Global Policy Forum

By Taylor B. Seybolt

abstract

This article assesses the consequences of eight military interventions in Somalia and Rwanda in terms of the number of lives saved. It argues that variations in outcome are mainly due to factors under the intervenor's control. To succeed, the decision to intervene must lead to identification of the objectives of military action, which determine the strategy needed to save lives. Whether or not a particular strategy saves lives depends on the intervenor's motives, capabilities and response time. A two-by-two matrix with one humanitarian dimension and one political dimension puts humanitarian actions into political context and displays considerable explanatory and prescriptive power. Among the findings is that most humanitarian interventions are far more likely to succeed when the intervenor has political motives as well as humanitarian ones.

Introduction

Military interventions in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 and Somalia in 1992 marked the emergence of a phenomenon that had previously received little practical or analytical attention. Military intervention for the stated purpose of helping the local population to survive the predations of armed and dangerous men was not a flash in the pan, as shown by interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda in the ensuing years, and in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. There is every reason to believe that humanitarian interventions will be undertaken in the future: humanitarian crises will continue to arise; a number of national militaries maintain the capacity to respond; the United Nations Secretary-General favours intervention; and a growing number of people accept the idea that basic human rights trump state sovereignty in extreme cases.1

Despite the likelihood of future humanitarian military interventions, there is little consensus about what factors determine whether they will succeed or fail. This article addresses the challenge of how to respond to humanitarian crises once governments have decided to use military assets. It stands in contrast to political, legal and ethical critiques of whether to use military force for humanitarian purposes. This consequentialist approach complements other approaches by implying that the question of whether to intervention should rest in part on the expected likelihood of success. This paper presents one measure of success and the main factors that determine the short-term outcome of a military venture.

Two questions drive the analysis. First, have past military interventions for stated humanitarian purposes saved lives? Evidence from seventeen interventions in six locations yields the answer ‘sometimes'.2 More interesting is the observation that different military operations in the same country, during the same crisis have had varying levels of success in humanitarian terms. In other words, the structure and process of a conflict by themselves do not determine the effectiveness of an intervention. This article argues that the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention is within the control of the intervenor, within limits imposed by the characteristics of the conflict.

The second question is what factors under the intervenor's control determine the effectiveness of humanitarian military interventions? I contend that the intervenor's objectives and strategy are the main links between an intervention and its outcome. My central hypothesis is that in a successful humanitarian intervention the decision to intervene leads to identification of the objectives of military action, which determine the strategy needed to save lives. The three key explanatory factors that influence whether the central hypothesis hold true are the intervenor's motives, capabilities and the time it takes an intervenor to respond to a crisis.

The following section defines a measure of humanitarian effectiveness. It also defines each of the five factors under scrutiny and identifies their relationships to each other. Section three describes four military operations in Somalia, determines the number of lives saved (or not) by each one and analyzes the reasons for success and failure. Section four does the same for four military operations in Rwanda. These eight operations in two very different environments are the basis for a comparative analysis in section five. The conclusion notes theoretical and policy implications of the article.