Global Policy Forum

By Nii Akuetteh

Nii Akuetteh--a member of the Scholars' Council at TransAfrica Forum in Washington DC-- is founder of the Democracy & Conflict Research Institute (DCRI) in Accra, Ghana. Before this, he was based in Abuja, Nigeria serving as the founding Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the regional arm of George Soros' global network of democracy-promoting foundations.

Washington is playing a leading role in the unfolding drama in Darfur. So we have an obligation to know about the history of United States policy in the neighborhood. Not long ago, Ronald Reagan's policy in neighboring Chad deepened a longstanding crisis and scuttled a chance for peace. This may be a cautionary tale for Darfur, where US President George W. Bush proposes humanitarian intervention to end the suffering.

That earlier crisis was neighboring Chad's civil war, begun 1963. After eighteen years, continuous fighting had devastated the country and foreign interventions—overt and covert—by Libya, France, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had all failed. African-led mediations had produced four agreements to form unity governments but none had lasted beyond a few months. In November 1979, the African leaders produced "Chad's last best hope," a carefully-balanced compromise that created a fifth unity government, called GUNT II (after the first Transitional National Unity Government, which had collapsed). Tragically, this hope too was dashed only four months later. This was when Hissene Habre, the warlord serving as Defense Minister, attempted a violent power grab, which was neither his first nor second try to wrest control. His cabinet colleagues fired him and, in June 1980, sentenced him to death after trying and convicting him in absentia. Desperate to crush Habre's rebellion, GUNT II turned to the Libyans, who chased him into Darfur. Libyan troops then became the keepers of Chad's hard-worn peace.

Enter newly-elected U.S. president Ronald Reagan. He declared Chad a major foreign policy priority and said the right words—neutrality, peaceful solutions and no foreign meddling. Actions, however, told a different story. The Reagan administration brushed aside the hard-worn African consensus, branded Libya's troops occupiers and insisted they leave. To sugarcoat its demands, Washington promised to fund a replacement Inter-African Force (IAF). The Libyans withdrew in November 1981 and 4,800 IAF troops arrived in Chad in December. Requested to honor its pledge, Washington became stingy—it provided 8 cents of every dollar the IAF needed. This, combined with mandate disagreements, kept the IAF toothless.

Having deceived the Africans, the Reagan administration rapidly implemented its real agenda. The goal was to overthrow the consensus GUNT government and replace it with Washington's favorite Chadian warlord, Hissene Habre—the same renegade warlord condemned to death by his former colleagues. The U.S. covertly showered cash, arms and equipment on Habre. Rejuvenated, his militia roared in from Darfur and took Ndjamena, Chad's capital, on June 7, 1982. As a direct consequence, the OAU became acrimoniously split; the IAF peacekeepers withdrew; the GUNT formed a government in exile; and its militias re-entered Chad as a two-pronged armed rebellion that soon threatened Habre's grip on power.

Reagan hastily leaped to Habre's defense. He first informed Congress and invoked the War Powers Act. Next, he sent two sophisticated surveillance planes to Habre, followed by other military aircraft, Redeye missiles, sundry war materiel and even American "advisors," whose number may have reached 500. In July and August 1983 alone, new U.S. military aid for Habre totaled $25 million. Washington also pressured friendly capitals to help Habre. One was Paris. For months, Francois Mitterrand resolutely rejected Reagan's entreaties to go to Habre's aid. Eventually Paris capitulated: It halted secret negotiations with Muammar Gadhafi. Instead, Mitterrand mounted Operation Sting Ray, a massive military intervention that sent 3,000 French troops into Chad on 9 August 1983. A second noteworthy source of help was Zaire. Mobutu Sese Seko sent three Mirage aircraft and 1,800 Zairian paratroopers into Chad. Mobutu's rewards included a White House photo opportunity and effusive Reagan praise. Thanks to this muscular American-orchestrated intervention in 1983, Habre beat back the challenge.

Protected by Reagan, Mitterrand, and other friends, Habre tyrannized Chad with impunity until 1990, when an aide, Idriss Deby, overthrew him. Uncovered documents and other evidence now suggest Habre probably murdered 40,000 political opponents—after the war. Weeks ago, on July 2, in Gambia, the African Union joined the U.N. and the EU in ordering Senegal, where Habre lives in exile, to put him on trial.

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