Summary
1. PM = Permanent Member. ANY State is eligible.
NPM= Non-PM
P5 = The five PMs as of 1945. No change of status.
FPM= Financial (% budget contribution) PM.
2. This scheme is a compromise between proposals for:
(a) Retention/ expansion of PMship;
(b) Abolition of PMship;
(c) Expansion of non-PM. Frequent rotation;
(d) Extending PMship to additional named States.
Principles of (a) democracy, (b) economy/efficiency < limit tenure and veto and < convergence of P and NP categories.
3. Optional group/regional sharing (Belize paper) applies to ALL categories.
4. Veto= two [or three] concurring blocking votes by PMs in one or more category.
5. Numbers of PMs:
Alt. 1 No.
¨ P5 5
¨ 1x 4 regions; excluding the Group of Western 4 (regional election)
¨ FPMS; excluding the United States of America 2
Alt. 2 No.
¨ 2 x 5 regions; including P5; excluding 9 (regional election)
the United States of America
¨ FPMs; including the United States of America 3
6. Tenure:
¨ FPMs - as long as qualified.
¨ Non-P5 PMs - three years.
7. Total numbers rationalized (impact of #2 - #6, above):
Alt. 1
¨ 11 PM + (9 to 11) NPM = 20 to 22.
Alt. 2
¨ 12 PM + (9 to 11) NPM = 21 to 23.
II. Introduction.
8. It is suggestion that:
"We cannot escape the overdue obligation … to rationalize the structure of the Security Council, so that the veto is tamed and equity and democratization take center stage. … (a) [All] regions [should] obtain balanced and equal representation as permanent members; small countries [should] be brought into the Council's decision-making; and (c) consideration [should] be given to such devices as multiparty seats or constituency groupings." (A/AC.2471996/CRP.1, 11 January 1996, para. 20, quoting the statement of the Honorable Dean O. Barrow, Deputy Prime Minister of Belize, during the general debate at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, 25 September 1995.)"
9. The foundations of this objective are two principles, firstly, that of democracy. This derives from the fact that central to General Assembly resolution 47/62, instituting the process of reform of the Council, are the requirements embedded in its title that representation on the Council should be equitable and that there should be an increase in the body's membership. These requirements inevitably respond to a variety of undemocratic factors related to the Council, including the unelected nature of the present permanent membership; the eternal nature of tenure of those members; historical non-participation on the Council of nearly 50 per cent of the Organization's members, notably smaller and weaker States, from which much of the business of the Council is derived; the veto, and oligopolistic aspects of the maintenance of peace and security.
10. This anti- democratic trend was understandable in the light of the uncertain global military situation prevailing while the Charter was being drafted. This was compounded by the volatility of the security situation at that time and during much of the lifespan of the United Nations. A seriously aggravating feature was undoubtedly the unsettled international political situation, marked by the existence of the allegedly bipolar pattern in international relations. In recent years, there have been several far-reaching changes in that pattern and in the security situation. The Security Council, the General Assembly and other organs have also taken very major steps not only to enshrine democracy as a component of internationally protected and domestically provided human rights, but also to reaffirm its central role in internal relations and the life of the Organization. (See the report of the Secretary-General on support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new and restored democracies, agenda item 41, on 13 November 1995 (see A/50/PV. 56).) It is evident that, in resolution 47/62, democracy is the ingredient which the General Assembly has mandated should be infused into the Council and related processes.
11. The second principle is that of economy and efficiency. This principle also relates to the changed pattern of international relations and the widespread adoption (with varying degrees of alacrity and commitment) of liberal economic tenants. This principle pervades all aspects of the life of the Organization, particularly the current processes of global restructuring and reform, including that of the United Nations. As the Secretary-General noted in his statement of 6 February 1996 on the financial situation:
"Certain basic structural issues need to be addressed comprehensively if the Organization is to be responsive to the changing international situation. These include the composition and procedures of the Security Council." The principle postulates that the main watchwords should be the need to economize and to devise efficient mechanisms and processes.
III. BROAD OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Introduction
12. It is clear that, even if, pursuant to these two principles, there is a consensus favoring particular reforms of the Council, any of the present permanent members can effectively block change by exercising its right to veto any of the Council's decisions. Nevertheless, since, in good faith, all the Organization's voting members approved the adoptions by consensus of resolution 47/62, it is the burden of the present paper that there is a middle path between the diverse and seemingly irreconcilable proposals that have been made. Indeed, it is respectfully contended that the possibly common flaw in most of those proposals is their failure rigorously to apply the two principles mandated by the resolution.
B. Retention and Expansion of Permanent Membership
13. At one extreme are various proposals the thrust of which is that the existing permanent five should retain their status of eternal membership, which should be extended to a variety of additional beneficiaries on a number of bases, including size of population, size of economy, demonstrated commitment to are to be warmly commended. However, the application of any set of apparently objective criteria is open to subjectivities. Furthermore, although many of these criteria encompass the principle of democracy, several fail to address the principle of economy and efficiency.
C. Abolition of permanent Membership
14. Proposals that permanent membership should be abolished comport with the principle of democracy and might crudely comport with the economic principle. Nevertheless, the reality is that peace and security is an occupation that is resource-intensive in terms of personnel, experience and finance. These proposals may therefore fail the test of efficiency to the extent that they do not identify a modality for effectively identifying a core of Council members privileges and/or prerogatives, to assume field responsibilities and leadership in the Council's decision-making.
D. Continuation of Permanent Five Plus Frequent Rotation of Some Non-Permanent Members
15. The last-mentioned proposals bear some resemblance to the suggestion that permanent membership status should be frozen and, in place of additional new permanent members, there should be systems of frequent rotation of a specified number of seats by special non-permanent members. These latter members would be identified by criteria to be devised. It is argued that occupation by such larger States of a specified number of non-permanent spaces would free up the remaining slots for the masses of presently disenfranchised smaller and more disadvantaged States. Here, again, possibly selective or subjective application of even objective selection criteria poses a problem that challenges the democracy principle.
E. Extension of Permanent Membership to Further Named States.
16. The same may be said of proposals that the existing system of permanent membership should be extended by according that status to specific additional named States. Although those proposals comport with the desire for economy, they are not entirely in harmony with democracy. An additional problem with such proposals is that, in the absence of safeguard devices, future problems of reductions of state territory and population and other changes provoking issues of State succession could bedevil this modality of membership, rendering it both undemocratic and inefficient.
IV. Suggested Reforms
A. Introduction
17. It is recommended that the dictates of democracy and economy/efficiency require the closest possible approximation and convergence of both existing forms of membership, namely, permanent and non-permanent membership. Those principles and, in turn, such convergence would appear to necessitate restructuring of the institution of the veto. While practical reality appears to militate against proposals limiting tenure of the permanent five, such considerations of equity) and economy/efficiency justify permitting groups of States in the same neighbourhood to pool their resources and offer themselves as joint candidates in elections to the Security Council.
B. Optional Sharing of Seats
18. In a related paper, it has recommended that:
"On an optional basis, regional arrangements or agencies or ad hoc groups of members of the United Nations should be at liberty to share single seats on the Security Council." Submission of the delegation of Belize, "Shared seats on the Security Council", submitted to the Working Group on Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council on 29 January 1996."
In that submission, it was suggested that the Council could certify particular regional arrangements and agencies as notionally satisfying Chapter VIII of the Charter for the purposes of common Council membership. Alternatively, two to five States satisfying specified criteria for adjacency would be automatically qualified without the requirement of Council certification. The submission also proposed details about voting, Council committee membership, termination and certain limitations in relation to those arrangements/agencies or groups that became members of the Council.
19. It was suggested that the proposals were justified on the basis of:
(a) Such Charter provisions as Article 51 and Chapter VIII;
(b) The spirit of international cooperation that pervades the Charter and the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations;
(c) The recent practice of peace-keeping by regional arrangements/agencies and solidarity in security matters;
(d) The dictates of economy and efficiency, particularly in view of the cost-sharing and cost-reduction the proposal stimulates, since only huge delegations beyond the means of the vast majority of States can now effectively participate in the demanding work of the Security Council;
(e) The preoccupation of the international community, including the Council, with the security of small States;
(f) The increase in beneficial system-improvement participation by small and weak States;
(g) The enhancement and improvement of transparency and multi-directional flows of information.
20. It was noted that there were several potent analogues to the ideas contained in the proposal. These included:
(a) The systems of formal organized constituencies in certain international financial and development assistance/environment regeneration institutions;
(b) The widespread growth of regional security institutions;
(c) The proliferation of regional agencies in the context of the radical redefinition of the concept of security.
21. As noted, this concept is animated, inter alia, by the principle of economy/efficiency. On the basis of fairness and democracy, it is recommended that his modality of membership should be optionally available to both permanent and non-permanent members. The sharing of seats facilitates possible without encumbering the process by the multiplication of voices and votes and the addition of noise and clutter.
C. Approximation and Convergence of Both Forms of Membership
22. In our view, especially for reasons of democracy, but also because of economy/efficiency, permanent membership should be available to ALL members of the Organization, and no further attempt should be made to devise qualifications criteria. This is a logical consequence of and, at the same time, facilitates approximation and convergence of both forms of membership. Universal legibility for both forms of membership is also facilitated by seat sharing, since aggregations of States are better able to compete for permanent membership. In addition, approximation and convergence of both forms of membership, along with seat sharing, advances the beneficial objectivity of the proposals summarized in paragraphs 13 to 15 above. We now turn to the collateral issues of financial permanent membership, tenure and the veto.
1. Financial Permanent Membership
23. Notwithstanding the notion of democracy, it is recommended that there should be introduced a new subcategory of financial permanent membership where by individual States would qualify for membership on the basis of substantial contributions to the Organization's budget. This is strongly motivated by the desperate financial emergency presently being undergone by the Organization. It is clear that several of the proposals for naming specific States for membership are thinly disguised efforts to obtain infusions of funds into the Organization's coffers. It is possible that the probably consistency of that motivation with the economy/efficiency principle is a substantial justification for facial violation of the democracy principle.
2. Tenure
24. Since the notion of financial permanent membership has an undemocratic element, in the crucial matter of the tenure of the status it should be restricted. It is therefore proposed that the tenure of that status should not be eternal, but for as long as the member is qualified. Furthermore, if additional States eventually satisfy the financial criteria, a system for rotation might have to be considered.
25. It is also proposed that the tenure of the new general class of permanent members should be three years, thus somewhat approximating non-permanent tenure (two years), while permitting any new permanent member that has made an investment related to its membership to fulfill its responsibilities.
26. In order to permit groups or individual members to continue to perform such responsibilities, on the one hand, and so as not to deny the members of the new general class the incidents of membership enjoyed by the permanent five, on the other hand, it is recommended that permanent (and non-permanent) members should be able once to succeed themselves, that is, to enjoy successive terms.
3. Veto
27. What would continue to be the most attractive feature of permanent membership to its possessors, despite limited tenure, is the ability to exercise the veto. It is proposed that, pending the ultimate abolition of the veto, the entitlement to the veto should be so modified that it is available only where a minimum of two [or three] permanent members concur in its exercise. We believe that the suggested alternative of restricting the use of the veto in certain areas (e.g. Chapter VII action) is excessively restrictive, especially in view of the possibility that there might be future cases arguably falling under that Chapter that the internal community and/or the Council might deem require action by the Council.
V. NUMBERS
A. Permanent Members
28. Two alternative models are proposed. In the first, (a) the permanent five would be unchanged; (b) there would be one additional permanent member assigned to each of the five United Nations regional groups except Western European and Other (already represented by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); and (c) there would be financial permanent members, which would be likely to be two in number (not including the United States of America, already included under (a)).
29. In the second model, (a) on the basis of democracy and equality, each regional group would return two permanent members; the existing permanent five would be deemed to be included in the quota of their respective groups except in permanent members, including the United States.
30. It would be probably wisest to return regional members in elections conducted at the United Nations exclusively among regional members.
B. All Members
31. Under both alternatives, there could be 9 to 11 non-permanent members, bringing the total membership to 20 to 22 and 21 to 23. It should be stressed that while it might appear that these schemes involve a reduction in the number of non-permanent members, the approximation and convergence of both categories should result in a substantial increase in participation. At any rate, it might be decided to provide for a larger gross number of members in that class.
ANNEX
Shared Seats on the Security Council
I. Introduction
1. The purpose of the present annex is to elaborate on certain aspects of the proposal that, on an optional basis, regional arrangements or agencies or ad hoc groups of members of the United Nations should be at liberty to share single seats on the Security council.
II. DETAILS
A. Basic Structure
2. There are two alternatives:
(a) From time to time the Council will certify that a regional arrangement or agency is qualified for purposes of membership of the Council. It is expected that, with the widespread popularity of those institutions, the Council will readily certify many of the arrangements or agencies presently in cooperation with the United Nations or which have conducted regional peace-keeping and similar exercises. Upon presentation to the Council by one of the members of a document signed by the representatives of all of the members of the certified arrangement or agency attesting to their desire to participate as a group in membership of the Council, the presenting member will be permitted to offer itself as a candidate representing a group in the next election to the Council;
(b) Between two and five adjacent States would have the liberty of offering themselves as a candidate for group membership of the Council. The representatives of the participating members would all sign a document attesting to their desire to participate as a group in membership of the Council. The member presenting that document would be listed as a candidate representing a group in the next election to the Council.
3. Adjacency. In the second alternative, the following groups of States would satisfy the adjacency criterion:
(a) Two or more mainland States, each of which is contiguous to at least one other member of the group;
(b) Two or more island States from each of which an imaginary uninterrupted straight line can be drawn to at least one other member of the group;
(c) A combination of one or more mainland and one ore more island States that satisfy the requirements of (a) and/or (b).
4. Head of delegation
(a) In the first alternative, the chair of the group and head of delegation would be the presenting Member State;
(b) The chair of any ad hoc group and head of delegation would be the presenting Member State;
(c) At any time, the States participating in alternatives (a) or (b) could designate another State as the chair of the group and head of delegation.
5. Voting. Only the current chair and head of delegation would have the right of speaking and voting. Although for the purpose of counting votes in the Council, any such vote would be deemed to be on behalf of the voting member only, the other members of the group would be bound by it.
6. Security Council Committee Membership. A Security Council Committee member from any State member of a group would present all members of the group. It would be expected to share information and consult with the other members of the group.
7. Termination. Any participant in alternative (a) would become ineligible to continue participation upon the date on which its membership of the arrangement or agency terminates. Any participant in alternative (b) would be at liberty to withdraw from participation by written notification to the President of the Council.
B. Limitations
8. Number of members of groups. There would be no limit to the maximum number of participants in alternative (a). In alternative (b) the maximum number of participants would be five, the number of seating places in the Council chamber presently assigned to each delegation.
9. Number of groups. If it is desired to limit the number of groups, various formulae could be devised.
C. Probable beneficiaries
10. Subject to any limitations, it is probable that potential beneficiaries of this modality of membership could include States from seven or eight major subregions.
III JUSTIFICATION
A. Charter of the United Nations
11. The critical importance of the subregional dimension in international peace and security is rooted in the Charter, Article 51 of which recognizes the saliency of collective self-defense notwithstanding the Charter's establishment of enforcement by the global Organization. This theme is further elaborated by Chapter VIII, which acknowledges the potential importance to peace and security of regional agencies and arrangements. The proposal outlined in the present document is entirely consistent with those provisions, as well as with the spirit of international cooperation which pervades the Charter and which inspired the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations.
B. Recent Practice
12. In recent years, a very substantial proportion of peace-keeping exercise has been conducted by regional agencies or arrangements. Examples are the recent actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the former Yugoslavia; by members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia; by members of the Caribbean States (OECS); and of the CARICOM in Grenada. These recent trends might resemble earlier actions by members of the Organization of American States (OAS). The solidarity in security matters that has epitomized those actions is the e thrust of the proposal of the present document, as is the repeated emphasis by the Secretary-General that peace and security should increasingly be viewed as a shared endeavor between the global Organization and regional agencies.
C. Economy and Efficiency
13. Apart from the relevancy and efficacy of peace-keeping from within a region, such activities are often cost-effective and economically efficient. This is strongly underscored by the dire financial condition of the United Nations. In view of the financial dependence of the Organization, it is clear that it is essential to devise modalities for cost-sharing. Since very few States are able to afford to maintain the large delegations (of up to 15 persons) required to service a Council member, this proposal addresses the issues of economy and efficiency.
D. Security Concerns of Small States
14. A crucial aspect of many of the situations of conflict and security in the twentieth century has been the targeting of small and weak States by aggressor States. It is therefore fair and rational to facilitate the participation on the council of small States.
15. In fact, during the past 15 years or so, small States, which were usually unrepresented in the Council, have been critically involved in many of the matters of the most crucial importance dealt with by the Council. Examples have been destabilization, mercenaries and insurrection (Maldives, Comoros, Grenada); nuclear testing and passage of nuclear waste (pacific, Caribbean); and regional conflict (Central America).
16. The locales of many of the unrepresented small States are also included among the world's most strategic areas.
E. Improvement of the Council's decision-making
17. It has been noted that the emergence to independence of many small States and their immediate acceptance by other nations and their constructive involvement in international life have helped to substantiate the theory that each unit in the international system plays an important role regardless of its size and wealth. Recent illustrations of the high quality of inputs of the smaller States are the contributions of members of the Alliance of Small Island States to the work products of the Barbados Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the Conferences of the Parties to the Biodiversity and the Climate Change Conventions.
It has been further noted that the recognition of the personality of such small entities adds to the diversity necessary for the healthy growth of human society and international law. Expressions such as the "family of nations" and the "international community" are quite common. A small family of creatures, as size wealth, however, has the germs of atrophy and decay. An international family consisting of members with a wide variety of attributes is more likely to grow.
18. It is submitted that, in addition to the important contributions which, as a result of this proposal, small States will be enabled to make in matters directly affecting them, their input will be invaluable in decision-making on the establishment, implementation and modification of Security Council sanctions regimes.
F. Information and Transparency
19. Although there are ongoing efforts to improve transparency of the Council's decision-making, it is clear that much more needs to be done. This will be facilitated by increasing the number of States with access to inside information without encumbering the process by the multiplication of voices and votes and the addition of noise and clutter.
20. At the same time, the Council would benefit by having access to a larger pool of sources of information from the members of the group or the relevant subregional organizations.
IV ANALOGUES
A. Organized Constituencies
21. In the economic field, the modality of seat sharing is well established and works effectively in such agencies as the Global Environment Facility, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In those agencies, the members of the group are actually represented and bound by the actions of the voting member. However, under the present proposal, this would not be the case.
22. Besides, this proposal works no harm to national sovereignty and realistic notions of pride and well-being, while being entirely consistent with security, both national and global.
B. Growth of Regional Security Institutions
23. It is relevant that, in recent years there has been a steady increase in the number of agencies with important roles in the maintenance of peace and security. In addition to NATO and the Rio Pact in the Americas, reference has been made to activities under the aegis of such economic integration agencies as ECOWAS, OECS and CARICOM. Additionally, there have been established the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Caribbean Regional Security System and the South Pacific Forum. All of these trends are consistent with the proposal herein.
C. Proliferation of Regional Agencies
24. In recent years, the Council has been obliged closely to look at the interaction of conflict/security with the global and regional economies, the environment and social, physical and other institutions and infrastructures. Consequentially, there have been proposals for vesting in the Council formal responsibility for broad new genres of "security" in those spheres. It is arguable that those proposals are undergirded by the extraordinary explosion of often overlapping agencies for regional cooperation in economic integration; trade; border activities; shared natural resources, especially in river basins and mountain ranges; and miscellaneous activities (e.g. the Association of Caribbean States). This demonstrates that time is ripe for the very modest form of cooperation that is proposed in the present document.
