Global Policy Forum

Introduction

1. It is almost two years since the discussion paper (A/AC.247/5(c)) prepared by an informal group of small and medium-sized countries was circulated.

2. The paper was intended as a contribution to the ongoing work of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and related matters. It reflected the broad agreement of the Group on a number of fundamental principles on which reform of the Security Council should be based together with the position of the Group on the principal issues of substance.

3. The paper that follows reflects the desire of the Group to draw upon the richness and depth of the ideas and proposals which were presented in the Working Group by many delegations over the past two years.

4. In revisiting the positions, both of principle and substance, contained in the original discussion paper, the Group wishes to acknowledge that a reasonably large number of delegations would seem to share the approach which the Group has taken. The Group hopes that this paper might encourage and contribute to the new momentum which many delegations have called for in the next stage of the deliberations of the Open-Ended Working Group.

5. It has been the practice of the Open-Ended Working Group to consider the main issues concerning the reform of the Security Council by Cluster. While work has been proceeding concurrently under each Cluster, it is becoming clear that agreement in the areas in Cluster II is proving easier to reach. The Group believes that improvements in the working methods of the Security Council should not await agreement on other aspects such as size and decision-making. There should therefore be no reason in principle to link agreement in this cluster to progress in the other. Both clusters should form part of the final package.

General comments

6. The following principles should guide the reform of the Security Council:

(a) The reform of the Security Council should strengthen its effectiveness. Any expansion should not be so large as to impede unduly its efficiency.

(b) Enlargement of the Security Council must

- ensure representativity of the increased general membership.
- take into account new economic and political powers.
- enhance equitable geographic representation.
- take place in both the categories of permanent and non-permanent members.

(c) The possibility of all Member States to serve on the Council on the basis of the criteria of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter remains an important consideration.

Size

7. The upper numerical limit for the size of the Security Council should be no greater than 25.

Permanent membership

8.
- Global influence, capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular through peacekeeping operations and through the assumption of an additional financial burden (peacekeeping operations budget) and equitable geographic distribution should be taken into account for selecting new permanent members. Fixing objective criteria for selecting new permanent members would, however, be difficult to achieve and might threaten the whole process of reform.

- Enlargement in the permanent members of the Council must include countries from the underrepresented regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, in keeping with the principles mentioned in paragraphs 6 (b) and 6 (c) above and the criteria listed in the above paragraph. Germany and Japan are already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats.

- The idea of rotational regional seats for permanent members has been noted. Its feasibility both practical and political would need to be further explored.

- Expansion in the category of permanent members should be undertaken in a non-discriminatory manner.

Non-permanent membership

9.
- The increase in and geographic distribution of non-permanent seats should ensure as much as possible a balanced configuration of the Security Council. The criteria for their selection (Article 23.1 of the Charter) should be maintained.

- Special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established.

Veto

10. Discussion has shown that a large majority of delegations support limitations on the scope and application of the veto.

Consequently, there is a need to examine in detail means whereby the application of the veto could be limited either by agreement on the specific circumstances when it could be exercised or by political undertakings to be given by permanent members on its use.

Review

11. An essential element of a comprehensive reform package will be to ensure that new arrangements on the size, composition and decision-making procedures of the Council are subject to review at a later stage, such as 10 to 15 years after their entry into force.

A large majority of member States would seem to consider the veto should not be exercised with respect to Charter amendment (Article 108).

12. Measures already taken to enhance the relationship between the Council and the general membership as well as to improve the working methods and procedures of the Council, constitute a positive development. These measures should be maintained and improved and, where appropriate, be formalized.

13. Further improvements should be made in:

(a) Briefings on the work of the Council by the President of the Council;

(b) More open meetings of the Council with regular orientation debates;

(c) Consultations between Security Council and troop-contributing countries;

(d) Transparency of the work of sanctions committees;

(e) Implementation of Article 31 and 32 concerning the participation of non-members in informal consultations of the Security Council;

(f) The right of any member of the United Nations to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council in cases when the Member States feel there is a threat to international peace and security;

(g) The provision of the tentative forecast of the programme of work to non-members of the Council;

(h) The inclusion in the rules of procedure, or otherwise formally approved, of the recommendations of the General Assembly of 14 April 1949 on what is considered an action of a procedural nature;

(i) Regular meetings between the President of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

*Previously issued as A/AC.247/1997/CRP.2 of 27 March 1997.