Global Policy Forum

Below is the text of the report submitted to the UN Security Council by the Britain Ambassador on the visit of the recent visit to Sudan by the Security Council delegation. In his report the UK Ambassador Jones Parry, who was leading the mission, indicated the principal mission of the delegation was to persuade Sudan to accept UN force deployment in western Sudan region of Darfur. He says the Sudanese rejection of the UN deployment is fuelled by the "adoption of Security Council Resolution 1679 under Chapter VII". The delegation explained to the Sudanese official that "Chapter VII was a technical, not a political, issue. A Chapter VII mandate was likely to be required for any UN force in Darfur to enable the force to give the necessary protection to civilians, and to itself".

"President Bashir made it clear that he did not think external troops should be mandated to attack Sudanese", the report said. On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the report says that the CPA remains a fragile deal. Sudanese First Vice-President Salva Kiir told clearly the UN SC delegation that "implementation of the Agreement was essential. Without it, there would be no Agreement, and with no Agreement, war would be probable".

1. Madam President, May I begin by thanking all members of the Council who participated on this Mission. Their commitment and solidarity made this a particularly useful and timely visit. I am also grateful to the Secretariat for their assistance and participation.

2. It is now almost three years since the Council first began to debate whether Sudan was an appropriate subject for its agenda. Grave problems had emerged in Darfur, and relations between Khartoum and the periphery were increasingly difficult. Much has happened since then. By today the Council has adopted seven Resolutions on Sudan, and two Presidential Statements. Those of us who visited the region can be in no doubt about the appropriateness of the Council's attention to Sudan and the wider region. For me, the argument is not whether we should be involved in Sudan and Darfur, but have we been able to do as much as we ought. That view was reinforced by the visit to Chad.

3. Sudan, the biggest country in Africa, is very complex. Darfur has rightly seized the attention of the world, but the situation there is very complicated. During its visit, the Mission found the conflict in Darfur not fully understood by the international community. It found, for example, that the terms 'government', 'rebel', 'Arab' and 'African' were often over-simplifications of a more complex situation on the ground,where alliances between tribes and groups often shift. The porous - or non-existent- border with Chad exacerbates this. A number of the Council's interlocutors described the situation 'in Darfur as a traditional conflict between herdsmen and farmers over limited national resources. They outlined the challenging nature of governing a region with its peculiar tribal complexities and lack of public services. A lasting solution to the problem in Darfur can only be found through the traditions and customs of the peoples of the region. Indeed, GoS' support for an AU, rather than a UN, force in Darfur is partly motivated by its belief that African states possess a similar heritage to the people of Darfur. We will need to continue to ensure - and stress to GoS - that any UN force will have a strong African participation and character. 4. In the North/South context, the comprehensive Peace Agreement marked the cessation of hostilities, but the Government of National Unity is still a young body.

5. It was important that the Mission begin its work in Khartoum and emphasise its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan. We stressed that the Security Council wishes to work in partnership with the Government and the other main actors in Sudan to help tackle the range of problems which the country faces. That assistance today is expressed in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the South, UNMIS, by the work of the Special Representative Jan Pronk to which I pay credit, and by the huge involvement of the UN Agencies delivering support to the people of Sudan. But if it is the Security Council's role to promote international peace and security, correspondingly it is the obligation of the Government of Sudan to protect its citizens, and to respond positively to the offers of help from us and others.

6. The situation in Darfur has deteriorated this year. Humanitarian access has not been consistent and has diminished. Attacks on individuals, particularly women, have increased. The Wali of North Darfur told the mission that there are 129,000 lDPs in the camps in North Darfur,with another 279,000 lDPs outside them. There were a further 622,000 people who had been affected by war, bringing the overall total impacted by the conflict to be 1.31 million. Positively, the African Union Mission, AMIS, has been on the ground for 12 months, and its peace troops have been delivering improved security to the people of Darfur in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Thanks in particular to the AU, and with the support of others, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja on 5 May. Support for this Agreement is not homogeneous among the different groupings in Darfur, nor is opposition consistent among those parties who have declined to sign the Agreement.

7. Two truths were clear to the Mission: first the Agreement needs to be sold urgently to those living in the region and those displaced elsewhere; secondly, its implementation is key to peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider region. We heard many interlocutors describe what was wrong with the accord. It is not perfect. But it is the only agreement that we have, and in the view of the Mission, it needs to be implemented robustly. We encouraged those who had not joined the Agreement to do so as soon as possible. 8. In support of this Agreement, the UN family, particularly the World Food Programme, has now the largest food support operation in the world. Hundreds of tonnes of food are delivered daily by convoys coming all the way from Port Sudan and from the South, much of the time on unmade roads, the line of white trucks visibly delivering life-saving relief.

9. In Addis Ababa, the Mission found them selves in full agreement with the African Union that at the earliest opportunity, the United Nations should take over the peacekeeping role in Darfur. President Konare and Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit emphasised that this was the wish of the African Union. The AU has done a very good job starting from scratch in difficult circumstances. We emphasised this in our meeting with the Commander of AMIS in Darfur. But sustaining such a force, rotating its troops, providing the necessary capacities including command control and communications, delivering financing, implementing the more robust post- Abuja mandate, are all difficult challenges. Hence the agreement that it was time for the wider international community to share the burden and provide a UN force for Darfur.

10. A primary purpose of our visit and of our discussions was to persuade the Sudanese Government that this was the best option for Darfur and for the country. In Khartoum we found many hostile perceptions of a UN deployment, fuelled in part by concern by the adoption of SCR 1679 under Chapter VII. This Chapter is a major irritant for the Government, the President and Parliamentarians in Khartoum. We explained that Chapter VII was a technical, not a political, issue. A Chapter VII mandate was likely to be required for any UN force in Darfur to enable the force to give the necessary protection to civilians, and to itself. So Chapter VII would help the UN to implement the DPA, which was what the Government wanted. Chapter VII would only mean the UN mission in Darfur had the same mandate as nearly all the UN's peacekeeping operations in Africa, including, at the moment in DRC-which the Council visited after Sudan - Cote d'ivoire and Liberia.

11. It was always unlikely that the Government of Sudan would agree to a UN mission during the Council's visit. But the Mission had an important role in explaining why we thought this was in the interests of Sudan and encouraging them to take on this view. The process to get agreement from the Government of Sudan may be tortuous. By the end of our visit, the Mission felt we had edged further towards the probability of the Government of Sudan accepting such a deployment. Under Secretary-General Guehenno and his colleagues from the AU are now in Khartoum and the region as a Technical Assessment Mission. The Mission considers that they should have two objectives. First, to secure the agreement of GoS to strengthening AMIS so that it is better able to implement the DPA and protect civilians until a UN force is deployed. Second, to then identify with GoS the transition arrangements if AMIS is to be gradually replaced by a UN force. That is the intention, and in my view, it is crucial that this is agreed very quickly, and the necessary planning completed urgently.

12. Security in Darfur must be quickly improved in order to cope with the present array of attacks. Civilians must be afforded protection, their rights assured and impurity for abusers ended. That is why we need to implement the DPA and quickly strengthen AMIS' role. To secure the agreement of the Government to the transfer, I assume that the AMIS mandate must first be strengthened to reflect the need to implement the DPA, and the UN should then take over that same mandate. If this is agreed, then it will be for this Council to draft and agree the necessary Resolution to provide the mandate for the UN Force. President Bashir made it clear that he did not think external troops should be mandated to attack Sudanese. He therefore accepted that control of the Janjaweed, long sought by this Council and a pre-condition for the security of persons in Darfur, was the responsibility of his government. We looked to them to fulfil that responsibility now.

13. But whilst the international community's attention is righly focussed on the problems of Darfur, the Mission left with a clear sense that we shouldn't lose sight of the wider problems in Sudan, in particular in the South. The comprehensive Peace Agreement, which marked the cessation of hostilities, is being taken forward. But the Mission found that implementation is slow. International donations to the South are also dying up. In one of the more sobering comments made, a member of the Southern Sudan parliament reminded the Mission that were Southern Sudan a country, it would be the poorest in the world. Yet Darfur's future is inexorably linked to that of the South; and the South's to that of Darfur. A holistic solution is required, that addresses all the countries problems and through a coordinated response of the range of bodies in the UN family. Security is of paramount importance. But, it cannot be viewed in isolation from the humanitarian or social initiatives.

14. The Council in November 2004 travelled to Nairobi, and in its work there, contributed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in January 2005. Our Mission was united in pressing for the implementation of the CPA. We visited UNMIS and were impressed by the work it carries out on the ground. We met and discussed implementation of the CPA with President Kiir of Southern Sudan, also Vice President of Sudan, and his Ministerial colleagues. It was clear that the Agreement remains fragile, and that there is a continuing risk to civilians outside the main towns. President Kiir also stated clearly that implementation of the Agreement was essential. Without it, there would be no Agreement, and with no Agreement, war would be probable. This was a stark warning of the crucial importance of moving forward on full implementation of the CPA. As we left Juba, we paid our respects at the tomb of Dr John Garang, who negotiated the CPA, and whose death has been such a loss to the peace process and to Southern Sudan.

15. In the South, we also discussed the problems caused in the region by the attacks launched by the Lords Resistance Army, the LRA. This scourge is present in Southern Sudan, and also in the Garamba Park in the DRC, as well as affecting Northern Uganda. Its activities over 19 years have led to more than 1.7 million internally-displaced persons, and to many deaths. The need to overcome this small group of people who are causing such havoc throughout the region is only too obvious. The Government in the South is making overtures to the LRA, hoping that it can persuade them to negotiate peace with the Government of Uganda. Clearly, there is a need for a political process to entice the bulk of the LRA members away from the leadership, and to try to reintegrate them into their societies. But there must be real doubt about the extent to which Kony and the other indictees are in any way prepared to work for peace and to put aside their appalling record. In my view they need to face justice in The Hague. I have separately asked the Secretary-General, in following up the mandate in Resolutions 1653 and 1663, to provide this Council with a written report on the regional dimension of the LRA. We need to put in place a comprehensive response by the international community, given the obvious threat to regional peace and security which the LRA still poses.

16. In Addis, we had a full exchange, not just on Darfur, AMIS and a UN peacekeeping operation, but on wider issues. President Konare set out his deep concern about the situation in Somalia, and described the AU approach to the DRC and Cote d'ivoire, in both cases in terms very similar to that of the Security Council. But we also noted the importance of the wider relations between the United Nations and the African Union. With foresight, the Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the role of regional organisations. Our co-operation with the African Union is a positive and timely development, which has many possibilities. Peacekeeping and demobilisation, destabilitarisation and reintegration, security sector reform are obvious candidates for co-operation. The UN has a particular responsibility to seek to help develop the capacities of the AU and of its regional manifestations. But that responsibility goes wider. I hope that other regional groupings can increase the support they are already giving, and that bilateral donors will also help develop essential capacity0 .It is crucial in its own right, but particularly important that we help African initiatives to tackle African problems. But more widely, the entire UN family should develop closer relationships with the African Union and its different components.

17. We were able to have four meetings with representatives of NGOS working in Sudan and Chad. I would like to pay tribute to their immense contributions. They, the UN Agencies and the peacekeepers are carrying the burden for us today in Africa. They are tackling humanitarian concerns, providing water and sanitation, delivering medical assistance and educational support, and proving an essential basis for longer-term development.

18. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the work being done with women. We could only admire the courage of women confronting the immense burdens of life in Darfur and in the camps of Chad. With quiet dignity, they have to carry water, search for firewood, face attack and violation, not just from the Janjaweed, and at the same time bring up families, often without male support. SCR 1325 was much quoted. So it should be. It was a landmark Resolution which addressed the role of women as the particular victims of conflict, suffering disproportionately from attacks, from HIV/AIDS, often wrongly disowned by their families, and with little access to medical assistance, counselling, and so on. At the same time, they lack the empowerment to play the role in political life which is not only their right, but would introduce a degree of sanity into much of the activity in the region. So the need for full implementation of 1325 is obvious. That requires a comprehensive strategy to secure the rights of women, to provide them with relief and assistance, and to empower them to play their just role in society.

19. Sudanese women have already identified a series of actions to help achieve these goals. These include urgent political, economic and social legislative reform; access to and ownership of property and land; their full involvement in DDR processes; the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence and the prosecution of the perpetrators; and the establishment of women's resource centres for refugee and l DP women.

20. Responding to these priorities is essential if we are to achieve sustainable peace in Sudan. I hope that the UN family, but not just in Darfur and Chad, can better play its part in working with host governments to develop strategies which deliver these goals. Then as effectively as possible and without duplication, the individual Agencies should work to secure implementation of that strategy.

21. It was right that we should end our visit in Chad. After Darfur we flew to N'djamena and on Saturday, 1? June flew back Eastwards, nearly to the Sudanese border, and visited the camps at Goz Bieda. Their scale is huge. President Deby said that 700,000 Chadians had been displaced due to the raids being undertaken daily from Darfur, although the UN estimate is much lower. There were a further 300,000 external refugees in Chad, including 200,000 from Darfur and 40,000 from the Central African Republic (CAR). We had to Ieave the camps by 12:30, because any later, and our planes would not have been able to take off in such a hostile climate.

22. The Mission was immensely moved by the dedication of UN workers, and NGOs as they tackled the massive task of bringing relief and assistance to so many people. Worryingly, despite being in camps, individuals particularly women, are at risk of attack. Within the camps we were alarmed to learn that recruitment and intimidation of persons is regularly carried out by rebel groups. Nor had we appreciated in advance the threats which the camps pose to local resources, particularly declining water supplies and firewood.

23. Yet the local community has embraced the lDPs and refugees as guests. It was also a stark reminder of the poverty of the region to discover that local people visit the camps in order to receive medical attention, particularly to give birth, and to be guaranteed food. The provision of food by the WFP and others is close to 100 % of requirements, but to sustain that level, is an immense challenge. So is the need to provide adequate security for and within the camps. But it will not be acceptable to deliver a UN force giving better security in Darfur if this merely transfers the attacks and the insecurity into Eastern Chad through a porous or non-existent boundary.

24. Back in N'djamena, our final meeting was with President Deby. He set out clearly his preoccupations, his concern that the consequences of the Darfur situation was undermining Chad, and that the State was under threat.

25. The Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security. Our visit demonstrated the importance of Council action on the ground in Sudan, and in the region. But it also reminded us of the wider UN interests in Africa. 2005 was a good year for development assistance. Substantial additional resources were pledged. Sudan and Chad underline why these are so desperately needed, why the MDGs are crucial, and how their implementation is so far behind schedule. The need to move from the humanitarian to longer-term assistance is all too apparent. But Chad is the seventh poorest country in the world. Delivering the Goals, ensuring a partnership with the international community, and accountable relationship between donor and recipient, is basic to the development contract. With it goes governance, the Rule of Law, and essential rights for the people of the region - rights which include the protection of women and the right to development.

26. This was a successful visit by a united Council. We delivered messages of support and partnership, but did not shirk from the tougher arguments where those were necessary. Sudan demands an integrated approach to secure the implementation of the two Agreements, and then to move on to tackle other issues like Eastern Sudan. But Sudan cannot be considered alone. It needs to be seen in a regional context. Its relations with Chad and the situation there should be of particular concern to this Council. Of course, the governments concerned have the overall responsibility for the security and protection of their people. But it is all too apparent that the UN will have to strengthen its assistance, not just for security, and be prepared to do this for some time if fragile Agreements are to be implemented. Peace in Darfur is closely related to peace in Sudan, and in turn is vital for regional peace and security. The United Nations must be prepared to provide essential support until sustainable peace and development are achieved.

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