The mandate of the Open-ended Working Group on the reform of the Security Council is defined in General Assembly resolution 48/26 of 3 December 1993 as "to consider all aspects of the question of increase in the membership of the Security Council, and other matters related to the Security Council". In the preamble to the resolution the Assembly recognized, inter alia, the need to review the membership of the Security Council and related matters in view of the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations.
Based on that mandate, reform efforts are aimed at achieving a comprehensive and genuine reform, embracing at the same time so-called cluster II (""the matters related to the Security Council"" and cluster I view, the latter implies an increase in both the permanent and the non-permanent category of membership. Any other result would remain partial. It would ignore the new realities and changes in international relations as mentioned in resolution 48/26. Submissions in document A/49/965 of 18 September 1995 indicate that only a small minority of States so far wishes to exclude an increase in the category of permanent membership.
In the same document, several countries have proposed to re-examine or to review periodically the new composition of the Security Council as an element of an overall agreement (Nordic countries, Movement of Non-Aligned Countries). Germany shares their view and has stated this on several occasions. In Germany's view, a periodic review clause will represent an essential element for reaching general agreement on a comprehensive reform package:
Benefits
1. The periodic review clause will guarantee that an increase in both membership categories is not irreversible. All new permanent and non-permanent seats would be subject to re-examination after a certain period. As far as new permanent members are concerned, their status will be permanent but not eternal.
2. New permanent members will become accountable to the general membership. The performance and the action of any new permanent member will be taken into account at the moment of review. Any new permanent member could be replaced.
3. Countries whose aspirations have not been taken into consideration for a seat in the Security Council keep their chance to improve their status. They may demonstrate their qualification for a better status, including the possibility of permanent membership, at the moment of the review of the composition of the Council.
4. A periodic review will allow the membership to re-examine the composition of the Council against the background of possible new political and economic realities. This flexibility would better meet the needs of a political decision of this kind than any "objective" criteria, be they based on the size of population, financial contributions or military troop contributions.
5. Altogether, the periodic review clause would allow a far-reaching, genuine reform while maintaining the possibility of adapting the composition of the Security Council in the future to new and changing realities.
Terms of reference. Field of application.
6. A review should address all aspects of a reform package. The elements of a comprehensive reform package are closely interlinked. It would therefore be difficult to exclude any of them from a periodic review. This refers to all elements contained in clusters I and II that will become part of the package.
7. A periodic review clause would not restrict rights and obligations held by the existing five permanent members.
8. New permanent members would not be entitled to use a possible veto right regarding the review results.
9. The review would take place after 15 years. Fifteen years is the average of existing proposals, which have mentioned periods of 10, 12, 15, 20 or 10-20 years. A period of 15 years is less than half of the time that has gone by since the last change in the composition of the Security Council (1965-1996). Fifteen years would be a foreseeable and at the same time stabilizing time period with regard to any new composition of the Council. The period would start after the entry into force of the changes agreed upon in the comprehensive reform package.
10. The review would be compulsory and be automatically put on the agenda of the General assembly. An eventual new composition of the Council would have to be decided within two years, that is, at the latest at the end of the following session of the General Assembly.
Possible Reading
11. An appropriate place for a periodic review clause would be Article 23 (4, 5 new) of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 23 would read as follows:
Article 23
(1) [to be adapted]
(2) [to be adapted]
(3) Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.
(4) New permanent members who are not the original five permanent members are subject to a periodic review in accordance with Article 108. The review process is compulsory and will take place after fifteen years. Ratification of the review result does not necessarily require ratification by the new permanent members.
(5) Other changes regarding composition and working methods of the Security Council than those mentioned in paragraph 4 are subject to the same periodic review.
12. This reading is a preliminary proposal. The final wording is subject to further discussion.
13. In the same context, other Articles of the Charter may also need to be amended. Furthermore, details of the review process could be included in a resolution of the General Assembly.
