Summary of Ideas on a Possible System of More Frequent Rotation in Additional Non-Permanent Seats in the Security Council
1. Our Working Group should now take up the study of the proposals-mainly those of Italy, Turkey and Mexico-which concern systems of rotation in the Security Council. Pursuant to these proposals, it is not a question of creating new categories of membership of the Council, but of allowing some States which have strength and influence in international relations, and the capacity and will to make a significant contribution to the fulfillment of the Organization's purposes, to participate more frequently as members of the Council.
2. The purpose of the present paper is to outline a few ideas and thoughts in order to illustrate the functioning of a possible system which would allow a relatively broad group of States to participate more frequently in the Security Council in accordance with objective criteria based on the principles established by Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. This system could function independently and without detriment to any solutions that may be deemed appropriate with regard to the question of a possible increase in the number of permanent seats, with or without the right of veto.
3. The delegation of Spain is of the view that the criteria to be applied in order to ensure the proper application of Article 23 of the Charter should be:
(a) Objective, so that they will enjoy general consensus and the support of all Members of the Organization;
(b) Open and flexible, so that they will allow participation by any State that meets the criteria. Thus, flexible access to more frequent participation in the Security Council will become an incentive for countries to maintain or increase their contribution to the tasks of the Organization, particularly those relating to international peace and security.
4. The point of departure should be Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which provides, in respect of the election of non-permanent members of the Council, for due regard to be specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
5. Accordingly, the first criterion to be applied should be the contribution of military, police and civilian personnel to United Nations peace-keeping operations. Indeed, the most serious commitment that Member States can make to the Organization is the contribution of their nationals to such operations, which often constitute high-risk situations. Such contribution may be said to the touchstone of each country's real commitment to the tasks of the Organization with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The intense national debates that arise in many countries when contributions to such operations are being decided on, negotiated and assessed bear witness to this.
6. Another criterion could be the financial contributions effectively disbursed to the Organization's budgets. This is an important criterion, as it ensures crucial financial support, not only for the day-to-day functioning of the Organization, but also for the implementation and development of peace-keeping operations. This is especially relevant at the present moment, when the Organization is undergoing a financial crisis.
7. Lastly, without excluding any other criterion that might be applied, it is necessary to take into account the population of Member States. At a time when efforts are being made to democratize the Organization, it would be very beneficial for the countries with larger populations to participate more frequently in the Security Council. In addition, by increasing the participation of developing countries, such a demographic criterion would offset the pervious criterion, which is based more on economic capacity.
8. A given percentage could be established for each of the three criteria mentioned above which would allow a number of countries to be included in the more frequent rotation cycle. The cycle would include those countries which had the required percentages in any of the following categories:
(a) Total personnel assigned to peace-keeping operations;
(b) Total financial contributions effectively disbursed, both to the Organization's regular budget and to the peace-keeping budgets;
(c) Population as a percentage of the world total.
The percentages could be calculated with reference to a certain period immediately preceding the start of the respective cycle. Since non-permanent members of the Council are elected for a term of two years, a few simple calculations can be done, purely for illustrative purposes, on the basis of a two-year period (1994-1995), in order to consider the results.
9. Thus, for example—leaving aside the current permanent members of the Council—we find that:
(a) Fifteen countries have a population totally over 1 per cent of the world total; of these, six have a population totaling over 2 per cent;
(b) Ten countries have made contributions totaling over 1 per cent of the United Nations budgets (both the regular and the peace-keeping budgets); of these, six have made contributions totaling over 2 per cent;
(c) Lastly, 27 countries have each contributed over 1 per cent of the personnel assigned to peace-keeping operations, of these, 13 have contributed over 2 per cent.
10. Of the 39 States that are above the 1 per cent level in at least on of these categories, 18 are developed countries and 21 are developing countries. Overall, 18 States score above 2 per cent in at least one of the three categories. Eight of them are developed countries and 10 are developing countries. The countries on both lists belong to all the regional groups recognized by the Organization.
11. Thus, a list of countries formed on the basis of these criteria would not be composed exclusively of either rich countries (since population and troop contributions would both be taken into account) or large countries, since small countries with relatively large troop contributions could also be included and have their efforts acknowledged by the international community.
12. Another advantage of a system such as this is that the list would be renewable at the end of every cycle, allowing new States to be included in the rotation, on the basis of data reflecting changes in their participation in United Nations activities or their population.
13. At this point, it is necessary to return to Article 23, paragraph 1, of the Charter, and to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. The regional groups would continue to submit their candidacies to the General Assembly in accordance with a pre-established rotation, as they have done up to now; the Assembly would have the last word, by electing these countries to the Security Council through a two-thirds majority vote, as in the case of the other non-permanent members. This would ensure that the countries elected to the Council would not only convey the concerns and aspirations of the various regions, but would also act on behalf of the entire international community, as stipulated by Article 24 of the Charter.
14. What has been stated on previous occasions bears repeating, namely, that a system of more frequent rotation for a certain number of States will also increase opportunities for participation by other, smaller States, which, when being endorsed by their regional groups, are frequently displaced by other States with greater influence in the region.
15. From a legal standpoint, a system of rotation such as the one described would be simple to implement, since the only change that would need to be made to the Charter would be to amend Article 23 so as to increase the number of non-permanent members. The rest of the system could be put in place through a General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus or with very broad support.
16. In conclusion, a system structured along these lines would be more equitable than the present one, would ensure a more efficient Security Council, and would be objective, thus winning the acceptance of all Members of the Organization.
Ideas for adaptation of the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions
A compromise solution with a view to adapting the Security Council system for the adoption of decisions could be based on the distrinctions established in Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations. This would allow for differentiation of three types of Council decisions, concerning:
(a) Procedural matters: Decisions would be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of the Council;
(b) Substantive matters not related to Chapter VII: A special qualified majority would be required, without the right of veto (this majority could be established at three fifths or two thirds of the members of the Council);
(c) Substantive matters related to Chapter VII: The same qualified majority would be required, but with the possibility for permanent members to exercise the right of veto.
· Presented on 28 February 1996. Previously issued as A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10 and A/AC.247/1996/CRP.10/Add 1
