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The Dangers of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment

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Le Monde diplomatique
March, 1998

Stop Press

Following the publication in our February edition of an article on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the acronym MAI - that previously meant nothing to the man-in-the-street - has entered into Europe's everyday political vocabulary. Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), described the MAI proposal as the "constitution for a single global economy" yet it was being discussed behind closed doors at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

It is not difficult to understand why. The MAI provides for sovereignty to be transferred from states to international investors in all sectors: culture, agriculture, industry and the service sector. As a result of mass protests from trade unionists, trade associations and, in France in particular, the world of culture and the arts, adoption of the agreement - scheduled for late April - seems unlikely to take place. Even after the introduction of a number of "exceptions" relating to cultural issues, any agreement would leave citizens bereft of a voice in vital decisions and result in the transfer of national sovereignty to those who hold the keys to international capital.

Wielding Power Behind the Scenes

It is unlikely that the OECD hierarchy and its secretary-general, Donald J. Johnston, in particular, have welcomed the publicity that the controversy over the MAI has generated for them since early February. The OECD brings together the world's 29 wealthiest states, but at its headquarters, the Chí¢teau de la Muette in an elegant quarter of Paris (1), curiosity on the part of the man-in-the-street is not appreciated.

They prefer to keep the company of administrators (a mere 600 of them) and "experts" from governments and employer associations, united in their devotion to a radical free market economy. In a constant stream of "studies", they argue for ever-greater workforce flexibility, reject job security measures, call for the minimum wage to be abolished and for more and more privatisation etc. (2). This they are able to do in perfect tranquillity as a result of their comfortable operating budget - some $266 million - paid for exclusively by those same states whose attempts to intervene in their own economies are constantly reviled. France contributes 7.05% of that budget. French workers on the minimum wage will be delighted to learn that their government pays FF 110 million ($18m) annually to an institution that devotes a great deal of its energy to condemning them as harbingers of unemployment.

In a very well documented (3), but hardly critical study, a former member of the French delegation, Henri Chavranski, describes the role of the organisation thus: "a discreet organisation providing analysis, reflection and advice, the OECD seeks to smooth out the differences between the Western economies that are liberal and developed but compete with each other; and for 35 years now it has been wielding power behind-the-scenes. The extent of its influence is hard to determine because it takes a variety of forms. The OECD's main asset is the ability to use the power of argument to persuade its member states." In others words, the organisation plays the role of political commissar in the "Ultraliberalist International", with the operational role having been assigned to its most important other members - the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the European Commission - and their national sections (those responsible for running the Treasury in France, for example).

Why then is the MAI being discussed by 29 states at the OECD, and not at the WTO which, with 131 member states, is a priori the more legitimate forum?

Using the language of diplomacy, Mr Henri Chavranski provides us with the answer: "The negotiations began and are continuing within the OECD exclusively, between member states that are providers of capital; those states are firmly convinced that this kind of internal procedure is the only way of producing a binding and therefore useful text that will subsequently be gradually extended to non-OECD countries wishing to attract foreign capital." He goes on to say that, at the WTO, "the presence of countries that have major reservations concerning or are actually hostile to the very principle of a binding agreement on investment means that the negotiations would be unlikely to succeed".

(1) OECD, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16. Tel: +44 145 24 82 00.
(2) See Serge Halimi, "Pour l'OCDE, le salaire, voilí  l'ennemi!", Manií¨re de voir, no 32, "Scénarios de la mondialisation", November 1996.
(3) Henri Chavranski, L'OCDE au coeur des grands débats économiques, La Documentation franí§aise, collection "Les Etudes de La Documentation Franí§aise", Paris 1997, 146 pages, FF 80.



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FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.