By Nira Reyes Morales
Le Monde DiplomatiqueNovember, 2002
Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the first Socialist president of Chile since Salvador Allende, had just returned from signing an agreement establishing political and trade links with the European Union, when he told Congress in May: "I was very proud that the EU members see Chileans as respectable, serious and responsible partners. Chile is making a dignified entrance into the developed world. Sometimes I ask why the world shows such interest in forming alliances with our small country."
Chile is anything but secure, though: its government is worried about self-preservation should the Latin American financial crisis spread. The president set out the priority measures that his centre-left government (Coalition of Parties for Democracy, CPD) hopes to implement. Through the Chile Solidario (Chilean solidarity) subsidy system, the government aims to eradicate poverty, which affects 20% of Chile's 15m people. It also intends to use the Auge programme of universal cover to provide direct access to health care, and hopes to create a developed economy by 2010, the bicentennial of Chile's independence from Spain (1).
Lagos repeated his wish to finalise Chile's transition to democracy by amending the 1980 constitution, bequeathed by the military dictatorship. The government has repeatedly relegated constitutional reforms they have proposed for over a decade. Chile's economically correct neo-liberal policies, which favour key macroeconomic indicators, and its historical preference for institutional stability, have ensured its exceptional political and economic standing in Latin America. Chile has mythic status in the eyes of citizens and foreign observers. Chileans are torn between national pride and feelings of disillusionment as they try to live their lives bewildered by the economic miracle.
Chile's role as the Latin American tiger stems from its high annual growth, which soared to 7% between 1990 and 1997. Inflation is currently 3.6%, the budget deficit is under 1%, foreign debt is still under control and the country's annual growth, currently 2.2%, is South America's highest, outpacing Brazil's 1.5% (2). A presidential adviser, Fernando Reyes Matta, says: "Ricardo Lagos and his administration want to start a social-democratic revolution from within the third world." But Chile, as it struggles with the region's economic devastation, has paid a price for stability. Although the UN development programme describes Chile as low-risk for foreign investors (3), it also maintains that Chile should rebuild its fractured national identity (4).
The government's secretary general, Heraldo Muñoz, often says: "Chile is a credible nation." Yet according to Tomás Moulian, a sociologist, "governability and democracy are two separate things. What we have in Chile is a governable democracy. It reinforces our economic model. But fear is still with us and Chileans are fatigued (5)." People suffering from depression, stress, disillusionment - or euphoria - have a shaky sense of national identity (6).
Contrary to a strong media belief, Chile's economic success is not the result of General Pinochet's policies. The "Chicago Boys", a group of University of Chicago-trained economists, became his advisers in 1975, yet Pinochet's "successful" stewardship led to a major economic collapse in 1982. Under 12 years of democratic CPD governments (1990-2002), annual growth held steady at 5.8%. During the military regime of 1973-1990, annual growth was just 2.4%.
Chile is still feeling the effects of that 1982 recession, as the president pointed out earlier this year in response to criticisms of Chile's lower growth rates, set against previous years. Under pressure from business and the right (both groups are quick to see a threat of chaos whenever economic conditions seem inauspicious), Lagos said these were the critics who had pushed Chile into one of its worst economic downturns: "In this country, people either remain silent or only partially speak their minds. I want to remind them that since 1982 this crisis has cost Chile $500m every year, and there's still a balance due."
Justice where possible
Threats from economic and rightwing interests have continued since democracy was reinstated in 1990. These groups were a real danger to the first CPD government, led by Patricio Aylwin. The military contemplated a power grab at the slightest sign of instability, and to counter this, the government chose to implement policies based on "justice insofar as justice is possible" and to impose a socially paralysing consensus. This guaranteed governability and smoothed a transition to democracy, without military involvement. But Chile remains divided politically and ideologically, as shown by the 2000 election results. Lagos, the CPD standard-bearer, won in the second round with only 51% of the vote, against 49% for Joaquín Lavín. Lavín, a member of Opus Dei (a rightwing Catholic group) and currently mayor of Santiago, represented the ultra-right Independent Democratic Union (UDI), still unswerving in its support for Pinochet.
According to government officials, one goal holds Chile together: "If it wishes to reassert itself, the nation must open its doors to the world and stay with that decision to the end." This applies especially to Chile's political and economic elites, which have taken a gamble by positioning the country within the globalised economy. The strategy has had some success, but it also has its flaws. Despite a highly diversified trade policy with Latin America, Asia, the United States and the EU, Chile is vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy as an export-dependent nation. Following the Asian financial crisis, Chile's unemployment rate jumped from 5.3% in 1997 to 9.8% in 1999, dropping to 9.1% last year.
After three decades of extreme socio-cultural change, Chilean society has become more complex and fragile than national achievements might suggest. Chile's economic model has propelled its people to seek growth and individual success. Under pressure, Chileans have become addicted to work. They often live in contradiction to their own personal values, in order not to find themselves outside the system. Chileans share a common obsession. But the government's lack of a strategic cultural plan is a real problem.
In an act of collective amnesia, all historical connection between Chile's post-dictatorship success and its military past seems to have disappeared (7). But actually re-establishing such a link is essential to the task of rebuilding a nation still in mourning. When, on 4 July, Pinochet resigned his constitutionally guaranteed position of senator-for-life, Chileans had mixed feelings: relief at his final departure from public life and bitterness at the way he had escaped justice. They were only observers as their sole chance to assess the historic and moral implications of Chile's darkest period slipped away. That day, in the words of Secretary General Muñoz, the government expressed hope that "the past will remain in the past and Chileans will turn the page forever". Though the government had previously assured the international community that Pinochet would face trial, it chose stability over justice, fearing that legal proceedings would worsen social tensions, although this was a hypothetical possibility.
Chileans were eager for a trial. Pinochet's supporters were sure he would prove his innocence while defending the legality of his actions. His opponents could see a judgment day, a chance to strengthen Chile's democratic foundations. But Pinochet will never face trial. All charges against him were dropped because of what was claimed to be his mild cerebral dementia, which did not, however, prevent him from writing his own letter of resignation or declaring "I'm not crazy!" in a phone conversation with the president of the senate, Andres Zaldivar. Ideals of democracy and justice were ridiculed. And Chile's malaise continues.
Chileans have yet to come to terms with their sudden transformation from social actors to consumers. In a climate of competitiveness, the economic losers have internalised their helplessness (8). "Since the people can't change the way things are, they're just doing their best to get by," said a man who sells cell phones, alarms and phone cards on buses and streets of downtown Santiago.
Beginning with the 1988 plebiscite, which the anti-Pinochet "no" forces won, and continuing into the prosperous 1990s, there were many, perhaps too many, fast changes. A government bureaucrat, once a leader of the University of Chile's Federation of Students (FECH) says: "We were supposed to celebrate 'springtime and change' [the slogan of the no campaign] but we ended up paying tribute to neo-liberalism. The push for change led to years of economic success yet brought almost no constitutional or social reforms. We were worn out, and growth lulled us into complacency" - which may be a more accessible version of happiness.
Adapting to changing times and strengthening its bases, Chile's rightwing regrouped within the Alliance for Chile, which includes the UDI and National Renewal. The demagogic Alliance, blending ideology, militancy and cohesiveness, cleverly stole a page from the opposition's book, which the presidential candidate, Lavín, used as his slogan: "Long live change!" Chile's right, which includes management interests and former military figures now in business, has proved much stronger than parties within the CPD coalition, divided and weary from the strain of governing.
On 16 July, after two years' work, a bill setting up a cultural council and cultural development fund - the centre of the CPD's programme - was presented to the Congress for approval. Poor planning meant that many CPD deputies were absent, and voting could not take place without a quorum. Lagos spoke of the deputies' parliamentary duties and used the powers in Article 65 of Chile's constitution to reintroduce the bill, which was eventually passed in August.
Disillusionment
Even though the path of consensus may have suited the needs of the first democratic government of the post-Pinochet era, it has become an obstacle to Chilean participation in civil society. Chile's transition to democracy demobilised social forces that had once been at the forefront of the fight against dictatorship. Feelings of disillusionment and resignation are now commonplace, and many observers agree with sociologist Tomás Moulian: "Despite his charisma, Ricardo Lagos arrived at the wrong time, economically speaking. He came too late to change the constitution."
Stripped of their political reasons for existence, activist groups now appear as unruly and antisocial forces. This July secondary school students demonstrated against proposals to raise public transport fares. Although they won their battle, they paid a high price, since newspapers, television and government officials all focused on the disruption and the damage to public order caused by their demonstrations. The media ignored the students' long list of complaints, even though the government invited them into discussions. Demonstrations also happened on 11 September in the suburbs of Santiago to mark the anniversary of the coup that had toppled Salvador Allende in 1973. After 14 police officers were injured and 505 people were arrested, the police and government blamed "marginalised youths".
Now that competitive individualism has replaced the public interest, Chileans refuse to pay taxes to fund public education. They prefer to work desperately hard to enrol their children in expensive private schools instead. Given the fascination with individual success, involvement in the welfare of others is seen as misguided. Chileans and, at times, their political representatives no longer understand the relationship between cause and effect.
The military dictatorship managed to destroy Chileans' sense of social equality, their collective imagination and their potential for mobilisation. With the government split between neo-liberals and social democrats, some within the administration have also given up these ideals. Chilean society remains convinced of (or perhaps just resigned to) the idea that rectifying social inequalities depends on growth and individual success.
Take Mauricio, born in Valparaíso. His father, a watchmaker, sent him to Santiago to study engineering. Mauricio boasts that he can navigate any obstacles in the labour market: "I'm better off than my parents. Sure, I feel a little insecure. I'm scared that I might lose my job and not be able to find another. But if I keep up with my training, things will get better. All my money goes to pay for my medical insurance, retirement plan and other deductions. Since my kids aren't in university yet, all I can do is further my education and work harder than others so my employer doesn't fire me."
According to the World Bank, poverty in Chile has decreased. Between 1987 and 1998 cases of extreme poverty (less than $1.60 a day) dropped from 13% to 4%, and less extreme cases (under $3 a day) fell from 40% to 17%. But in the absence of official income redistribution policies or comprehensive anti-poverty measures, there is now entrenched poverty. "With all our wealth, maritime and mineral resources, and all the talk of national success, I wonder why I can't make the grade," says unemployed Pedro. Originally from the north, he relocated to Santiago but found no work: "I wonder why should Chileans like me still go hungry?" The top 10% of Chilean households consume 41% of national income, while the bottom 20% get by on a total share of only 3.7% (10). Although financial aid is available and there are assistance programmes, these stopgap measures do not provide opportunities for effective long-term social reintegration.
The Chile Solidario programme is ostensibly supported by social workers and anti-poverty groups, including sociologists from the SUR centre for social studies, the ministry of planning and the urban poverty programme (PPU). Participants in the programme get follow-up attention for problems including re-integration, alcoholism, depression, isolation and inadequate training. The programme intends to create a safety net for the 226,000 poorest families.
"Poverty and indigence are often invisible," says Fernando Munita, an anthropologist and co-director of the PPU. "From the outside it may look like a nice house, but inside you find all the problems of poverty. The good thing about Chile Solidario is that it addresses employment concerns while taking the whole situation into account. But I believe its funding levels are inadequate."
The Latin American crisis now threatens Chile directly. Its oasis of stability will suffer unless the government makes reforms to halt social fragmentation. Chileans want to take charge of their future, and move beyond a pre-fabricated consensus that can no longer accommodate their desire for change.
(1) The CPD coalition includes the Christian Democratic party (PDC), the Socialist party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Radical Social Democratic party (PRSD).
(2) Country Briefings (Chile), The Economist Intelligence Unit, New York, July 2002.
(3) The Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2002.
(4) Desarrollo humano en Chile 2002 - Nosotros los Chilenos: un desafío cultural, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Santiago, 2002.
(5) Tomás Moulian, Chile actual: anatomía de un mito, Lom/Arcis University, Santiago, 1997.
(6) Lo chileno, una herencia cuestionada, UNDP Chile, 2002. The report distinguishes between "proud" Chileans (32%), who see their lives in historical and traditional terms and tend to be in their mid-50s; "insecure" Chileans (38%), who lack the capacity for self-definition and are unsure which version of history applies to them - they are mostly middle-class. And there are "discontented" Chileans (30%) who do not believe in Chilean identity, have no stake in their country, and tend to be from the lower classes.
(7) See Patrick Zachmann, Chili: les routes de la mémoire, Marval, Paris, 2002.
(8) Chilean social workers call this helplessness "acquired despair" (desesperanza aprehendida), connoting disappointment and acceptance, and summed up as "discouragement".
(9) International Monetary Fund, New York, August 2002.
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