Global Policy Forum

By Adam Wolfe

On October 6, 2004, Tony Blair became the first British prime minister to visit an independent Sudan. His brief trip to Khartoum yielded a promise from President Omar el-Bashir to comply with a list of five demands to alleviate the crisis in the western province of Darfur and move toward a comprehensive peace agreement. This will not be the first time el-Bashir disappoints a Western government seeking a peace treaty, but Khartoum's failure to heed Blair's warning may lead to a collapse of his country - regardless of how swiftly the Darfur crisis is solved.

To many Western observers, el-Bashir's government appears to be the greatest obstacle to peace, and his negotiating style has been derided as paranoid or as an attempt to obfuscate the government's intentions from the negotiation moderators. There is some truth to this, but the government's actions appear rational when the various regional peace negotiations are viewed as a whole. Still, if el-Bashir's government does not quickly move to resolve its continuing peace negotiations, Sudan will collapse into a state of regional warring factions.

Conflicting Negotiations Outside of Darfur

The central government signed a peace agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (S.P.L.M./A.) in late May that halted the fighting in the country's 21 year north-south civil war, but the agreement rests on a very shaky foundation in a country on the verge of collapse. The two parties have signed six protocols and agreed in principle on the terms to finalize the negotiated settlement. A meeting began on October 7 to work toward completing the deal, but some observers fear that hard-line elements within each party may have grown stronger, and the culmination of negotiations that once appeared imminent may be further delayed. Khartoum may delay the signing to extract concessions in its other peace negotiations; the S.P.L.M./A. may attempt to use the West's attention on the Darfur crisis to extract further concessions from the central government.

Ending the north-south civil war will do little to stabilize the situation in Sudan. Two new fronts have been opened up since the beginning of the north-south civil war that transformed Sudan's conflict into a center-periphery confrontation, and the government's control of the center may be slipping.

In 1995, a coalition of internal and exiled opposition parties, including former members of the S.P.L.M./A., formed the National Democratic Alliance (N.D.A.), which opened a northeastern front in the civil war with staging grounds in Eritrea. The N.D.A.'s confrontation with the central government has been less destabilizing than that of the southern rebels', but it may prove to be as intransient. Negotiations to end this conflict are continuing in Cairo, with the latest round scheduled to resume October 16. The sporadic negotiations have kept this conflict at a low-grade level and the N.D.A. has announced its intent to disband its military wing. But, if the negotiations collapse, the N.D.A. has access to funding that would allow it to assault the central government on a level comparable to that of the S.P.L.M./A. Khartoum is preparing for this possibility in a similar manner as it did in its western region. Reuters has reported that the government is arming tribes loyal to the central government in the eastern provinces because of fears that the rebel groups may be preparing for an attack.

Resolving the Crisis in Darfur

Khartoum had been negotiating in Nigeria with the two rebel groups from Darfur who launched an uprising in February 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement (S.L.M.) and the Justice and Equality Movement (J.E.M.), but on September 17 the talks collapsed. The rebels refused to sign a deal that would allow greater access to refugees unless the central government acted to disarm the militias, which were armed by the central government and have been attacking the subsistence farmers in the region perceived to be aligned with the rebels. The government refused to disarm the largely Arab militias until the generally black rebels were confined to containment areas. Neither party has publicly changed its position since the collapse, but talks are scheduled to resume October 22.

The conflict pits three African Muslim tribes -- the Fur, Zagawa and Messalit -- against Arabic Muslim nomadic groups. Although the ethnic distinctions between these groups have largely faded over the years from intermarriage, tensions between the two groups increased during the 1990s as an extended drought intensified the competition for natural resources, and the central government began a campaign to arm the Arabs and disarm the African tribes after taking power in 1989.

After years of low-level fighting between the groups, the current conflict erupted in February 2003 when the S.L.A. and J.E.M. attacked government and military targets in the western province. The central government, preoccupied with the north-south civil war and unable to extend resources or troops to Darfur, ramped up its arming of militias within the Arab groups known as the Janjaweed. The conflict quickly descended into its current state in which the militias and rebels rarely engage in direct combat by using civilians in the region as a buffer. Although the rebels and militias have experienced relatively few casualties, it is estimated that 50,000 civilians have died because of these tactics, and 320,000 will likely die from malnutrition and disease even if the crisis is quickly ended.

The conflict has gained the attention of the United Nations, United States and European Union, but none of these groups have moved beyond the position of threatening Khartoum if it fails to disarm the militias. The United States and European Parliament have declared that the militia attacks against the western farmers amounts to genocide, and the United Nations, as part of its largely toothless second resolution on Darfur, is investigating the situation with a report to be submitted in three months.

Many observers have stated that the declaration of genocide has encouraged the rebels' obduracy in the negotiations and may prolong the killing of the Darfur farmers. Samantha Power, Pulitzer Prize winning author of A Problem for Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, described the S.L.M. and J.E.M. as "a rebel movement emboldened by the belief that the United States is on its side." The rebel groups have calculated that the longer the humanitarian crisis continues, the stronger their position grows in the Nigeria negotiations.

In the coming months, the crisis in Darfur will likely move toward resolution with the deployment of African Union (A.U.) troops and inspectors throughout the region. Under pressure from the U.S., E.U., and U.N., Khartoum has accepted that up to 3,500 A.U. troops will be deployed to the region to monitor a binding peace agreement between the rebels and the government. The details of how each group will disarm, who will monitor who and what kind of power sharing deal will be extended to the rebels will be extremely difficult issues to negotiate, but the pressure on both groups from the Western powers and the financial support pledged by the West to the A.U. will likely force a deal to materialize in the next six months. However, even after the killing in Darfur is brought to an end, the political crisis in Sudan will continue as the central government sees its power at the geographical peripheries of the country wane.

Khartoum as the Rationally Paranoid Negotiator

Sudan's central government has put forth a wide variety of arguments for its failure to disarm the Janjaweed militias and has projected nearly all of its geopolitical insecurities onto the western conflict. In the past few weeks, Khartoum officials have claimed that the Popular National Congress party (P.N.C.), an Islamist opposition party in Khartoum led by the recently arrested Hassan al-Turabai, and the J.E.M. were cooperating on coup lots against el-Bashir's government; that Washington has provided aid and training camps in Eritrea to the Darfur rebel groups; that Chad is supporting the J.E.M. in an attempt to weaken Khartoum's power; and that the Bush administration is overstating the severity of the crisis to draw attention away from its difficulties in Iraq during the U.S. election year.

Khartoum's scrambling dissemination of accusations can be explained by its weak position in the country's internal and external affairs. The government's negotiating position has weakened with the S.P.L.M./A. in the south, the N.D.A in the east and the S.L.M. and J.E.M. in the west. In the capital, some hardliners in the central government have shifted their support to the P.N.C. because they think el-Bashir's government may be on the brink of collapse. The country's borders have grown porous and unguarded; the September 19 killing of Lord's Resistance Army rebels by Ugandan troops in southern Sudan demonstrated the lack of control that the government has over vast areas of its country.

Under these circumstances, el-Bashir's government is grasping for straws, attempting to hold onto the power that it has managed to retain. Chad and Eritrea would like to see the collapse of el-Bashir's government, though not the statewide failure that might follow, and these accusations are an attempt to preempt any diplomatic moves the powers might be contemplating to try to bring this about. Statements by John Garang, the leader of the S.P.L.M./A., have indicated that should the group's negotiations fail with Khartoum, his rebel movement would begin coordinating with the likeminded groups in the west and east. Many well-placed observers also indicate that the ties between the J.E.M. and P.N.C. are probably true, though not at the level claimed by el-Bashir's officials.

However distasteful the government's actions have been toward the minority groups in Sudan, the Western powers have an interest in maintaining the geographical integrity of the country. There are large reserves of recently discovered oil in Sudan; should el-Bashir's government collapse, the factional disorder that could follow would take these resources out of the market's reach.

Conclusion

Sudan's future is looking increasingly bleak, and the prospect of complete collapse is hovering above the country larger than at any time since the mid-1980s. Should any of the three major peace negotiations fail, or should the P.N.C. succeed in ousting el-Bashir's government, the country could quickly descend into chaos. Each negotiation needs to be carefully shepherded to a binding and equitable settlement, while at the same time the collective effect of the settlements must allow el-Bashir's government to hold onto power in Khartoum, though at the same time not seen as artificially propping up his government. The only viable alternative to el-Bashir's control of Khartoum is the Islamic P.N.C., an outcome unacceptable to the U.S. and E.U. For this reason, the Western powers will not lean too hard on Khartoum.

With careful leadership from the U.S., E.U., U.N., the Arab League and the A.U. the collapse of Khartoum's government can be avoided and the regional conflicts that threaten the integrity of the country can be brought to a close, but the chances for success are growing slimmer with each passing day.

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C íŸ 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.