Global Policy Forum

The notion of strengthening and expanding United Nations peacekeeping forces to quell foreign conflicts is a fine idea. But as President Clinton and other world leaders work toward that goal in the wake of their recent summit meeting in New York, they will have to overcome a host of political, military and financial obstacles, not the least of which is determining the appropriate American role.

There is no question that more effective U.N. peacekeeping operations could help control or even prevent bloodshed in troubled regions of the world, including the kind of ethnic slaughter that unhappily has become common in the last decade in Africa, Asia and the Balkans. But as U.N. failures in Rwanda, Bosnia and Sierra Leone demonstrate, a major overhaul of the organization's approach to crisis intervention is required if the U.N. is to play a useful role in pacifying turbulent lands.

Mr. Clinton recognizes that the U.N. cannot substitute for American-led forces in a conflict like the Persian Gulf war. When military action is warranted to defend vital American interests overseas, Washington often must act on its own or in concert with its allies. Fighting such wars is not a role U.N. forces can play, though Security Council endorsement for American intervention abroad is advisable whenever possible.

The more limited aim for the U.N. is to develop well-trained, adequately armed forces that can be dispatched quickly to trouble spots to prevent ethnic or political conflicts from escalating into widespread violence or to help maintain a truce or sustain a peace agreement that brings a war or ethnic strife to an end. There may also be circumstances when a robust U.N. military force can help protect civilian populations against genocidal attacks.

A recent report on U.N. peacekeeping efforts that was commissioned by Kofi Annan, the secretary general, properly said that the U.N. peacekeeping department — with 32 officers coordinating 27,000 troops — needs a larger and more professional staff and an intelligence-gathering capacity. It suggested that the U.N. abandon the pretense of neutrality when it was clear that one side in a conflict was responsible for the bulk of the atrocities. This principle could be misapplied, but it deserves consideration by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis. Britain's foreign secretary, Robin Cook, offered to establish a U.N. military war college in Britain to train peacekeeping forces, an idea Secretary General Annan has endorsed.

Many of the peacekeeping department's failures stem from the members' lack of commitment. Congress, for example, has agreed to pay only a portion of America's assessed peacekeeping dues. That is lamentable, but the payment scale — which reflects the relative wealth of nations in 1973, when it was established — does need modification.

With these and other reforms, the U.N. should be better able to handle low-intensity peacekeeping missions. Dealing with more complex and dangerous conflicts is another matter. Most governments want no part of them — especially conflicts in Africa, where many foreign powers believe they have no vital interests. The most painful example is Rwanda in 1994, when the U.N. pulled its troops out just as a genocide that eventually killed 800,000 people was beginning. A report by the U.N. last year concluded that a small contingent of troops might have prevented the slaughter, had Washington not blocked it. The United States, which had just lost 18 soldiers in Somalia, was unenthusiastic about becoming involved in Rwanda.

The next year, Dutch peacekeepers stood by in Srebrenica, Bosnia, as Serbs massacred thousands of Muslim men. U.N. peacekeepers pulled out of Angola last year when civil war resumed — in part because peacekeepers had been prohibited by members from forcibly disarming the rebels, who had reneged on their pledge to turn in their weapons.

Only a united Security Council can provide the forceful mandate required to make U.N. forces more effective in such difficult circumstances. With Russia and China wary about legitimizing outside intervention in their internal conflicts, it will be hard to achieve that kind of consensus in cases where violence is not spilling over borders. Regional intervention could be an alternative in some instances — NATO in Kosovo, for example — but regional powers often have complex and uneasy relationships with the countries in which they are intervening.

As the nation with the most powerful and transportable military forces, the United States will inevitably be drawn into U.N. peacekeeping operations. Washington should stand ready to contribute financial and logistical support. There will be occasions when the use of American troops is warranted, but Washington should not make a blanket commitment to contribute soldiers to all U.N. peacekeeping operations. There are places and times when a U.N. force is more acceptable to nations if Americans are not in the ranks.