Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping:

United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s has been characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of elements to enhance peace. These include the supervision of cease-fire agreements; regrouping and demobilization of armed forces; destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercise; reintegration of former combatants into civilian life; designing and implementation of demining programmes; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons; provision of humanitarian assistance; training of new police forces; monitoring respect for human rights; support for implementation of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; and support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Such operations are a collaborative effort; they are effective only when decisions are taken in concert by the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat and other members of the United Nations family. Coordination with non-governmental organizations and regional bodies that are active in a mission area can also be crucial to a mission's effectiveness. An essential element for success is the relationship with the local population and the parties to the conflict.

The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has undertaken studies of four multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations: the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). In carrying out these studies, the Unit obtained the input of a wide range of official actors, including troop-contributing countries, Security Council members, mission personnel, and staff from the relevant departments of the Secretariat who helped in the conduct of the operations at the Headquarters level.

The Unit has also benefited from studies of other operations done by research institutions and foundations. These include the study of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) done jointly by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore, and one on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) prepared by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, both of Germany. Other studies that have contributed to the lessons learned analysis include the study of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) by the International Peace Academy and studies on demobilization and post-conflict peace-building done by the World Bank, the International Resource Group, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

It is hoped this report will assist in improving the planning, support, conduct and management of peacekeeping operations. The Lessons Learned Unit is grateful to the Government of Germany for funding the publication of this report.

A. Mandates and Means

1. The United Nations should be actively involved in the negotiations of peace accords, cease-fire agreements or other accords that define its role in a conflict situation. Before the Organization takes on a peacekeeping task, the parties must demonstrate a commitment to implementing the accords.

2. The mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable and provide for the necessary means for implementation. The mandate of an ongoing operation should be adjusted to take account of changing circumstances and conditions in the mission area.

3. The Secretariat and Member States should provide the Security Council with all relevant information in order for the Council to take an informed decision when framing or readjusting a mandate. The mission, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), should provide information gathered by all components -- political, military, humanitarian, civilian police and human rights -- to the Secretariat to assist it in better informing the Security Council.

4. In seeking an in-depth assessment of potential crisis situations before formulating a mandate, the Security Council may consider expanding its sources of information to include informed views of military experts, academics, concerned media representatives, non-governmental organizations and agency staff. Other ways of obtaining information could also be pursued, such as fact-finding missions; ongoing consultations with parties to a conflict and other local actors; consultations with potential troop-contributing countries; and participation in negotiating cease-fire and peace agreements in order to determine how they can become the basis of realistic, manageable mandates.

5. The Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States, collectively and individually, should provide a peacekeeping operation with adequate means and resources to implement the mandate. If a mandate is changed or adjusted, the mission must be provided with the necessary resources to implement the modified objectives. The Secretariat must clearly indicate to the Security Council and the General Assembly what is required to implement the mandate given to a peacekeeping operation.

6. Mandates should be conceptualized flexibly and could include elements of peace-building and emergency reconstruction of war-torn economies. The means to do this must be provided, such as a trust fund, assessed contributions, a mixed peacekeeping force with strong security elements as well as a substantial engineering capacity, communications experts etc.

B. Planning

The planning of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping operation should cover the full range of it activities. To be effective in the long run, the planning process has to be as comprehensive as possible.

1. Planning for an operation should begin with the collection of all information about the country and region of deployment. In addition to traditional sources of information, brainstorming sessions should be conducted with all elements of the United Nations system that may have some relevant knowledge about the situation. Elements to be consulted as a general rule are the military, political, humanitarian, specialized agencies, information, human rights and legal affairs. The experience of non-governmental and local bodies of the situation on the ground is invaluable to the planning process and consultations with these parties should also be held. Other sources of information include Governments, regional organizations, academic institutions and human rights monitoring groups.

2. The survey/reconnaissance technical mission should include representatives of all substantive components of the proposed mission. The team should propose an operational concept; the team's report will form the basis of the plan for the mission. The report should include strategic options and courses of action.

3. When the mission's mandate has been approved by the Security Council, the mandate should be translated into an operational plan with detailed and specific activities for each component. This will also assist in the determination of budgets, logistical requirements, and other administrative back up required for the mission. The operational plan for the mission should be as complete as possible, including integrated military, political, humanitarian, demining, police, human rights, and information issues. Issues that are ignored at this stage will have a negative impact on mission activities later on.

4. Whenever possible an advance team should be sent to prepare the ground for the deployment of the operation. This includes situations in which the United Nations is taking over operations from a multinational or regional force. In such a case, the advance team should be in place for a reasonable period, prior to the pull-out of the other force.

5. Planning is a dynamic process and contingency plans should be developed, keeping in mind the changing situation in the field.

6. Planning for liquidation of a mission should be done well in advance and in coordination with all departments and agencies of the United Nations system to ensure a smooth departure.

C. Coordination

Effective coordination of all components of a peacekeeping operation is essential to the overall success of the mission.

1. There must be clearly defined common goals and objectives which provide all the components of a peacekeeping operation -- military, humanitarian, civilian police (CIVPOL), human rights, political, administrative -- with a coherent framework for their activities. This framework must be drawn from the mandate of the mission.

2. Coordination between the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat in the definition and implementation of peacekeeping mandates should continue to be strengthened.

3. Realizing the importance of coordination, the Secretary-General has constituted a task force consisting of the under-secretaries-general of substantive departments dealing with peacekeeping to provide policy guidance at the highest level. This policy guidance, to be effective, should be translated into directives at the working level.

4. The SRSG is the recognized institutional head of the United Nations family in a mission area and under the SRSG should be a unified, cohesive structure. All substantive decisions in the field with political ramifications should be taken in the name of the SRSG. The SRSG must be an experienced political negotiator as well as an effective manager of a complex operation. Frequent changes in the top leadership of an operation, including component heads, detract from the objective of developing a coherent and integrated structure for the operation.

5. All members of the United Nations family in the mission area should have mutual knowledge of each other's organizational mandates, objectives and operating procedures. Respect for each other's organizational cultures can contribute to improving coordination.

6. Guidelines to improve civilian-military coordination within a mission could be developed. These should include information on the role, function and organization of coordination mechanisms, such as a joint civilian-military coordination or operations centre to be set up both at mission headquarters and in the regions of the mission area. The guidelines should describe the range of military support services and assets (e.g. transportation, engineering, logistics, security) that can be used for humanitarian purposes. Mechanisms to resolve day-to-day management issues as well as urgent problems requiring the attention of top management should also be described.

7. The non-governmental community is closely associated with the humanitarian element in a mission area and close cooperation with it is vital to the success of the peacekeeping operation. Coordination of activities with the non-governmental community, to whatever extent possible, is essential, keeping in mind their independence of the United Nations system.

8. When the interests of some non-governmental organizations are at variance with those of the peacekeeping operation, a senior official could be assigned as a liaison to manage such differences constructively, without detracting from the common goal.

9. All UN entities in a mission area must be headquartered close to each other for effective coordination. An inter-agency agreement defining the responsibilities of each entity in the implementation of the peace agreements could be considered.

10. Innovations to improve coordination have had some success and could be considered for other missions: the appointment of a deputy SRSG, at the Assistant Secretary-General level, to act as a general manager responsible for day-to-day administration and coordination allowing for an integrated military-humanitarian-development approach. The deputy SRSG should be familiar with the United Nations structure and procedures.

11. There should be a clear chain of command between a peacekeeping mission and Headquarters. Ideally, all individual units and departments should work through the SRSG, as he/she is the head of the mission. All requests or instructions should be issued in the name of the SRSG, who should also be informed of all communications from Headquarters to component heads.

12. An interdepartmental framework of cooperation has been established for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs to improve coordination among those departments. This framework should be strengthened.

D. Intelligence and Information Analysis

1. An effective political and humanitarian early-warning system is needed for potential conflict zones. Given the necessary political resolve, the key to a successful early-warning system would be effective targeting of warnings to relevant political bodies and individuals. However, it cannot be assumed that they will act on such warnings.

2. A well-managed intelligence and information analysis programme can greatly assist a peacekeeping operation. This should be taken into account in future operations, despite the Organization's traditional reluctance in this area.

3. A detailed intelligence management plan should be completed in advance of deployment. Such a plan should cover in as much detail as possible the mission area, the collection efforts, analysis and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, operational security and the acquisition/maintenance of intelligence products, including maps.

4. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely sharing of intelligence information, both among contingents in the field and between mission headquarters and New York.

5. A combined civilian-military information analysis cell may be established in the Office of the SRSG for political and military analysis.

6. Ensuring security of information gathered and protecting the confidentiality of sources is essential. Missions must develop standard operating procedures for these.

E. Military

1. Detailed standard operating procedures for all functions of the military component should be developed. These are a valuable tool for the planning process, as well as operational and administrative/logistics activities.

2. Units should arrive in the mission area well balanced in composition and capable of accomplishing their envisaged tasks. In providing troops for peacekeeping operations, Member States with known capabilities in specific areas of expertise should contribute troops for those purposes. Emphasis should be put on capability rather than numbers.

3. Troop contingents that arrive late and not fully equipped detract from the overall effectiveness of the mission. Troop-contributing countries must ensure that their contingents are properly equipped to perform assigned tasks and are deployed to the mission area as expeditiously as possible.

4. To avoid problems arising from mismatching troops and equipment, all contingents must arrive with their own equipment. When this is not possible, troops should be given some time to train with the new and unfamiliar equipment, prior to deployment.

5. There is a need for flexibility in allowing overlap of incoming and outgoing contingents, even if it results in exceeding the mandated troop strength for a limited time, as long as the Security Council and budgetary authorities are kept fully informed.

6. Good and reliable communications are essential for operational efficiency. Adequate communications equipment and facilities must be provided for in the initial mission plan and the necessary budgetary requests made.

7. Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if a peacekeeping operation is to succeed. Individual contingents must respond consistently to the direction of the Force Commander and not to national imperatives and agendas.

8. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently detailed to eliminate doubt as to individual and unit behaviour under various contingencies, and should include guidance concerning mutual support by personnel and units of the force as a whole.

9. Unilateral withdrawal of national contingents after they have been deployed in an operation should be discouraged as such actions jeopardize the safety of the remaining force. Any withdrawal must be carried out in consultation with the Secretary-General and must be implemented in the field under the authority of the Force Commander.

10. When deciding on the use of commercial service contractors in support of military elements, the United Nations must recognize that such contractors are not capable of providing for their own security, and place an added burden on the military. This should be factored into the planning of troop requirements.

F. Security

1. The head of the mission is normally the designated official responsible for the security of all mission personnel. This official should assign to a senior officer with the appropriate training the task of assisting with security measures.

2. A security plan should be prepared immediately upon the start-up of the mission, using guidelines contained in the Field Security Handbook published by the United Nations Security Coordinator. This plan should detail the actions to be taken to ensure the security of United Nations staff members and property in any emergency. The security plan should be fully understood by all officials directly concerned with security; in addition, all staff members should be aware of what is expected of them in an emergency. It is essential that the plan be subjected to rigorous rehearsal, evaluation and appropriate modifications, in consultation with the United Nations Security Coordinator at Headquarters in New York.

3. There should be only one integrated and comprehensive security plan which includes both the peacekeeping mission and the United Nations agencies working in the mission area. There should not be two parallel security plans for the same mission area, or separate security plans for the military and civilian components of the mission.

4. All personnel should receive a security briefing immediately upon arrival in the mission area and a security training programme should be in effect. Security training should include such subjects as the security plan, convoy procedures, personal security awareness and fire safety.

5. Missions should ensure that adequate rations, drinking water, medical supplies and fuel reserves are on hand to meet emergency requirements. Communication systems should be adequate to allow for uninterrupted communication in the event of an emergency.

6. As a standard procedure, heads of missions should be briefed by the United Nations Security Coordinator at Headquarters in New York, prior to deployment in the field.

7. The security of personnel and mission assets, being a fundamental concern, should not be compromised for budgetary reasons.

G. Training of Local Police and Human Rights Monitoring

1. The training of local police should be envisaged as part of long-term peace-building activities of the mission and within the context of the development of security, human rights and public administration systems. The development of these systems should, as appropriate, be set in motion along with the peacekeeping operation. The Centre for Human Rights, the Crime Prevention Division and relevant specialized agencies should, therefore, be included in the consultative process when defining the role of CIVPOL.

2. The training programme for the local police, if part of the mandate, should be formulated in close cooperation with the local authorities leaving it to them to select trainees, ensure their upkeep and to provide the infrastructure for training as well as supplies and equipment. If the local authorities are unable to provide the latter, the international donor community could assist. A comprehensive appeal for equipment and supplies must be planned and prepared well in advance so that the equipment is available when needed.

3. The CIVPOL must work closely with both the military and civilian components, particularly the human rights monitors. The idea is to marry the practical experience of the police observers with the legal and human rights expertise of the human rights monitors. Coordination of activities should start from the conceptual and planning stages through to implementation and follow-up.

4. CIVPOL observers should be trained in human rights monitoring, and be aware of other internationally approved norms and guidelines on crime prevention and criminal justice, including relevant principles of international humanitarian law.

5. The CIVPOL observers must be able to communicate with the local population. The hiring of interpreters must be budgeted for in advance.

6. Guidelines should be developed for such often-mandated CIVPOL activities as training of national police forces, including the investigation of human rights abuses.

H. Logistics

1. Operational and logistics plans should be fully integrated and developed together. As soon as a concept of operations is formulated, a logistics concept should be developed, followed by a comprehensive operational plan and a logistics plan to support it.

2. Mission specific guidelines to troop-contributing countries should clearly include all stores and equipment required to be brought by each contingent and the period for which contingents are required to be self-sufficient.

3. The mission logistics infrastructure should be set up at the earliest to ensure smooth induction of troops and personnel and the early establishment of all components of the mission. This requires early budgetary allocation; selection, recruitment and positioning of essential logistics staff; finalisation of service and supply contracts; and early procurement action. Standard operating procedures to minimise delays should be adopted.

4. Efforts should be made to improve material management and inventory control through the establishment of an electronic inventory which could provide easily accessible information on available equipment and stores.

5. Mission start-up kits containing critical operational material could be readied and warehoused centrally to offset procurement delays during the initial deployment phase.

6. Vehicles and stores at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, should be in a serviceable condition before being dispatched to missions. Adequate resources should be provided to the Base for this.

7. In view of the fact that military logistics units are not readily provided by troop-contributing countries, it may be necessary to provide logistics support through commercial contractors. Another option may be to use military logistics units during the initial deployment phase and, thereafter, civilian contractors. The Organization must strengthen its ability to administer such contracts efficiently.

8. The status-of-mission agreement must be finalized at the earliest and should provide for certain facilities for contractors providing services to the United Nations, including the prompt issuance of visas; freedom of movement; and the right to import, for the use of the United Nations, supplies, equipment and material, free of tax or duties.

9. Standard operating procedures are a valuable tool in the execution of administrative/logistics activities and should be prepared in advance whenever possible.

10. Mission liquidation planning should start once the deployment phase has ended. A detailed plan should be prepared to ensure a smooth exit. Based on the liquidation guidelines, detailed instructions for the disposal of assets should be included in the liquidation plan.

I. Finance and Budget

1. Early approval of the budget for a peacekeeping operation is an important factor in minimizing delays in deployment as most contractual and procurement actions can only be initiated only after budgetary approval. Therefore, preparation of a budget should begin simultaneously with the operational plan for the proposed mission.

2. Requirements for each planned activity of the mission should be provided for in the budget. Budgets for peacekeeping operations should be as comprehensive as possible, with all substantive components providing input, especially when a peacekeeping mandate is being renewed or modified.

3. To minimize lead time, procurement procedures should be streamlined and simplified. A list of approved vendors, arranged by commodity, should be maintained to facilitate procurement of goods and services. Field staff that have the authority to make procurement requests should be made aware of each step of the procurement process.

4. Consideration should be given to further delegation of financial authority to the field. There should be greater decentralization of spending authority, with regional offices of the mission being allowed to maintain petty cash accounts.

5. The new, simplified procedures for reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment should be implemented.

J. Personnel and Training

1. A reliable system of civilian stand-by personnel in key categories, such as administration and finance, political, public information and legal, can be developed. The setting up of "start-up" teams and the early identification of staff for senior, core posts would shorten recruitment time.

2. Qualified and experienced staff from within the United Nations system should be released to serve with peacekeeping operations, especially in the areas of procurement, finance and personnel. The United Nations must consider giving incentives to both mission appointees and Headquarters staff wishing to serve in the field in order to attract a better calibre of staff for peacekeeping operations.

3. It is essential to select and appoint international staff who have both the necessary professional skills and knowledge of United Nations procedures to key positions at the outset to lay a strong foundation for the efficient functioning of the mission. Training courses in critical fields should be held periodically at Headquarters to develop a pool of staff that could be deployed to the field at short notice.

4. In recruiting staff, due weight should be given to such factors as political and negotiating skills, ability to work in an international environment, ability to cooperate with other components of a mission, sensitivity to foreign cultures and traditions, and the ability to drive on less than perfect road conditions. In keeping with the Organization's policy on achieving gender equality, the recruitment of women at all levels should be encouraged.

5. Quick turnover of staff in key positions is detrimental to efficiency and continuity.

6. A training cell must be established in all missions, and briefings and orientation should be provided not only to military observers and CIVPOL, but to all civilian staff as well. The training should include some practical exercises to improve interaction and cooperation among the various components of the mission.

7. Orientations should include information on the history, culture and traditions of the host country, the nature of the conflict, the mandate of the mission, the role and functions of the different mission components as well as agencies that are operating in the area, and on the standards of behaviour expected of United Nations staff in the conflict area. A systematic debriefing of mission personnel should be established so that the Organization benefits from their experience.

K. Medical and Health

1. Each peacekeeping operation must contain a medical element and this must be included in the initial plan for the operation.

2. The composition of the medical element should be tailored to suit the mission's environment and requirements. The medical element should include an internist and a female medical officer.

3. Pre-deployment medical briefing of staff, including medical staff, is essential. All personnel must be well informed, through briefings and guidelines, about health and hygiene issues in the mission area.

4. Preventive measures and medications prescribed by the Medical Unit should be observed by all mission staff.

5. Contingents must maintain a 90-day supply of medical consumables when entering the mission area.

6. To improve coordination between headquarters medical branch and the field medical units, which are attached to different national contingents, standard operating procedures and treatment protocols should be developed for all medical units of the mission. Reporting procedures should also be developed to share experiences on disease incidence and treatment success.

7. Medical evacuation procedures should be clearly defined and emergency evacuation authority should be delegated to the Force Medical Officer.

8. Stress is often a consequence of working in a difficult and conflict-ridden environment and stress management for staff must be regarded as a priority for peacekeeping operations. Education on how to manage stress, stress intervention and stress debriefing after service should be carried out.

L. Demining

1. Whenever peacekeeping operations have to be conducted in areas strewn with land-mines, demining aspects assume great importance. Planning for demining should commence at the outset and the demining plan should be woven into the operational plan for the mission.

2. In operations where demining is envisaged, a representative from the Demining Unit should be included in the reconnaissance/survey missions and in the planning team constituted to develop the operational plan.

3. Demining has two aspects: the immediate operational demining necessary for the conduct of the peacekeeping operation and the long-term humanitarian demining to rid the country of land-mines laid over a period of time. The Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) is responsible for the former, while the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) for the latter; however, close cooperation between the demining units of both Departments is necessary to ensure that plans for operational and humanitarian demining complement each other.

4. Adequate funds for operational demining should be included in the budget of the peacekeeping operation so that it is not dependent on voluntary contributions.

5. In order to build indigenous capacity for long-term demining, it may be necessary to conduct demining and mine-awareness training. In such cases, adequate budgetary, staffing and administrative provisions must be planned well in advance. Mine-awareness briefings for mission personnel should be conducted regularly.

6. While civilian contractors to conduct demining are preferred by national military contingents, these contractors should be on the ground and operational before troops arrive in-theatre and are ready for deployment. If this is not possible, then demining should be conducted by military units for the initial months of deployment.

7. A political initiative to ensure that new mines are not laid must be conducted in tandem with demining, otherwise the effort is for naught and these costs of demining, in financial terms and lives lost, will continue to rise.

M. Humanitarian Relief in a Peacekeeping Environment

1. Humanitarian indicators can serve as an important barometer of political trends and must be given appropriate attention at the political level.

2. Greater cooperation in pooling and accessing information within the humanitarian community, between the humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping operation and with Member States may help to provide a more complete picture of the humanitarian situation, especially during pivotal moments of complex emergencies.

3. A critical analysis of the nature of the conflict will contribute to conceptualizing comprehensive humanitarian action. Effective targeting and channelling of humanitarian aid depends on accurate political analysis of the conflict and, thus, the context within which the aid is delivered. This would dispel any misperception that aid is not reaching those most in need.

4. A systematic needs assessment by a lead agency should be conducted to avoid disproportionate distribution of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian assistance to refugee camps should also be provided with the ultimate objective being repatriation.

5. A consolidated relief strategy should be developed for humanitarian emergencies, backed up by specific operational plans, including guidelines for actions to be taken by the United Nations system, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The implementation of these plans should be monitored regularly, evaluated periodically and revised as conditions in a country change.

6. The physical infrastructure has to be improved and maintained along with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Donors and financial institutions must be encouraged to contribute to such rehabilitation even in countries where there is no government.

7. Aid for internally displaced persons must be part of contingency planning and responsibility for such persons must be clearly assigned within the humanitarian community working in a country.

N. Public Information

1. A successful information campaign requires a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of the mission. It should be a part of the overall operational plan of the mission, should be monitored from Headquarters to ensure political coherence, and should be coordinated through the SRSG, so that there is a consistent public information voice and message from the United Nations as a whole. Public information specialists must be part of the mission from its inception.

2. Good media relations is a long-term proposition and should not be viewed as a one-time activity. Press relations and trust have to be developed over a period of time. When something goes wrong, it is generally best to acknowledge that, explain why it happened and what is being done to avoid the problem in the future. If journalists are to represent the United Nations perspective they have to feel sympathetic to the problems that peace-keepers face. They are more likely to do this if they trust the UN spokesman as a reliable and honest source.

3. Good media relations in the field include providing journalists with basic information about the United Nations, its structure, aims and objectives in a mission area, nature and constraints of the mandate, as well as the political, social and other conditions in the host country. The briefing materials prepared for mission staff and national contingents could be shared with journalists to good effect.

4. Journalists safety concerns may also affect their coverage of events in a mission area. To the extent possible, they should be provided with some measure of security. However, it is not advisable to house journalists inside a United Nations compound.

5. Journalists tend to concentrate on dramatic events, such as military actions, ignoring soft news stories on other positive United Nations activities because they are not dramatic enough. It is up to the field operation's information section to make such stories easily accessible to the media.

6. There are four target audiences for United Nations public information efforts in the field: the international audience; the parties; the local population and the local media; and the mission personnel themselves. Effective international media coverage depends on the optimal use of television, while local populations in many countries can be best reached through radio. Information strategy should therefore be designed with the potential of each medium in mind from the very outset and resourced accordingly.

7. Effective communication and interaction with the local population is essential for the mission to achieve its objectives. The mission must be able to explain its mandate to the local population, to articulate what is expected of persons living in the mission area, and to counter false expectations of the United Nations role.

8. Mission personnel also need to be continuously informed about the goals and activities of the mission; changes in its mandate if any; changes in the political or security situation in the country; and all other relevant developments. Mechanisms such as briefing sessions for staff, periodic newsletters, including relevant developments at the United Nations Headquarters, and a staff hotline are some ways to keep mission personnel aware and informed.

9. The diplomatic community in a country is another important target group for information activities. Diplomatic representatives can exercise political influence on the parties involved in a conflict; they also serve as important sources of information for the media. The diplomatic community, therefore, should be kept abreast of developments in the mission area and the assistance of diplomats should be solicited in helping the SRSG carry out diplomatic functions.

10. Pre-packaged public information material on the United Nations, the mission and its mandate can be prepared in advance of the mission's deployment and can be sent with the advance party so that some information activities can be started before the public information component is fully functional.

11. The designated spokesman for the mission must be among the first to arrive in the mission area and must have strong journalism or public relations credentials. Under the guidance of the SRSG, the spokesman must be the voice of the mission and the information officers of all other United Nations entities in the mission area should work in coordination with the spokesman.

12. To ensure the integrity and quality of its information products, the mission must be supplied with all necessary equipment and staff to allow it to produce its media programmes free from dependence on Government facilities. United Nations information must be kept strictly independent from the information activities of all the other actors present in the area, including the parties, as well as representatives of governments that may have their own agendas to pursue.

O. Relations with Local Population

The support of the local population is essential to the success of a peacekeeping operation. Lack of local support not only hinders the operation in the implementation of its mandate and the conduct of daily activities, but can also pose a physical danger to the mission's personnel.

1. The local population should perceive the mission and its staff as being impartial. When the parties to a conflict attempt to use the mission or some of its staff to their own advantage, as they often do, the mission and its information component must be able to maintain and project its image of impartiality and neutrality. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour.

2. The United Nations must also demonstrate a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities. It must not be perceived as being "above the law". Designating an ombudsman, or a focal point, to consider the grievances of the local population against the mission or its staff could be considered.

3. Respect for the cultural traditions and social mores of the local population is an important part of maintaining good relations with the local population. Briefings on history, culture, and other aspects of life of the host country should be conducted for all staff.

4. Efforts at peace-building -- such as assistance in the restoration of basic civic services and support in rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated country -- can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grass-roots support for the operation.

5. In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the operation is best advised to work through existing local authorities and community elders and its peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict management, provided these do not contradict accepted international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in areas of recent and ongoing conflict, the operation must exercise great caution in identifying local community leaders, since it is often unclear as to who actually represents the community. Due to strife, population displacements and other extenuating circumstances, traditional societal patterns and roles may have become blurred or have submerged under new, often militaristic, hierarchies.

6. As peacekeeping missions become more multi-faceted, peace-building is becoming an integral part of their activities. Emphasis should be placed on support of processes and institutions that reinforce reconciliation between warring parties and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, so that once the mission pulls out it does not leave behind a vacuum, but a foundation of peace and development that the country can build on.

7. The United Nations must gear the composition of its peacekeeping forces to the new and changing role they are expected to play. The force could consist of mainly fighting troops when the imperative is maintenance of peace and security. This can be changed gradually, when the emphasis of the mission has changed to peace support and peace-building, to include more engineering or other units that could assist in the reconstruction of the country.

8. Discretionary funds for peace-building should be made available to the SRSG to enhance the SRSG's leverage with the local authorities and the humanitarian community. The mission could use these funds for quick-impact projects and infrastructure repairs, among other things.

9. An integral part of United Nations peacekeeping should be the promotion of "indirect peace-building", i.e., the resurrection of a web of non-governmental civic, professional, business and other associations.

10. During the liquidation of an operation, consideration should be given to what resources could be left behind in the country to assist in post-conflict peace-building.

P. Demobilization

Demobilization in a peacekeeping environment is the down-sizing or complete disbanding of armed forces of parties to a conflict. Generally, demobilization is accompanied by the disarmament, retraining and integration into civilian society of some of the former combatants, and others into a restructured national army, police or other paramilitary force.

1. In the context of peacekeeping, demobilization can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement. The peace agreement should also establish the institutional framework for the demobilization exercise, including the schedule for down-sizing of forces and the establishment of the restructured national army.

2. Demobilization must be specifically included as an element in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation.

3. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration form a continuum. Demobilization is only possible when there is some level of disarmament. Similarly, the success of demobilization efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former combatants and their integration into civilian life or the restructured army.

4. Planning for demobilization and reintegration must be done in tandem. This requires the combined and coordinated efforts of several players: the parties to the conflict, the local governmental authorities, the UN specialized agencies, donors, non-governmental groups and the humanitarian community, as well as the peacekeeping operation. The efforts of all should be properly coordinated and should form part of an integrated approach.

5. The demobilization plan should include operating procedures for standard activities to be performed during the entire process, such as weapons classification, storage and destruction; registration and identification of ex-combatants; and site selection and basic requirements for assembly areas; among others.

6. The plan should also define the incentive package to be provided to former combatants to encourage demobilization. This could include staggered cash payments, food aid, clothing, household utensils, and implements and tools that would help former combatants become as self-reliant as possible.

7. There should be an information strategy to accompany the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The strategy should include general information about the entire process as well as specific information, such as locations of assembly areas; who is responsible for what element of the process; what a former combatant can expect at an assembly area; what are the options following demobilization. To guard against a backlash caused by unrealistic expectations of what the United Nations is going to provide, the public information campaign should present a clear and realistic picture of what the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process entails and the role, limits and constraints of the United Nations in it. The responsibilities of other actors -- the local authorities, the parties concerned, the non-governmental community -- must also be clearly spelt out to the public.

8. Designated assembly points for the combatants are useful at the early stage of demobilization. At these assembly points, weapons can be collected and registered.

9. The security of assembly areas must be ensured and infrastructure and amenities to house former combatants for a determinate period must be in place. In some situations, it may be necessary to have some infrastructure in place to support families of former combatants. An effort must be made to discourage the assembly areas from becoming satellite towns or permanent settlements dependent on UN support and supplies for their survival.

10. Transparency of the arms collection process is vital. Weapons storage areas should be situated at some distance from the assembly areas. It is preferable that the storage sites are guarded by UN peace-keepers. The turning in of poor quality or obsolete weapons could be indicative of a lack of a genuine commitment to the disarmament process by the parties to the conflict.

11. Final disposal of weapons and ordinance should also be planned in advance, in consultation with the parties. Some weapons are likely to be needed by the new, restructured army; others could be destroyed. The destruction of weapons and munitions must be accompanied by an effort to inform the local population of the reasons for those actions.

12. The registration and documentation of ex-combatants should be performed at the assembly areas. The registration process should be able to indicate the preferences and future plan of each ex-combatant, his or her skills and level of education, as well as other information required for reintegration. Following a preliminary health examination, reorientation for civilian life and counselling can also begin at this stage.

13. Reintegration projects located within existing communities have the advantage of an easier transition to civilian life and also of sharing much of the burden of retraining and socialization of ex-combatants with the community and the local authorities. The local communities would also benefit from these projects.

14. The impartiality of the monitors of the process must be beyond question. This is necessary to ensure that disarmament is and demobilization are evenly matched on both sides. This perceived impartiality is also essential if the United Nations is to monitor cease-fire violations or to mediate disputes.

15. The disarmament-demobilization-reintegration process requires a commitment in terms of political will and considerable resources on the part of the international community and the parties to the conflict. This commitment is a prerequisite for the success of demobilization and reintegration efforts.

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