1. The present paper focuses on the question of non-permanent membership. But because of the connections between the two categories of membership established in the Charter of the United Nations, it will be necessary to refer, in passing, to the other category of membership, permanent membership. The paper also addresses issues concerning the overall numbers for an expanded Council.
2. The delegation of Australia is of the view that the Working Group may be able to move its work toward the stage of forging consensus on the questions of the periphery or edges of those questions and work toward the core. This would mean beginning by dealing first with the question of expanding the non-permanent membership of the Council to enable it to reflect better the increase in the membership of the United Nations that has taken place since the non-permanent membership was last expanded, that is, by the decision of the General Assembly in its resolution 1991 A (XVIII), of 17 December 1963, implemented on 31 August 1965.
3. Such an approach would have the Working Group begin by focusing on the number "ten" mentioned in Article 23.1 of the Charter. The questions that would need to be answered would be: as the number "ten" is no longer sufficient, by what number should it be increased; and, how would the overall number arrived at be distributed amongst the various electoral groups?
4. The Australian delegation has previously called attention to the criteria for membership of the Council given in Article 23.1, pointing out that these had been challenged by no one.
5. It might be helpful to provide an illustration of this approach, not as an Australian proposal but rather as an illustration of an application of the methodology the delegation of Australia has suggested previously. This illustration is advanced in the belief that it may help foster concrete negotiations on a consensual solution.
6. When the 1963 decision was taken to increase the elected membership of the Council from 6 to 10 members, the membership of the United Nations was 109 Member States. Subtracting the 5 permanent members from that number and then dividing 104 by 10 reveals that the representation ratio for non-permanent members of the Council was 10.4:1.
7. If such a ratio of representation were applied to today's membership of 195, minus 5 permanent members, that would suggest that there should be 17 or 18 non-permanent members.
8. This points, straight-away, to an issue on which there has been widespread agreement within the Working Group, namely that whatever expansion of the Council is agreed upon should not produce a Council of an overall size that would reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of its work. A council of 18 non-permanent members, together with the present 5 permanent members, would begin to approach the margin of such effectiveness and efficiency of operation. In addition, when taking into account the widespread agreement that the expansion of the Council must be in both Charter categories of membership and thus include an increase in the number of permanent members in a way that thus include an increase in the number of permanent members in a way that responds to both contemporary realities and the imperative of balance between North and South within the permanent membership, then that margin is reached.
9. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these central facts is that the ratio of representation for non-permanent members that existed in the past, Namely 10.4:`, must now be altered.
10. Turning to today's membership of 185 States and subtracting 5 permanent members so that the electoral pool is 180 States, the question becomes—what ratio of representation should be applied?
11. If that ratio were moved from 10.4:1 to 11:1 then this would mean between 16 and 17 non-permanent members. If the ratio were 12:1 then this would mean exactly 15 Member States.
12. Fifteen non-permanent Member States plus the five present permanent Member States would provide a Council within the numerical limit that is considered efficient and effective. But it would again fail the requirement to expand the Council in each of the Charter categories of membership. Accordingly, if the category of permanent membership were also to be expanded by 5, as is widely discussed, then the overall size of the Council, 25, would be of a size that a very large number of Member States have indicated they believe would be acceptable.
13. Before examining how a non-permanent membership of the Council of 15, as against the present 10 Member States, could be distributed to ensure that the criterion of equitable geographical distribution was satisfied, it might be useful to examine briefly the ratio of 12:1 and the concept of representation to which it would seek to give effect.
14. Using the Australian system of Government as an example, the pool from which members of the executive Government, that is the Ministry and the Inner Cabinet, can be drawn is the Parliament of 224 members. Following Australia'' national elections held in March 1996, such an executive Government was formed numbering 28 ministers. This was a ratio of 8:1. The Inner Cabinet numbers 15 ministers, giving a ratio of 15:1.
15. It would be wrong to suggest that the way in which Australia forms its national Government would be a model for or has a specific application to what the Working Group is discussing with respect to the Security Council of the United Nations. Nor is it suggested that the Security Council is in any way the "Inner Cabinet" of the United Nations. It is not. But, there are principles of representation involved in the General Assembly's election of members of the Security Council that are not utterly distant from the principles that are illustrated by the Australian example above.
16. For example, points that may be derived from this example are: the ratio of representation of 12:1 is within the sort of range that could be expected to apply when a larger body of sovereign entities agrees to elect representatives to work on its behalf on specific executive issues, in the case of the Security Council, on "the maintenance of international peace and security"; and, the need to achieve the increase in the size of elected representation on the Security Council necessitated by the increase in the size of the pool of electors, can be satisfied through making a slight change in the past ratio of representation that is both within that range and maintains an optimal size of the executive body being so elected.
17. The present paper now returns to the question of what outcome the application of a representation ratio of 12:1 for elected members of the Security Council would produce.
18. Employing the four existing electoral groups, the present five representatives from African and Asian States could be increased to seven; the present one representative from Eastern European States could be increased to two; the present two representatives from Latin American and Caribbean States could be increased to three; and the present two representatives from Western European and other States could be increased to three.
19. These are not firm Australian proposals. They are illustrations of the application of a methodology that might help members of the Working Group begin to agree together, to negotiate a solution acceptable to all.
20. When consideration is given to the illustration above of a possible distribution of 15 seats deriving from a ratio of 12:1, it is important to call attention to the fact that the African and Asian Group represents some 55 per cent of the pool of 180 States; the Eastern European Group 11 per cent; the Latin American and Caribbean Group 19 per cent; and the Western European and Other States Group 15 per cent.
21. It could be argued that any consideration of the methodology, and more particularly the possible application of it as outlined above, either cannot be pursued separately from consideration of the issue of permanent members and/or that consideration of that issue would in turn affect the calculations that have supported what has been outlined.
22. On the latter point, the fact is that if the Working Group were to begin by subtracting 10, not 5, permanent members, leaving an electoral pool of 175, not 180, for non-permanent members, the application of the ratio 12:1 yields a result of 14.5 members or, rounded up, 15 members. In other words, the same result.
23. To insist upon such a priori linkages would remove the benefits of the methodology of proceeding from the periphery to the core. It is designed to seek to ensure that we make progress, to unlock the situation in which the working group has found itself up to the present time, and above all to try to ensure that the various parts of the expansion question are not held hostage to each other.
24. Having made these points, it may be helpful to make a few points, too, about permanent membership.
25. In considering an expansion in the permanent membership category, the following basic points are now the subject of considerable convergence of views:
(a) The present permanent five will remain;
(b) For reasons consistent with the concepts in the Charter and with reality, Japan and Germany must be added;
(c) There must be a developed/developing country or North/South balance within the permanent membership, a balance that is, at present, deeply lacking;
(d) This suggests that three other permanent members, which are not from the industrialized North, should also be added.
26. If these perspectives were to be followed it is easy to see that the permanent membership of the Council in the future would be made up of 10 members. These, together with the 15 elected members produced by a ratio of 12:1 would provide a Council of 25 members.
27. The specific issue of permanent membership of the Council is mentioned here because of its connectedness to the issue of an expansion of non-permanent members; the main subject of the present paper. An increase in the number of non-permanent members, is an intrinsic value and a necessity.
28. The Working Group must start to concretize its work. It can do this by developing an agreement on an expansion in the non-permanent membership of the Council.
29. The Australian delegation hopes that the issues advanced in the present paper on this subject, by way of illustration, will help foster practical discussions and negotiations leading towards consensus.
