Global Policy Forum

Expected Council Action

At the initiative of France and the UK, the Council will begin what seems likely to be an extended process of overhauling some key elements of peacekeeping. France, as Council president for January, is organising an informal seminar on 22 January and a thematic debate in the Council on 23 January. A succession of meetings on the subject seems likely in the forthcoming months, perhaps with the goal of reaching decisions by end of August.

The informal seminar will be held at the French mission. There will be a panel made up principally of peacekeeping practitioners. All 15 members of the Council are expected to participate. Discussion is expected to be free-flowing and to focus on options for resolving some of the broad challenges to peacekeeping. A French-British joint non-paper outlining the key challenges will be circulated ahead of the seminar.

The following day, 23 January, the Council will hold a public debate to begin the process of getting input from the wider UN membership. This event will feature some major troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and senior members of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General has indicated that he will participate. France as president of the Council will brief on the initiative including the seminar. No formal substantive outcome from the seminar and debate is expected. However, a procedural decision on how to carry forward the work is possible.

Background

In two days in January this year the Council has yet again taken some momentous decisions that will significantly increase UN peacekeeping both in terms of costs and resources (resolution 1861 on MINURCAT adopted on 14 January and resolution 1863 on Somalia adopted on 16 January).

This dramatic beginning to 2009 brings to mind a similar dramatic set of decisions in August 2006 when the Council in a period of twenty days established three new peacekeeping operations (resolution 1701 on Lebanon, resolution 1704 on Timor-Leste and resolution 1706 on Sudan) which together constituted authorisation for an almost 50 percent increase in UN peacekeeping. (Please see our Special Research Report of 8 September 2006, Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping.)

Both surges follow a steady increase in UN peacekeeping commitments over preceding years. But surges are risky—as was recognised in 2000 in the Brahimi Report (recommending just one new peacekeeping operation per year) all the more so in light of the fact that, over the last decade, the Council has not only expanded peacekeeping operations significantly but also has developed peacekeeping from simple military operations into new multidimensional integrated operations, often requiring creative partnerships with many different actors including regional organisations.

With more ambitious mandates and more difficult environments, the challenges in the field to peacekeeping have grown enormously. The UN has been active in responding to the developments in existing missions with new forms of mandates (e.g., the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)). The Secretariat has responded with improvements in its processes and management, provision of more comprehensive doctrine, application of lessons learned and innovations in command and control. However, the political, security and logistical challenges are not by any means resolved as the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has clearly demonstrated.

On top of the problems of expanding demand is the serious problem that has arisen over the past five years of capacity and resources. There are several dimensions to this.

• Firstly, many of the "traditional troop contributors" (this term tends to be used to include the Europeans, Scandinavians, some Latin American and others who provided most of the peacekeepers until the early 1990s) to peacekeeping no longer have the capacity to contribute troops due to their deployment in non-UN operations.

• Secondly, many of the new contributors of troops to UN operations are developing countries whose military forces lack the infrastructure, equipment and training to effectively integrate into complex missions.

• Thirdly, there is a significant lack of available and qualified police—this is a global problem.

• Fourthly, there is a significant lack of available and qualified civilians (an issue addressed by the Council as a UK initiative on 20 May 2008 [S/PV.5895 and resumption 1] and still awaiting a report).

• Fifthly, inflexibility in UN staffing rules which inhibit rotation of otherwise qualified and available UN staff to missions. (It seems that recent decisions by the General Assembly Fifth Committee have at best only scraped the surface of the problem.)

• Sixthly, and exacerbating all of the above, is the global financial crisis which means that the wealthy countries are feeling fiscal pressures which are unprecedented in the whole history of UN peacekeeping. At a time when the cost of UN peacekeeping will be at an all time high (over $7 billion in 2009) the financial incentives to take a hard look at peacekeeping are apparent to all.

It is also apparent that in the background lie additional serious political issues.

• Some Council members are increasingly concerned about the growing need to exercise sufficient member state oversight and management of the current huge investment in peacekeeping. Closely related to this is a sense that there are no effective institutional channels for efficient two-way communication and information flows between the UN and member states.

• Some Council members (and many General Assembly members) are concerned that there is insufficient focus on properly managing the integration of the various silos which constitute peacekeeping. Bilateral efforts, regional efforts, UN military, UN police, UN civilians and UN agencies are all spending huge resources but often pulling in different directions and not addressing the root causes. This often manifests itself as a complaint that peacekeeping operations have plenty of money for foreign soldiers but no serious capacity and no money for employment initiatives, quick impact projects and other like initiatives. (In 2006 the Norwegians began an initiative, "Project on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations", which addressed this problem providing a series of concrete recommendations (available at www.regjeringen.no/integratedmissions). (Please see our 9 May 2008 Update Report on Building Sustainable Peace: Post-Conflict Stablisation.)

• Many General Assembly members, including the now large number of non-Council members who provide the bulk of UN troops and police, are dissatisfied with the Council's exclusive approach to participation in the Council's oversight of peacekeeping and the lack of opportunity for effective input by TCCs to management issues, and strategic decisions directly affecting their national contingents. (Please see our 19 October 2007 Working Methods Special Research Report.)

Statistics

As of 31 December 2008 the number of UN operations was 16, the same as in 1998. However, the size of the operations is vastly different. In 1998 the 16 operations had 14,600 uniformed peacekeepers. The 16 peacekeeping operations in 2008 involved 88,000 troops, military observers and police physically deployed. Moreover, by the end of 2008 the Security Council had authorised 130,000 military and police personnel. One hundred and ten thousand uniformed personnel plus civilians were on the ground. The peacekeeping budget had grown to $7.36 billion for 2008-2009 from $1.5 billion in 1999-2000.

Past Initiatives on Reforming Peacekeeping

The UN has made a number of serious attempts to reform and improve UN peacekeeping in light of changing demands and better knowledge. In 2000 the Secretary-General set up a high-level panel chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The primary objective was for the panel to "undertake a thorough review of the peace and security activities and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future". The initiative was spurred by the peacekeeping failures in 1990s, especially in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. The outcome of that panel, the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, or the Brahimi Report, made wide ranging proposals on improving UN systems and processes for the management of peacekeeping operations. Among the key recommendations of the Brahimi Report were:

• necessity of getting clear and achievable mandates for UN operations;
• being able to conduct robust peacekeeping;
• equipping UN forces with the capacity, when mandated, to confront violence; and
• ensuring political and resource backing from member states before missions are launched.

In his In Larger Freedom report for the 2005 World Summit then Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged member states "to do more to ensure that the UN has effective capacities for peacekeeping commensurate with the demands that they place on it". He urged them to:

• create strategic reserves that could be deployed rapidly; and
• to establish an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome expressed support for standby arrangements and stressed the need to "mount operations with adequate capacity to counter hostilities and fulfil effectively their mandates." It also endorsed the creation of "an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity."

The Council too has paid attention to the thematic challenges of peacekeeping and at times has evidenced a desire to effect some change. The challenge of addressing the UN's peacekeeping capacity and linking it to achievable mandates and adequate force generation arrangements was first addressed in the Security Council in 1994. In its presidential statement of 3 May (S/PRST/1994/22) the Council set down criteria for itself when establishing a new operation. Among the key points covered were:

• the need to recognise the limits of peacekeeping and the importance of having a peace to keep;
• the need to improve the quality and speed of the flow of information available to support Council decision-making;
• the need for enhanced consultations and exchange of information with troop-contributing countries;
• improving the capacity of the United Nations to meet the need for rapid deployment and reinforcement of peacekeeping operations and noting the Secretary-General's intention to devise stand-by arrangements; and
• coordination between the military and civilian components of a peacekeeping operation.

However, practical implementation of these goals proved challenging—especially any changes which had impact on established institutions and traditional Council working methods. The "fire and forget" mentality in which the Council would launch an operation and then essentially forget about it till the mandate was due to expire, prevailed. Nothing was done to improve Council systems for information flows.

And there was also only limited progress in securing an effective response to the concerns of TCCs. On 31 January 2001 the Council held a meeting on strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries (see also resolutions 1327 and 1353). In the presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/3) following the meeting the Council recognised the need for transparent three-way communication between the Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries as a result of the increasing complexity of the peacekeeping relationships. It reiterated its agreement to hold consultations with troop-contributing countries at different stages of peacekeeping operations. It was also at this meeting that the Council decided to establish a Working Group of the Whole on UN Peacekeeping Operations to address generic peacekeeping issues and technical aspects of peacekeeping operations. Neither of these decisions has yet realised their potential. Indeed in June 2001 in resolution 1353 the consultations with TCCs were effectively downgraded to formalised participation in a closed meeting immediately before adoption of a resolution.

On 8 January 2007 the Council in a presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council with "more regular, analytical reporting on regions of potential armed conflict". In the statement the Council also recognised the importance of a more strategic approach to the "oversight and direction of peacekeeping".

On 16 April 2008 the Council held a high-level debate on the UN and regional organisations, focusing particularly on the relationship with the African Union (AU). At the end of the debate the Council adopted resolution 1809 which expressed a desire to further enhance the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU; encouraged ongoing efforts of the AU and subregional organisations to strengthen and take on peacekeeping operations in Africa and recognised the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UN mandate. It also welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to set up within three months an AU-UN panel to examine the modalities of how to support such peacekeeping operations, particularly start-up funding, equipment and logistics and to consider in-depth lessons from past and current AU peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General has circulated a report from the AU-UN panel to member states. It is currently being translated and once released will have the document number S/2008/813. The report makes recommendations for strengthening the AU-UN relationship and developing more effective partnerships. It also recommends the establishment of two new financial mechanisms, one based on UN assessed funding and designed to support specific peacekeeping operations and another voluntarily funded multidonor trust fund. It also recommends the establishment of a joint UN-AU team to examine the detailed modalities needed to implement its recommendations.

In 2008, during the UK presidency in May, the Council held a public debate and adopted a presidential statement on 20 May 2008 which invited the Secretary-General to provide advice within twelve months to the relevant UN organs on how "to support national efforts to secure lasting peace more rapidly and effectively including through coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing."

What has Precipitated the French/British Initiative?

Various events in 2008 seem to have brought to the surface the urgency of a more comprehensive approach to dealing with some of the problems confronting peacekeeping and the difficulties for the Council in making decisions on peacekeeping. At the end of 2008 the complex, quick-changing conflict in eastern DRC highlighted the inadequacy of the Council's traditional hands off approach to managing peacekeeping operations especially when confronted with the need for making a quick decision on implementation of a protection mandate and on expanding a peacekeeping mission. The problems implementing the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment have also illustrated another set of practical difficulties for the Council. And the memory of the renewed crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006 is still in Council members' minds.

But it seems that there are also wider concerns also coming to the surface. In the past, interested P5 members seemed content to leave the Secretary-General with all the responsibility on peacekeeping on the basis that—to the extent that they wanted or needed to influence events—this could be done behind the scenes more effectively than through the collective machinery such as the Military Staff Committee or the Working Group on Peacekeeping. But viewed in 2008, with the current level of investment, the risks and complexity, the need to ensure the very best prioritisation of resources and cost efficiency along with much enhanced media and NGO scrutiny and domestic demands for accountability, the case for significant reform seems to have fallen on sympathetic ears.

Areas likely to be covered by the Council include the following.

(i) Information Flow: What information does the Council have, what does it need, and who has the information? (Remembering that some of the most vital information is often held by Council members themselves in reporting from their own military and other sources and often this amount of information exceeds what is available to UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or even the UN Force Commander.) How should information be pooled in New York? How is confidentiality best maintained when necessary? What information is essential to enhance political decisions, not of only an initial mandate, but also how and when missions should respond to developments in the field using powers already in their mandates. Related to this is what mechanisms should be developed to improve reporting between the Secretariat and the Council and between the peacekeeping missions and the Secretariat? For example although the Secretary-General's reports reflect lessons learned the Council does not have an opportunity to discuss lessons learned with the Secretariat. Better information would help the Council decide if a mission is needed; in prioritisation of resources between missions; and in determining when and how to wind down missions. It may also allow the Council to find better ways of supporting ongoing peace processes.

(ii) Peacekeeping Capabilities: There is clearly an overstretch in peacekeeping. Additional resources need to be found for new missions. In light of their large commitments to the UN in Lebanon and ongoing demands in Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that "traditional troop-contributing countries" will be able to provide new resources. But the developing countries that are now the backbone of UN peacekeeping have a separate set of problems such as lack of equipment and training which often lead to under-utilisation of their resources in the field. As a result of all of these factors, inevitably other ways to increase capability for new missions such as by decreasing demand in old missions or through closing operations will be on the agenda. But this can only be done by addressing the question of whether resources are being allocated properly.

(iii) Costs: Peacekeeping costs are already at an all-time high. The UN had estimated $7.4 billion as the peacekeeping budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year which is a 10 percent increase over the previous budget and a nearly threefold increase in budget and personnel since 2003. The annual peacekeeping budget is three times the size of the annualised UN regular budget for the rest of the Secretariat. Combined with the global economic downturn members are likely to be keen to discuss ways of streamlining peacekeeping costs. This is likely to be discussed in the larger picture of better use of resources.

(iv) Input and Participation: How to close the gap between those who are deciding on and supposedly overseeing the mandate for the peacekeeping missions and the countries that are contributing troops? While these problems have always been present they become much more pressing during a period of overstretch and economic instability. Complaints from TCCs about inadequate consultations may require a hard look at much more effective formats for two-way exchanges of information.

(v) Strengthening the Secretariat: Does the Secretariat need to be strengthened further in order to cope with the type of peacekeeping that is expected of it? Has the Secretary-General's restructuring of the peacekeeping operations department in 2007 led to the Secretariat being better equipped to deal with the challenges of today's peacekeeping operations? Is more needed from the Fifth Committee to provide effective conditions for staff rotation?

(vi) Revitalisation of Current Structures: Do the Military Staff Committee and Working Group on Peacekeeping need to be reviewed and refocused to help solve some of the issues? Is there a more effective way of working with the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (commonly referred to as the C34) which was established in 1965 to review ssues relating to peacekeeping?

(vii) Thematic Issues in Peacekeeping Mandates: Many peacekeeping mandates now include issues such as protection of civilians or children and armed conflict. How best to assess what is being done in these areas? What is the impact on resources? How is the mandate being carried out?

An overriding issue which links all these areas is the quality and transparency of the information flow to the Council so that it is able to improve its technical understanding of the situation on the ground and the risks and opportunities that need to be weighed. Only then can the policy makers improve the quality of the collective strategic thinking and avoid the tendency for the Council to lurch into politically driven initiatives rather than assume collective responsibility for effective cooperative oversight.

Options

The Council may consider the following options regarding its next steps.

• Formally recognise the start of a process of looking at peacekeeping problems by a procedural decision. This could be done thorough a note by the president outlining the steps taken in January and recording the Council's decision to continue over a specified period of time to work on these issues with the intention of reaching a more concrete outcome by a defined date, e.g. 31 August.
• Informally agree to participate in a process to tackle the issues raised by France and the UK. A non-paper summarising the suggestions made at the seminar and debate could then be circulated to Council members and be used as the basis for further action.

Peacekeeping Dynamics in the Council

The complex relationships among the different peacekeeping actors have given rise to interesting dynamics within the different groups within the Council.

The permanent members pay a premium in their assessed contributions for peacekeeping operations above their assessment for the regular budget. This increasingly large financial outlay has in recent years impacted on positions by various P5 members.

Japan is now back as a Council member. It is the second largest financial contributor to the peacekeeping budget (although it does not pay a higher percentage than its assessed share.) In 2005-2006, when Japan was last on the Council, it at times demonstrated that the costs of peacekeeping were a major factor in its positions on substantive issues.

Among the elected members of the Council, there are some like Mexico and Costa Rica that do not take part in peacekeeping operations. This gives them a technical disadvantage in terms of analysing issues, but both seem to have strong policy interest in improving the effectiveness of UN action on peace and security.

Croatia may have interesting perspectives as a former host country for a major peacekeeping operation, UNPROFOR.

Austria and Turkey have been actively contributing uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations for many years and are likely to take a lively interest in this issue.

Other members like Uganda and Libya have important national interests (given the conflicts in neighbouring countries and the roles of UN peacekeeping there) which seem likely to give them a heightened perspective on how the Council should manage peacekeeping issues.

There is also a set of dynamics between African contributors and donors. Many African countries are ready to enhance their role in peacekeeping but they need help in building their capacity for peacekeeping. However, many developed countries are handicapped because this type of assistance does not qualify as overseas development assistance and domestic mechanisms for them to appropriate funds for such capacity building are constrained. It has been noted that one way of surmounting this problem would be through the UN if assessed contributions could be used to help build African peacekeeping capacity. But donors have been traditionally resistant to that idea. The Council decisions on support packages, first to the AU mission in Sudan and now to the AU mission in Somalia are steps in this direction. The Secretary-General's new report, S/2008/813, on assistance to the AU (discussed above) will be relevant in this regard.

Possible Solutions

SCR is not an advocacy organisation. It therefore does not make recommendations. However it has evolved a practice of analysing a range of possible options in most of its reports. At this time the French/British initiative is at an exploratory stage and it seems that the Council is very much at the beginning of an extensive process. Most Council members have not yet become engaged in discussion of the substance. It is therefore too early to be outlining the kinds of options that are under consideration.

Nevertheless it is possible to draw attention to some key option areas that seem likely to arise:

1. Diplomatic Resources: The goal seems to be to achieve better use of resources in the field and better outcomes, improve efficiency and perhaps even reduce costs. Every government knows, from its domestic experience, that if you set these sorts of objectives and you really do want to achieve big gains in improving operational areas, you have to be willing to invest a significant increment of up-front effort in evaluation and ongoing oversight. A critical option therefore will be whether Council members are willing to acknowledge that achieving the desired goal will require a shift in priorities of their own diplomatic and military resources—primarily in New York but in capitals as well—so that more capacity is devoted to quality management of peacekeeping.

2. Secretariat Resources: A related option, which will also be critical, is to signal that the member states understand that the new approach they want probably cannot be achieved by the Secretariat and missions without adjustments in UN resources. Moreover they will need to be willing to signal an intention to support in the Fifth Committee reprioritisation and or new resources if it is required.

3. Cultural Change: The Council in recent years has evolved a highly politicised culture. It is after all a political organ. But political bodies can also be effective oversight bodies which work in close operational partnership with executive organs in ensuring effective implementation of programmes. An important option for the Council therefore is whether it is prepared to find ways in which it can adapt its culture so that it not only preserves the high political role, (with all the attendant issues of formality, high-level representation, publicity and occasionally drama or even polemics) but is also able to work closely in a sustained and essentially practical process of cooperative oversight.

4. Work Habits: The Council has developed a work habit which tends to be driven by two predominant factors. The first is the tyranny of the "Programme of Work" and its schedule of mandate renewals. The second is the crisis of the moment. These two factors mean that urgent matters generally crowd out the space for sustained attention to ongoing persistent problems. An important option therefore is whether the Council can adjust its work habits so that its attention to problems in the field can be sustained. Is the Council willing to return, for instance, to the demanding but effective work habit which it applied in the early and mid 1990s when it received in informal consultations every morning a detailed (usually at least 30 minutes) briefing from the Secretariat on the previous day's and overnight developments from the field? If not, what kind of proxy can be created?

5. Institutional Changes: An important option may be to look at whether the current institutions used by the Council are the most effective vehicles for achieving the desired objectives. It may be that to achieve the goals desired, it would be wise to consider—as is common in domestic contexts—a more distinct division between the political phase and the technical phase. Governments would normally, for instance, use a cabinet committee rather than the full cabinet for the kind of task being contemplated because it requires in effect a cooperative working partnership between the political level and the professional level. It is fair to say that while the Council has two potentially useful subsidiary bodies—the Military Staff Committee and the Working Group on Peacekeeping—neither has been effectively adapted for oversight of modern UN operations. Both offer various options for addressing and depoliticising the issues.

6. Levels of Seniority: Council practice has tended to favour delegating technical aspects to "experts". However, the fact is that the experts are often relatively junior diplomats some of whom have political expertise but very few of whom have the kind of expertise necessary to evaluate and contribute to a genuine pooling of information and evaluation of mission specific problems. An important option therefore will be to consider staffing any new process with staff with the skills and seniority to ensure that useful evaluation can be made.

7. Two-Way Information: An important option will be to decide who can bring what to the table when discussing concrete mission related problems. A commitment to pooling information from the field by all relevant players is an important related option. This means not only putting new burdens on the Secretariat—which in any event usually only knows part of the jigsaw puzzle—but also ensuring that military advisers in UN missions are full players in the information pooling process. To do this they need to be senior, experienced in the UN mission context and highly competent. It also means ensuring that they are fully dialled into their national information flows so that they are able to contribute to the jigsaw pieces known by their national defence systems.

8. Participation: Sometimes the key parts of the jigsaw will be known by national contingents of countries not represented on the Council. Participation of their representatives in the information pooling and evaluation will therefore be an important option. TCCs currently have few incentives to see the Council as a useful or helpful vehicle for getting their insights heard. It may be that using options involving modified or new institutions, in a depoliticised environment which is not a decision making one, will make it easier for the Council to accept full participation by relevant TCCs—and some regional organisations as well—in the process. (It would also be very useful to have this group of countries as allies when the Council initiative comes to be discussed—as it inevitably will be—in the C34.)

9. Host Countries: Often host countries' perspectives can also add real value. Sometimes this may be inappropriate, but certainly not always. Sometimes the Secretariat can fully and fairly reflect the host country perspective. But not always. Again, acceptability in the C34 of any Security Council decisions to improve oversight of peacekeeping is likely to be greatly enhanced if a special role for input from host countries is envisaged.

10. Technology: The PBC country-specific configurations have already demonstrated the value of AV and IT in bringing necessary information and perspectives from the field to the table. An option for the Council is to decide that the PBC methodology in this regard will be an essential starting point for improving collaborative oversight of peacekeeping.