Article by Eddy Lee
International Labor Review
Vol. 135 (1996), No. 5
November 26, 1996
Rapid growth in world trade, foreign direct investment and cross-border financial flows is a sign of increased globalization of the world economy. The worldwide wave of economic liberalization driving these changes has raised significant apprehensions about the implications of globalization for employment and income inequality. This article seeks to allay some of these fears: that unemployment and wage inequality will inevitably increase in industrialized and developing countries; that an emerging global labour market implies a race to the bottom in wages and labour standards; and that these new problems mean the loss of national policy autonomy and government impotence.
The rapid growth in world trade, foreign direct investment, and cross-border financial flows over the past decade has been the main manifestation of the increasing "globalization" of the world economy. This phenomenon has been driven primarily by a worldwide wave of economic liberalization - the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade, the encouragement of foreign investment, and the deregulation of financial markets. At the same time, technological developments have magnified the effects of this liberalization by reducing the costs of transportation and communications, hence expanding the scope and volume of goods and services that are internationally tradeable.
The wave of economic liberalization that has underpinned this globalization of the world economy reflects a radical change in attitudes towards economic policy. In democratic societies this clearly represents a voluntary shift in political attitudes. But whether democratic or not, ruling regimes across the world, with only a few exceptions, have embraced the view that freer trade, investment and financial flows will be the most effective means for ensuring material prosperity. This view is buttressed by central tenets of neo-classical economics but perhaps a far more powerful influence has been the "international demonstration effect" of the phenomenal economic success of open economic policies in East Asia in contradistinction to the collapse of centrally planned economies and the failure of dirigiste policies in large parts of the developing world.
At the same time, however, there is a significant current of apprehension over the implications of globalization for employment and income inequality. On the face of it this is difficult to reconcile with the voluntary shift towards a more open world economy in democratic societies, which are also the only countries where the apprehension is voiced. But this can of course be understood as part of normal democratic debate. There are, besides, some objective grounds for the apprehension. As with all far-reaching economic transformations, globalization generates losses as well as gains. Moreover some of the losses are concentrated in particular groups of workers or geographical areas, rendering the costs more visible, while gains are more widely diffused and hence less noticeable. Proponents of globalization do not, of course, deny that there are these costs of transition or adjustment. Rather the argument is that the benefits outweigh the costs, that it should be possible for winners to compensate losers in the adjustment period, and that thereafter all would be better off. The rub, of course, is that the potential compensation is often not put into effect. In addition, the element of uncertainty over the future has to be taken into account. There can be no certainty that future outcomes will be as beneficial as predicted by the proponents of globalization. For this reason also, anxiety that globalization will result in job losses and increased inequality is understandable.
Against that background this article will examine four main sources of anxiety about the effects of globalization:
the fear in industrialized countries that globalization is unleashing new international competition from newly industrialized countries that they cannot withstand and which is causing rising unemployment and falling relative wages among unskilled workers;
a similar fear in developing countries that liberalization will lead to job losses and rising wage inequality;
the fear that globalization of the labour market is leading to a race to the bottom with respect to wages and labour standards;
the fear that in the face of these new problems globalization also implies a loss of national policy autonomy and governments are becoming impotent.
These concerns must be addressed if the basis for confronting the employment problem is to be established and the feasibility of full employment as an objective confirmed (see ILO, 1996).
Unemployment and wage inequality in industrialized countries
There have been two interrelated sources of apprehension over the impact of globalization on employment in the industrialized countries, lying respectively in the pattern of international trade and foreign direct investment. There is apprehension that increasing imports from low-wage countries have been destroying manufacturing jobs, especially in labour-intensive sectors. The same process is also seen as being responsible for the observed rise in wage inequality in some industrialized countries (Wood, 1994). The erosion of labour-intensive jobs is seen to have caused a fall in the demand for unskilled labour which in turn has caused a fall in their earnings relative to the more skilled.
This view derives from the factor-price equalization theorem in international trade theory which predicts that increasing imports from low-wage economies would lead to a fall, in the importing country, of the relative price of labour-intensive goods and of the relative wage of the low-skilled workers. If there is inadequate or no downward adjustment of wages to this new equilibrium level there will be a rise in unemployment that is concentrated among lower-skilled workers. If, on the other hand, wages do adjust fully then the impact will be reflected in a rise in wage inequality. Where there is incomplete wage adjustment then one is likely to see a rise in both unemployment and inequality.
The second source of apprehension has been over the impact of increasing outflows of foreign direct investment to low-wage economies driven by the attraction of lower costs. The impact of this process is similar to that of increasing imports from these same countries. Low-skilled jobs are in effect "exported" to low-wage countries through relocation (see, for example, Arthuis, 1993), leading also to a fall in demand for low-skilled workers in the industrialized countries and reinforcing the effects of increasing import competition. The underlying assumption is that an outflow of foreign direct investment will be a net destroyer of jobs because compensatory effects through increased exports of intermediate and capital goods and the return flow of profits will be weak.
A lively debate has emerged in the academic literature over how large these effects have been empirically. Two key issues have been, first, whether the factor price equalization theorem has been an empirically valid description of reality and, second, even if this were conceded, whether the magnitudes of the trade and investment flows involved have been large enough to explain the observed rise in unemployment and wage inequality.
On balance, the available empirical evidence suggests that both trade and investment flows have been only minor explanatory factors behind the rise in unemployment and wage inequality in industrialized countries.
With respect to the impact of trade with low-income countries on employment, the evidence does not support the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. For example in the United States, the price of labour-intensive manufactured goods has risen relative to that of skill-intensive ones, which is contrary to the predictions of the theorem. In addition, the change in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers has been uniform across sub-sectors of manufacturing whereas the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that it should have been different between labour-intensive and other sectors. It is thus unlikely that trade with low-wage countries has been a major cause of either the relative fall in the demand for unskilled labour or the rise in wage inequality. Other factors are clearly involved, such as lower growth, technological change, and the increased labour force participation of married women, institutional change in the labour market, especially deregulation and de-unionization.
Moreover, the potential magnitude of the trade effect has been relatively small. In spite of rapid growth in recent years the share of manufactured imports from low-wage economies was only 3.8 per cent of the GDP of the OECD countries in 1994. Similarly, the share of manufacturing employment in total employment was only 21 per cent in the United States and, of this, employment in labour-intensive manufacturing was at most a quarter (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993). Thus, even allowing for possible indirect effects such as induced labour-saving innovation in the face of imports from low-wage economies, it is highly unlikely that the overall effect of trade in reducing labour-intensive jobs could have been very significant (Sachs and Schatz, 1994; see also Rowthorn, 1995).
The benefits to the industrialized countries from trade with low-wage economies have also to be factored in. These include increased exports of skill-intensive consumer goods as well as intermediate and capital goods.
Similar arguments apply with respect to concerns over job losses associated with outflows of direct investment to low-wage economies. First, the magnitude of FDI flows remains no more than 0.5 per cent of GDP in the industrialized countries (Krugman, 1994a). Secondly, it is unclear how much of this relatively modest flow actually represents a displacement of investment that would otherwise have taken place in the home country. There is evidence that part of this investment has low opportunity costs to the home economy since much has been sector-specific investment which would not have been viable there from the standpoint of comparative advantage (Bhagwati, 1994). Instead, foreign investment has largely represented new opportunities to generate benefits to the home country in terms of the inflow of profits and expanded exports of capital and intermediate goods. Hence, taking into account both the magnitudes and the compensating benefits involved, it is difficult to see how trade and investment relationships with low-wage economies could have been a major factor behind the rise in unemployment in the industrialized countries.
A final point to be considered is that the bulk of manufacturing in the industrialized countries is now in skill- and innovation-intensive industries which are not under direct threat of relocation to low-wage economies. In such activities "competitive advantage is now far more affected by factors such as physical infrastructure, a committed, flexible workforce, and by the growth of unique relationships in supplier-user and other support relationships. These new factors in competitive advantage raise the advantages of immobility and collocation in the production of skill- and innovation-intensive goods and services" (Wade, 1996, p. 87). Hence, regardless of what the true impact of trade and investment flows with low-wage countries may have been on labour-intensive industry in the industrialized countries, it would be invalid to generalize on the basis of this experience and to extrapolate this into a doomsday scenario of the total de-industrialization of the developed world.
Unemployment and inequality in developing countries
In developing countries the major concern is that economic liberalization - motivated by a desire to benefit from the growth of world trade and investment flows - will generate high transitional unemployment and cause an increase in inequality. Job losses in uncompetitive industries occur immediately while job creation in competitive new industries may be held back by the inability of the financial system to meet the need of enterprises for investment funds, by bottlenecks in essential infrastructure such as power and transportation, and by shortages of skilled labour. In addition to these basic difficulties, the problem can be compounded by policy errors accompanying the liberalization process such as overshooting in terms of macroeconomic stabilization and inappropriate monetary and exchange rate policies that generate a debt crisis. The experience of Chile in the early 1980s illustrates the severe effects of overshooting in terms of stabilization policy. Output contracted by 23 per cent in 1982-93 and unemployment remained above 24 per cent for five years. Similarly, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 illustrated the devastating effects of wrong monetary and exchange rate policies.
These considerations imply that while the potential benefits from liberalization will be positive there may well be high transitional costs. There thus needs to be careful management of the liberalization process with respect not only to the pace and sequencing of trade liberalization measures but also to ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment. This will often need to be supported by policies to strengthen the supply response of producers to new economic opportunities. These include public investment to relieve bottlenecks in infrastructure, financial reforms to improve access to credit, measures to promote training in new skills, investment incentives, and export promotion measures. In addition there have to be active policies to provide a safety net for those adversely affected by the liberalization programme and to strengthen the capacity of the poor to respond to new economic opportunities.
Another concern that has recently surfaced in some developing countries is that economic liberalization may be leading to an increase in wage and income inequality. If so, this would constitute a particularly serious problem in countries where initial income inequalities and levels of poverty are already high.
On the face of it, this is a surprising development since the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade and its extensions predict that trade liberalization should raise the relative wage of low-skilled workers and reduce wage inequality in low-wage countries.
Indeed the experience of the East Asian economies since the 1960s is often cited as supporting evidence for the view that trade liberalization should contribute to reduced wage inequality in developing countries. Both the original newly industrialized countries and areas (NICs) - Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, China - and the new NICs - Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand - have a record, over an extended period of time, of combining rapid economic growth with low inequality compared to developing countries as a whole. All have oriented their manufacturing sectors towards exports and have extensively liberalized their economies.
However, the more recent experience of a number of developing countries - especially those in Latin America - shows a trend of rising wage inequalities in the aftermath of liberalization (Berry, 1996; Robbins, 1995). Liberalization appears to have disproportionately benefited skilled workers in several Latin American countries.
Several possible explanations have been advanced for this association between trade liberalization and wage inequality (Wood, 1995; Robbins, 1995; Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar, 1995). One is that the rise in wage inequality may have less to do with trade than with changes in domestic policy. For example, in Chile extensive labour market deregulation occurred at the same time that trade was liberalized and this, rather than trade, could be the main explanation of rising wage inequality. Another is that greater openness to trade has been accompanied by the more rapid diffusion of skill-intensive technologies. This is believed to have occurred through the increased inflow of foreign direct investment, which embodies relatively skill-intensive technologies by developing country standards, as well as increased imports of relatively more skill-intensive capital equipment by domestic producers. It is argued that this process has been triggered by a sector-biased technical change which raises profits in relatively more skill-intensive sectors. Yet another explanation that has been advanced is that the middle-income countries in which wage inequality has risen may in fact now be relatively well endowed with skilled labour by world standards, even if their skill endowment is still below that of the industrialized countries. Their comparative advantage may no longer be in exports that are highly intensive in the use of unskilled labour, and trade liberalization could thus lead to increasing demand for more skilled workers and hence to rising inequality. A final explanation that has been advanced is that the recent upsurge of labour-intensive exports from large low-wage countries such as China, India and Indonesia has intensified the secular decline in the terms of trade of such exports, thus indirectly depressing the wages of low-skilled workers in all developing countries.
Given the current state of knowledge it remains unclear what the precise explanations are of the rising wage inequality in several developing countries. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is cause for concern and should direct renewed attention to the policies which, directly or indirectly, affect the relative income position of various groups of workers. In particular, policies for improved access to education and training, and labour market policies directed at improving the position of vulnerable workers, will be gaining increasing importance in the context of disequalizing tendencies in the demand for labour. Special attention should also be given to the implications of various macroeconomic policies on wage and income distribution among the population.
The emergence of a global labour market
Another aspect of globalization giving rise to concern is that an increasing proportion of the world labour force is engaged in activities that are linked to international trade and capital flows. This is largely a corollary of the growth in world trade and investment flows described earlier. The higher proportion of world output that is now internationally traded, the increasing flows of foreign direct investment and the increase in cross-border production networks all imply that a higher proportion of the world labour force is affected by, and linked through, international economic relationships. The growing exchange of labour services that is effected through trade, investment flows and the international subcontracting of production is forging closer links between labour markets. "Consider, for example, a British entrepreneur who hires an Italian company to design a new line of clothing, then has those designs sent for production in southern China, and has a shipping company in Hong Kong send the finished product for sale in the United States. Without the entrepreneur or any worker having to cross a national border, this example involves the labour services of workers in five countries being exchanged" (Bloom and Brender, 1993, p. 4). International migration is another mechanism through which labour markets become linked more directly, but on the whole this has not played an increasing role.
Several specific developments have contributed to this greater linking of labour markets. One is the entry into the world market of countries which previously were relatively disconnected from it. The collapse of Communism and the initiation of the transition to a market economy was an important development from this perspective. So too is the increasing participation in the world economy of the most populous developing countries - China, India and Indonesia. More generally, the worldwide wave of liberalization of trade and investment flows has increased the share of the labour force engaged in employment related to world markets in many other countries. In particular, the share of developing countries in total manufacturing employment in the world increased from 43 per cent in 1970 to 53 per cent in 1990 (Freeman, 1994a).
Some observers see in these developments the emergence of a global labour market wherein "the world has become a huge bazaar with nations peddling their workforces in competition against one another, offering the lowest price for doing business" (Donahue, 1994, p. 47). Whether or not so starkly put, increasing economic competition that affects a growing number of workers across the world has been perceived as the most problematic implication of these developments.
The core apprehension is that intensifying global competition will generate pressures to lower wages and labour standards across the world. This is expected to happen through three interrelated channels. The first is through the responses of both nationally based and transnational enterprises to increased competition. Heightened competition leads to cost-minimization strategies which have potentially adverse effects on wages and on the levels and conditions of employment in enterprises. This occurs through corporate restructuring and downsizing and a hardened resolve in collective bargaining, as well as indirectly through the relocation of operations to lower-cost foreign locations. This is aggravated by the second and interrelated channel - the weakening of the bargaining position of labour. The underlying reason for this is that the demand curve for labour becomes more elastic when the labour market becomes more exposed to foreign competition (Rodrik, 1995). Employers can more easily substitute foreign for domestic workers by relocating production abroad. This strengthens their bargaining position either by actually choosing this option or by merely threatening to do so. It means that workers have to settle for less in wage bargaining and have to bear more of the cost of maintaining high labour standards.
The third channel through which pressures to lower wages and labour standards can operate is the weakening of the regulatory capacity of governments in the face of heightened international economic competition. The need to compete for export markets and foreign direct investment leads governments to respond favourably to the demands of domestic and transnational enterprises. The threat of relocation abroad by resident enterprises (both local and foreign) limits the capacity of governments to tax or impose regulatory mandates on them. Similarly, the ability of transnational enterprises to "shop around" for prospective investment sites generates competitive bidding by countries in terms of tax and regulatory concessions. The growth of export-processing zones in developing countries where tax and regulatory exemptions are often offered is a commonly cited illustration of this process.
There is so far very little empirical evidence on the strength of these forces and their overall quantitative impact. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are those who argue that the overall impact has in fact been relatively minor (see, for example, Krugman, 1994b). It is indeed important to be wary of sensationalist exaggerations on the issue. It has to be borne in mind that, while there has been a sharp increase in the number of workers engaged in activities linked to the world market, the absolute numbers involved are still small. In the industrialized countries an average of almost 70 per cent of workers are employed in the service sector, most of which consists of non-tradeable activities. Similarly, the bulk of employment in low-income developing countries is still in subsistence or traditional agriculture and in urban informal-sector activities which produce non-tradeables. The share of employment in tradeable, modern-sector activities in low-income countries averages 12 per cent if China and India are excluded. The corresponding shares in these two countries are respectively 15 and 16 per cent. It would thus be unwarranted to think that hundreds of millions of workers in large low-income countries such as China and India have suddenly entered the world labour market as a result of economic liberalization in those countries.
Another factor to bear in mind is that multinational enterprises are not as footloose as is commonly depicted in some of the literature on globalization. A recent analysis has shown that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are still primarily "home-centred". Based on data on a large sample of United States, United Kingdom, Japanese and German multinational enterprises for the years 1987 and 1992-93, the study concludes that "between 70 and 75 per cent of [MNE] value added was produced on the home territory" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p.96). It has also been pointed out that "except for the most routinized assembly operations, they are much less than perfectly footloose with respect to any location once they have invested there. They then face a variety of sunk costs, which constitute barriers to exit. These include initial start-up costs, the costs of learning over time about a particular environment, and the costs of building reputation, gaining acceptance among government, employees, and other firms regarding their reliability as producers, employers, and suppliers in each market" (Wade, 1996, pp. 80-81). Furthermore, some changes in the organization of production such as "just-in-time" inventory minimization and flexible specialization tend to increase the disadvantages of globally dispersed production and reinforce "the tendency of production to be located close to final markets" (Wade, 1996, p. 81). These considerations thus suggest that governments still retain significant leverage to influence the behaviour of multinational enterprises.
But if exaggeration is unwarranted then so too is complacency. There has been a qualitative change in the global economic environment affecting workers across the world and this has had some impact. It is therefore important to consider the policy implications of these developments. A key implication is that there is now a greater need to supplement national employment and labour policies with cooperative action at the international level to safeguard basic labour standards in the face of growing globalization.
Loss of national policy autonomy
Another source of apprehension is that globalization is restricting the scope for national policy and reducing the effectiveness of traditional policy instruments. This is believed to apply to macroeconomic as well as to labour and social policy. For example, the increasing power of globalized financial markets reduces discretion over interest rate and exchange rate policy and limits the scope for deficit financing. Similarly, the increasing mobility of capital and enterprises is believed to impose severe limits on the capacity of governments to tax and regulate economic activities.
There can be little doubt that, compared to the immediate post-war decades when there were controls over the capital account, fixed exchange rates, and relatively high trade barriers, the current global economic environment does pose new challenges to national policies.
The effectiveness of some national policies is circumscribed in some important ways. Fiscal and monetary policies have now to be more mindful of the judgement and sentiments of global financial markets. Similarly, greater openness of the economy implies that the impact of domestic policies on the international competitiveness and the external balance of an economy now figures as a more important consideration than hitherto.
Consequently there are stronger pressures to maintain sound macroeconomic policies, to eschew market distortions, and to improve allocative efficiency. In many cases this implies difficult economic reforms such as trade and financial liberalization, the removal of price controls and other forms of deregulation. But these reforms will be beneficial for growth since they create an incentive to allocate resources to activities that offer higher productivity and are more in line with a country's comparative advantage. This higher growth in turn favours employment creation. In addition, employment creation is enhanced by the removal of distortions such as the underpricing of capital and overvalued exchange rates, which increase the capital-intensity of production and hence reduce employment.
But all this presupposes that the international economic environment will be stable and that national policies will not be negated by external shocks.
A specific area of concern is the risk of instability in the international financial system and the negative repercussions it could have on output and employment. A feature of the recent globalization of financial markets has been the rapid growth of short-term cross-border flows in foreign-exchange, bond, and equity markets. Unlike foreign direct investment which is long-term in nature, these short-term flows can be volatile. With new communications technology, transaction costs are very low and adjustments in global portfolios can be made almost instantaneously. Because of imperfect information, portfolio managers sometimes overreact and take decisions that are not related to the internal economic conditions in particular countries. This could lead to financial crises in particular countries with a contagious effect on other countries. While there is no agreement on the possible solutions to this problem, it is more widely accepted that there should be continuing efforts to find ways of preventing or reducing the risk of financial crises and of resolving them more quickly and efficiently when they do occur (Eichengreen and Portes, 1995). In addition, some international facility for emergency financing for countries hit by crises would help by allowing the necessary breathing space for crisis resolution as well as limiting the knock-on effects on other countries. Measures to improve the prudential regulation of markets in new financial instruments and ensure greater transparency in the financial transactions of financial institutions and governments would also be helpful. A proposal to slow down the pace of transactions in foreign exchange markets through the imposition of a universal transactions tax has received wide attention. But doubts have also been expressed that it is not administratively feasible and may impair market efficiency (Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz, 1995; Garber and Taylor, 1995).
Apart from their impact on general economic strategy, considerations of international competitiveness also influence the formulation of national employment and labour policies to a larger extent than hitherto. But three crucial caveats need to be made. First, this fact does not automatically imply that the only way to deal with considerations of competitiveness is to lower wages and labour standards. There is a viable and preferable alternative of meeting competitive pressures through the "high road" of raising labour productivity. This can be done through investments in skill development, exploiting the productivity-raising potential of high labour standards and cooperative forms of work organization, and productivity-augmenting investments in infrastructure and research and development.
The second caveat is that increased economic integration does not mean an end to national policy autonomy with respect to labour standards. Basically this is because it is neither conceptually nor empirically clear that higher labour standards mean higher labour costs (Freeman, 1994b). There is in fact evidence that the costs of many mandated benefits are ultimately shifted to workers in the form of lower wages. In this case total labour costs, and hence international competitiveness, are not affected by higher mandated non-wage benefits. In addition it is possible, in theory, to adjust for any increased labour costs arising from higher standards through a depreciation of the exchange rate. In this way the costs of higher standards are borne by consumers in the form of higher import prices. It is similarly possible to redistribute the burden in the form of higher taxes if this were politically acceptable.
The third caveat is the point made earlier - that multinational enterprises are not as mobile as presumed by the more sensationalist literature on globalization and that there are some developments in the organization of production which favour national rather than cross-border production. There is thus still considerable scope for policy leverage at the national level.
A more general point is that there appears to be little empirical support for the view that globalization generates irresistible pressures towards policy and institutional convergence. For instance, the continuing divergence in terms of capital and labour market institutions between the United States, Japan and Germany, all arguably successful economies, points to the viability of alternative institutional arrangements. It is unlikely that a unique "best practice" exists which all countries have to adopt for competitive survival, irrespective of their past institutional development and current socio-economic structure.
Conclusions
The important conclusion to draw from this discussion is that, in spite of increasing globalization, national policies are still paramount in determining levels of employment and labour standards. These policies have to be more sensitive to considerations of international competitiveness, but this by no means implies that policy autonomy has ended or that the reduction of wages and labour standards is the only viable response to increasing globalization.
However, a basic paradox in the current phase of globalization is that, at the same time as the social dislocations caused by increasing international competition are rising, the capacity, and even perhaps the will, of governments to take such compensatory or ameliorative action is weakening. Globalization is being accompanied by a worldwide trend towards smaller government, manifested in reductions in public expenditure, lower taxes, reduced political support for redistributive measures and widespread deregulation of markets, including the labour market. Yet, in the context of growing inequalities and the increasing need to compensate losers in the process of globalization, these developments are, to say the least, unhelpful. The need is greater than ever to help displaced workers retrain and become reintegrated into the labour market and to alleviate poverty. There is also a greater need for specific labour regulations to protect vulnerable groups in the labour market. All these are important for maintaining social cohesion and staving off the political discontent that could thwart the process of globalization.
It is thus important to find ways of resolving this paradox. One possibility would be to search for more cost-effective and incentive-compatible means for achieving social objectives. For example, unemployment benefit schemes should minimize disincentives to work and to create employment, excessively distortionary labour market regulations should be avoided, and active labour market programmes should be made more cost-effective. If this could be done then it would have the double benefit of making redistributive programmes more feasible in fiscal terms as well as more politically acceptable.
* ILO, Geneva. This article is drawn, in part, from World Employment 1996/97 - a new ILO report of which Mr. Lee is the principal author.
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