Global Policy Forum

By John Vandaele

International institutions like the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund are slowly adapting to the growing economic impact of emerging countries. Even the informal club par excellence, the G8, is bound to open its doors for developing countries. There is one powerful institution though, that seems unable to adapt to the changing realities: the Security Council of the United Nations. By now, everybody has recognised that the composition of the council, especially its five permanent members -- the four victors of the second world war, the U.S., Russia, UK and France, plus China -- is too much a reflection of the past. Since 1993 a long row of commissions has been studying how to adapt the council to today's world. They have come up with several proposals, but none of them got the necessary support. One condition is that the five permanent members – the P5 -- have to agree. India, Brazil, Japan, Germany, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt...all are candidates for a permanent seat, but it has proved impossible to find an agreement.

Even if the composition of the council would change, there would still be a big democratic problem. It is the veto power of the P5 that skews the decisions of the council. In 1945 the victors of the second world war, in return for accepting the strong rules of the council, received the power to block any rule they don't like. That veto means that 30 percent of the world population runs the show in the council. And because the U.S. is responsible for 13 of 16 vetoes of the last 15 years, you could say that 5 percent of the world population has a disproportionate influence in this most powerful of UN organs. The veto really shapes the workings of the council. During the Cold War it was almost impossible for the council to involve itself in the vast territories the two superpowers regarded as their backyard. The council did not produce a single resolution about the war between the U.S. and Vietnam. After the Cold War, the council produced many more resolutions -- once a week instead of once a month -- but the bias problem remains, with now the U.S. having a disproportionate influence.

The Iraq wars, the one with Iran and then the two led by the U.S., illustrate the consequences of the veto power very well. The most important rule of the Security Council, the backbone of the international security architecture, is that the use of force between states is forbidden. There are two exceptions: self-defence, and military measures authorised by the council. Yet, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 the council did not really react because most of the P5, for one reason or another, liked Iran being attacked, one year after its Islamic revolution. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 on the other hand, the U.S. was able to convince almost all countries of the world to join it to force Iraq to respect the rule of law and oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. When the U.S. invaded Iraq, the council didn't do anything because the U.S. could block any resolution. So, three transgressions of rules, three different reactions.

The U.S. said it invaded Iraq to make sure the resolutions of the Security Council were implemented. Their reasoning was: 'council resolutions oblige Saddam to help the UN find his weapons of mass destruction, Saddam doesn't really do that, so the U.S. can invade'. Few states accept this justification now – then UN-secretary-general Kofi Annan called the war illegal -- but even if you do accept it, another conclusion becomes inevitable. Since there are several examples of other resolutions not being implemented, you have to conclude that not only the rule making process but also the sanctioning of rules (resolutions) is skewed by the power of the P5, primarily the U.S.

One example. In 1980 the Security Council unanimously voted resolution 465 which "calls upon the Government and people of Israel to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem." We all know that since then, Israel has not stopped building new settlements. But there were no sanctions, no attempts to implement this resolution. On the contrary, 12 of the 13 U.S. vetoes since 1995 concerned the Israel-Palestine question. Through the Security Council the U.S. prevents the world from tackling Israel harder over its breach of the rules of the Security Council. The question is whether in the end this leads to more security in the world and in Israel. John Mearsheimer in his book 'The Israel Lobby and US Foreign policy' fundamentally asks the same question: did the U.S. really help Israel by allowing it to neglect UN resolutions?

Without any doubt, this "special treatment" is the reason why the credibility of the UN is very low in the Arab countries. But the problem is broader: if the council acts immediately when 3,000 people are killed in New York on 9/11 but doesn't do anything when 10,000 Rwandans are killed every day for three months, developing countries are right to ask whether their security is of a lesser importance. Under U.S. President George W. Bush, the U.S. went further: even though the U.S. clearly dominates the council, at the moment when it could not, it just put the Security Council aside and invaded Iraq. For the credibility of the council, this is terrible. Our aim here is not U.S. bashing; besides, we understand that a country that is good for half of the world's military expenses is tempted to boss around the rest of the world. Our point is that if the Security Council wants to contribute to security in the world, it needs credibility and legitimacy, just like any other institution.

And here there's a problem. People all over the world tend not to like injustice. If the Security Council has two measures: one for the friends of the U.S. or the P5, one for the others, it will create tensions and undermine the credibility of the Security Council. It's no coincidence that the Arab world has the least confidence in the UN. And if people do not believe that multilateral institutions can take care of their security needs, they will resort to other methods. The council can only gain in legitimacy if it is seen more as applying the same standards to all people. Democrats should understand this, since one of democracy's pillars is that all people have equal rights. If such a policy is compatible with vetoes, it will be because the veto powers honestly try to follow certain principles or guidelines in judging security situations around the world, rather then just defend their own interest.

Kofi Annan tried to address this problem before leaving his post as secretary-general, but to no avail. European diplomats in the nineties already discovered the U.S. doesn't like any watering down of the veto. It remains to be seen whether the Iraq episode has convinced the U.S. government that it too needs multilateral institutions and international cooperation: opinion polls learn that U.S. citizens tend to be more convinced of this. If such a change is not in sight, the world depends on the personality and ideology of the U.S. president. That's one of the reasons why the world is following U.S. presidential elections with such avid interest. The U.S. president is a bit everybody's president, in that he or she has global influence. But the world outside the U.S. has no say in his election. That too constitutes a democratic deficit, Mister President.