Monaco's contribution relates to subparagraph 2 (a) of document A/AC 247. "Proposals on rotation or shared seats, including Article 23.2 of the Charter". It elaborates and complements the proposals previously outlined by the Monegasque delegation.
The wish to increase the membership of the Security Council is clear. It is a logical reflection of the profound transformation that has taken place in international society and, particularly, of the significant increase in the number of States Members of the Organization.
This is undoubtedly the only point on which there is really widespread agreement among States. Regarding the modalities for this increase, in contrast, it is difficult to find any real agreement, even though some ideas appear to attract more interest than others.
It is in this spirit that Monaco submits for the attention of the working group a simple and specific suggestion with a view to facilitating, if possible, the negotiations on increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.
It consists of a formula which, as far as we know has not yet been properly explored. Assuming an increase of 10 in the Security Council's membership, taking the number of members from 15 to 25, the formula could be as follows:
---Increasing from five to ten the number of permanent members who would have the same powers and responsibilities as the current members. The five additional members could be designated, preferably on regional basis, by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority vote and taking into account equitable geographical distribution and their capacity to contribute to peace-keeping operations;
---Increasing the number of non-permanent members from 10 to 15. The additional five non-permanent members could have a long term (between 6 and 12 years, for example) and be chosen by the General Assembly by a simple majority. Retiring members would be eligible for immediate re-election. Candidates should be capable of responding, as in the case of permanent members, to the need for an effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the other purposes of the Organization, and paying due regard, of course, to equitable geographical distribution (Art. 23, para. 1, of the Charter).
The other 10 non-permanent members would continue to be elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years, in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Charter. They would not be eligible for immediate re-election at the end of their terms.
In Monaco's view, this proposal would have three advantages:
First, it would provide an opportunity for five new major powers which are particularly representative and contribute substantially to peace-keeping operations and international security to have a permanent seat on the Security Council;
Second, it would give an opportunity to five other leading Powers, in particular regional Powers, which regularly participate in such operations and contribute substantially to them to be involved in the work of the Security Council for long periods of time;
Lastly, the more modest Powers would be able to participate in the Security Council with greater frequency, since the larger States which very often sit on the Security Council as non-permanent members would become permanent members or be elected for longer terms.
This is not, as Monaco sees it, immutable. Rather, it could form the basis for discussion and negotiation, since it is adaptable and can be tailored to different situations.
Thus, for example, if the membership of the Security Council is increased to 20, two members could be permanent and three could be non-permanent with a longer term. If it is increased to 22, three members could be permanent and four could be non-permanent with a longer term, and so forth.
The number of years in a longer term could also be flexible.
In conclusion, Monaco wishes to stress, in particular, that if the concept of non-permanent membership with longer terms is accepted, it would act as a significant means of encouraging certain Member States to maintain or increase their contributions to peace-keeping operations, since they would benefit, deservedly, from longer and renewable terms on the Security Council, thereby reflecting the size and regularity of their contributors.
Previously issued as A/Ac.247/1996/CRP. 12.
