March 1, 1999
Hans Van Sponeck, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, told correspondents today at a Headquarters' press briefing that, in a nutshell, what was happening in Iraq was a certain shrinking in the freedom of United Nations humanitarian operations to move goods and people, although the work was continuing fairly much as expected. However, if the frequency and the civilian damages continued to increase, they would have to rethink, he added, responding to a question on whether the continued air strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom in the "no-fly zone" might impact on his oversight of distribution of humanitarian goods or put the lives of his staff in danger.
As the designated security officers, he had taken a number of measures to react to the deteriorating security situation, he continued. Staff no longer stayed overnight in different parts of the country, but rather went out from, and returned to, a series of nodal points that were in touch with the Baghdad headquarters. Another adjustment he had ordered was that United Nations trucks and people no longer moved between Mosul and Dahuk between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m., as this was usually the time of confrontation. Such limitations, of course, impeded their work.
There was also a psychological element, he said. One of his colleagues had decided to resign because of the effect of the uncertainty about personal safety.
Asked whether he would pull humanitarian staff out of Iraq, Mr. Van Sponeck said he did not think so. As correspondents knew, even during the very critical periods for security in mid-November and mid-December, it was really only as a last resort that the painful decision to pull out people was taken, because what was at stake was the assurance that flows of humanitarian goods occurred as they should. A balance between the responsibilities for the security of the staff and assurance that observation and implementation activities continued had to be struck, as was expected by a people whose nose was barely above the water.
He explained that, at the moment, he was trying to give the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues a very broad overview of how the humanitarian programme was doing and how it was influenced by the increasingly volatile security situation in Iraq. Another subject of great importance to him was the assessment the Secretary-General had decided to carry out through the Office of the Iraq Programme and his office in Baghdad. That assessment aimed at establishing a good, honest insight into how well the programmes established under Security Council resolution 986 (1997) had performed, in all phases, in relation to the needs of 23 million Iraqis.
[Security Council resolution 986 established the modalities of the "oil-for-food" programme, whereby certain amounts of Iraqi oil could be sold, and a portion of the money obtained through the sale would be used to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people.]
Asked for an update on the situation regarding yesterday's air strikes and their impact on exports into Turkey, Mr. Van Sponeck referred the question to the Spokesman for the Office of the Iraq Programme, John Mills, who had been in touch with Baghdad. As he had not been in touch, he could not provide the update.
In response to another question, about the relationship between the Secretary-General's assessment and the Security Council Panel's work, he explained that the Secretary-General's assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq would review how well the "986" programmes had done with resources that were increasingly precarious and showing a downward trend compared to what was agreed to by the Security Council. The assessment exercise would contribute to the Panel's work as the Panel saw fit. He was at its disposal, but the assessment itself would be the Secretary-General's own picture of the situation.
Asked when the assessment would be completed, he said that the intention was to submit a first draft to New York towards the end of March for finalization. Deadlines were very tight. He wished to emphasize how difficult it was for his office, even in Iraq, to lay its hands on data that was more than anecdotal on what, as Humanitarian Coordinator, he believed was increasingly the issue. The issue was the effect on the Iraqi social fabric, and what was happening to people from a sociological point of view, keeping in mind the additive effect of years of deprivation.
The Government of Iraq was not very forthcoming in allowing them to carry out household surveys, he said. The few surveys that were available on nutrition and mortality, and the work on juvenile delinquency, all showed, as would be expected, deteriorating conditions and a deterioration of the social fabric.
Asked whether he thought, as his predecessor did, that the sanctions should be lifted, he explained that, as a civil servant, he concentrated on being a good manager, a good troubleshooter and a good interpreter. If he started questioning sanctions per se, he would be wasting energies he needed to do his work as a manager. That was counter-productive. What he thought in the evening at home was a different story, but he would not disclose that.
He wanted correspondents to understand, however, that he and his colleagues were sent to Baghdad to help the Secretary-General implement the Memorandum of Understanding that the United Nations has signed with the Government of Iraq. That was his prime concern -- to have an honest and well managed show and to troubleshoot -- and there was plenty of need for troubleshooting these days, as could be imagined. While that answer would disappoint them, he had no better answer.
