Global Policy Forum

By Adam Wolfe

In June 2004, Colin Powell, then U.S. secretary of state, visited Sudan's Darfur region to voice Washington's outrage at the unfolding crisis and labeled the situation "genocide" upon his homecoming. Ten months later, Robert Zoellick, the current U.S. deputy secretary of state, paid a more cordial visit to Sudan and made every effort to avoid using that signifier for intervention. His silence gave voice to a meaningful change in the U.S. approach to Sudan -- Washington's position has drifted from contained activism to strategic indifference on the crisis in Darfur. This disengagement has shifted the responsibility for resolving the crisis to the U.N., E.U. and N.A.T.O.

Washington Quits Darfur, Multilateral Organizations Fill the Void

Once the leading force in pushing for sanctions against Khartoum and peacekeeping intervention forces in Darfur, Washington has reassessed the situation and no longer sees the need to project any strong opinions. The Bush administration actively inserted itself into the north-south peace negotiations by sending John Danforth as a special envoy to Sudan. Once it became clear in 2003 that Khartoum's crackdown on rebel groups and civilians in Darfur might pose a threat to the north-south dialog, Washington quickly became the leading international force pushing for a resolution. [See: "Trying Times in Darfur and the Establishment of International Criminal Law"]

However, even this activist approach was contained by geopolitical realities elsewhere: the war in Iraq began to go badly, the trans-Atlantic dialog was in disrepair, China's fear of losing access to Sudanese oil and Russia's nausea at endorsing any action that would threaten the state's sovereignty -- partly due to Sudan being a major recipient of Russian military equipment -- effectively blocked any robust response from the U.N. Security Council, and Washington's commitment to north-south negotiations prevented it from taking any measures that might scuttle the long delayed resolution.

In this environment, Washington was unable to find a compromise solution to the killings in Darfur other than a series of weak U.N. resolutions and the introduction of a small, uncoordinated peacekeeping mission from the African Union (A.U.) with a mandate so confining as to make the mission's success impossible. Since the end of 2004, several factors have shifted that have made Washington's contained activist role largely unsustainable.

There are three main reasons for Washington's shift toward indifference on the crisis in Darfur. First, the north-south peace agreement has been signed and the southern rebels have integrated themselves into the government in Khartoum, suturing the south's rebuilding to the vitality of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir's government. Secondly, the U.N. voted to endorse an investigation of 51 of Darfur's suspected war criminals to the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.), with which the Bush administration refuses to cooperate. However, it is Khartoum's cooperation with Washington's "war on terrorism" that may have pushed the Bush administration into the position of having no position on Darfur.

Cooperation on the Intelligence Front

Although Sudan remains on Washington's official list of state sponsors of terrorism, Khartoum has been cooperating with the C.I.A. and other U.S. intelligence agencies on issues involving Islamic militants. Since 2001, the U.S. State Department's annual reports on world terrorism patterns have noted Khartoum's assistance. A recent Los Angeles Times article lays out how the relationship evolved from Khartoum's sharing of intelligence files to detaining and expelling Islamic militants from Sudan in close coordination with the C.I.A. Washington believes that leaning on Khartoum too hard for its role in the crisis in Darfur might disrupt the tightly entwined relationship between U.S. and Sudanese intelligence agencies.

Washington demonstrated its change in position with a March 25 fact sheet prepared by the State Department. In this document, Washington argues that the death toll in Darfur is much lower than any previous independent estimates put forth. Whereas the World Health Organization's estimated death toll for March to mid-October 2004 was 70,000, Washington's new statistical assessment of the situation estimates that there may have been as few as 60,000 deaths as a result of the fighting in Darfur to date.

The organization hired by the U.S. Agency for International Development has reported a death toll as high as 400,000. The number 200,000 tends to be the figure at the lower end of most extrapolations, but the U.S. State Department's high-end estimate was 146,000 "excess" deaths. This lower death toll is intended to make Washington's current non-position on Darfur more tenable; however, it also opens the door for other states and organizations to assume the role that the U.S. once played in Darfur.

The U.N., E.U. and N.A.T.O. will now take the lead in bolstering the ability of the A.U. troops to functionally operate in Darfur. The E.U. has pledged to provide the air transport for the thousands of A.U. troops promised to Darfur who have not been able to make the journey as of yet. N.A.T.O. has said that it will make its African debut by supporting the A.U. mission to Darfur, though the support will be under-the-radar so as not to take the spotlight off of the A.U. troops' role. On Friday, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan will pay his second visit to Darfur, following a donors' conference in Ethiopia intended to raise funds and support for the A.U. mission.

Conflict Resolution

The increased presence of multilateral organizations in Darfur, always aimed at supporting the A.U. mission, has been made possible by the exit of a robust U.S. presence in the crisis. However, their presence also means a shift in tactics toward resolving the conflict. It can be expected that any solution to the crisis will not emerge from military intervention or a bold new approach but rather through a course designated by international law.

As the E.U. and U.N. increase their diplomatic presence in Sudan, the long stalled negotiations between the western rebels and Khartoum may be brought back into the spotlight while the I.C.C. investigations will be used as a stick to push Khartoum into accepting a negotiated settlement. Whether or not these tactics will prove successful remains an open question; even with multilateral pressure Darfur will likely continue to bleed for the foreseeable future.

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