, drawing attention to any further outrages by the Janjaweed. A similar monitoring exercise in Sudan's Nuba mountains proved successful.

A new UN security council resolution could include a timetable that allows the diplomats more time, but sets out various steps if the Sudanese were to obstruct the aid effort or the Janjaweed attack the camps. The punitive action should be graded, beginning with "naming and shaming" those in the Sudanese government who have supported the Janjaweed, followed by a freeze on their assets abroad and a travel ban.

Getting the villagers back to their homes is probably not realistic in the short term. For now, the priority is to ensure that the Sudanese government honours its promises to provide access for the humanitarian agencies and ensures the security of the camps.

Diplomacy should be given a little longer and the military option kept as a last resort.

*About the Author: Ewen MacAskill is the Guardian's diplomatic editor.

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