Global Policy Forum

By Simon Chesterman and David Malone*

As the Bush administration casts about for a strategy to ensure electoral success at home, if not in Iraq, pressure on the United Nations to assume a greater role in Baghdad is beginning to increase. But the world body, seriously damaged by divisions in the Security Council over Iraq, is unlikely to be able to help much.

The news from Washington is bittersweet: Ideology is yielding to reality on the ground in Iraq - but with reluctance. The administration is experiencing shock in the face of effective guerrilla tactics by a determined band of opponents. Efforts to speed the withdrawal from Iraq risk proving the one thing that Bush sought to refute: that terrorism works.

Handing over the country to untrained Iraqi police and an untested government of exiles does not seem to be the answer. On The New York Times editorial page, prominent Democrats, and some conflict experts are therefore calling on the United States to hand this volatile mess over to the United Nations. But the UN's standing has been seriously damaged among critical Iraqi actors, and valuable UN lives have been lost.

In the spring we argued that the United Nations could be most useful in promoting the emergence of an interim government and launching a process of constitutional development. But, flush with apparent victory in Iraq, Washington wanted none of that. In May, the United States agreed that the United Nations would serve in a subsidiary political role, helping to sell the legitimacy of the U.S.-appointed Governing Council. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Kofi Annan's Baghdad envoy, accepted that this was the least bad option and had begun to do just that when he was killed with 21 colleagues on Aug. 19. The United Nations not only lost some of its best people, but the tragedy stiffened hostility to the United States among many within the United Nations.

The idea that the United Nations can somehow quaff the poisoned chalice is delusional. The present U.S. policy reversal and UN staff concerns place the secretary general in a difficult position. Until security improves, he cannot in good conscience send civilian staff into harm's way. But security will only improve when the United States looks less like an occupying power. Many analysts therefore think that Iraq is going to get worse before it gets better.

At present, the most likely outcome is a band-aid operation, with UN staff located nearby in Cyprus, Kuwait, and Jordan, flying into Baghdad as needed and increasing the responsibilities of local staff. Humanitarian relief could be coordinated on this basis and police training might take place outside Iraq, but the real political transformations that are required must take place in country. Meanwhile, this kind of shuttle work adds to the risk that a UN transport will be shot down, bringing its involvement to a halt once more.

Washington asserts that it will not cut and run in Iraq. More accurately, it seems to be trying to calculate how much it can cut, prior to the American election, without appearing to run.

Is there rejoicing at the United Nations over the plight of the Americans in Iraq? Not among the sensate. One reason is that first China and then Russia have begun to focus on the potential consequences of a rout of the Americans in Iraq. While events on the ground have validated many of the French and German criticisms of U.S. policy, it is not clear that the nostrums advanced by Paris - immediate sovereignty for the motley crew of U.S.-appointed Iraqis currently jostling for power in Baghdad - will lead to happy outcomes.

There are, therefore, no attractive options. The idea that the United Nations can somehow quaff the poisoned chalice is delusional. For the United Nations to return to Iraq in any meaningful capacity, it needs not only a request from Washington and the Security Council: It requires a request from credible representatives of Iraq's factionalized communities and strong support from key Arab constituencies. Without these, and without a radical change in the security situation, the risks remain too high.

*Simon Chesterman is a senior associate at the International Peace Academy in New York. David Malone, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the academy.

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