Global Policy Forum

By Menzies Campbell*

The Government Cannot Justify the Continuing Presence of Our Troops
Unless it Shows it has Learned From its Failures

The British and American governments like to pretend that things are getting better in Iraq. They are wrong. The facts belie their optimism. Between 2004 and 2005 the number of car and roadside bombs doubled, and suicide bombs trebled. Electricity supplies and oil production are still below prewar levels. Iraq stands on the threshold of civil war. The illegal invasion, launched on a flawed prospectus and with little understanding of the consequences, has resulted in the deaths of about 3,000 coalition soldiers, 40,000 civilians and many UN and humanitarian workers.

Since 2003 the coalition has met neither its obligations nor its objectives. There was a catastrophic failure to plan for postwar Iraq, followed by misjudgment and incompetence. This has been overlaid by a disproportionate use of military force, including gross human rights abuses. There are nearly 30,000 people being held without trial in Iraq. These failures and misjudgments have perpetuated the insurgency, increased corruption and criminality, and inhibited improvements to the lives of Iraqis. We must now face the possibility that Iraq could become a failed state. That would have devastating economic and security consequences for the region, and would risk taking the current humanitarian disaster to a completely new level.

The catalogue of errors means the capacity of the UK and the US to play a positive role in redeeming the situation is severely diminished. The legitimacy of the coalition, always questionable, is now simply not accepted by most Iraqis. A 2005 poll for the British Ministry of Defence found that eight out of 10 Iraqis strongly opposed the presence of coalition forces. Between 70%-90% want to see a timeline for the withdrawal of coalition troops.

Faced with this reality, the British and American governments seem to be in denial. The last time the British government allotted parliamentary time for a full debate on Iraq was July 20 2004, which was only the second occasion since March 18 2003. It appears to be running scared of critical evaluation. The coalition does not have an exit strategy, nor does it have a strategy for staying. But to continue as it has been is not a credible option. The British and US governments require a coherent stabilisation and exit strategy. The early moves by Iraq's government of national unity to form a reconciliation plan are positive, but vague on detail.

The foundation of a new strategy should be a peace process led by the UN to accelerate national reconciliation and the internationalisation of support for Iraq. If the problems of internecine conflict within Iraq have international dimensions, so too must the solutions. A new strategy would seek to build on the policies set out by the Iraqi prime minister and work towards an international "compact", similar to that agreed with Afghanistan, setting out the commitments of all sides and a comprehensive security and reconstruction strategy.

Only an international solution can shore up the legitimacy and effectiveness of Iraq's government, improve the delivery of essential services and facilitate the end of the militarisation. Every further association with the US and the UK taints the Iraqi administration.

What should that solution contain? First, establishing a regional contact group would strengthen the engagement of Iraq's neighbours, and require them to play a constructive role in reconstruction. A contact group could play a significant role in talking to insurgent groups, improving border controls and promoting economic stability.

Second, enhanced measures to train, equip and professionalise Iraqi security forces are needed to de-politicise them and improve security. Coalition forces should move towards training, advising and equipping. Third, a comprehensive, UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration strategy is necessary to make a reality of the Iraqi prime minister's policy that the militias must merge with the national security forces.

Fourth, there should be an end to systematic indefinite detentions by Iraqi and US forces, and full access should be granted to UN human rights monitors and the Red Cross. Fifth, the reconstruction process must be expedited and legitimised (60% of Iraqis believe the UN should have the lead role). Increasing UNDP and the World Bank involvement would enhance transparency and accountability. Donors must play their part and deliver on their aid pledges.

Sixth, Iraq needs a programme for phased security transfer and withdrawal of coalition troops. The Iraqis view them as occupiers. A limited British withdrawal is taking place but US troops are redeploying in other parts of the country. The UK should aim to achieve a series of withdrawals, in parallel with the US, according to milestones in the stabilisation and reconstruction process. A transparent agreement with the Iraqi administration would help to counter the perception of occupation and illegitimacy. I have been supportive of British efforts to bring stability to Iraq. But, support for the government cannot be unconditional. Unless it shows that it has learned from its failures and is ready to look afresh at the way out of the Iraqi quagmire, it will be impossible to justify the continuing presence of British forces in Iraq. With distressing regularity, the Commons pays tribute to the brave men and women who have lost their lives in Iraq. If the government cannot explain why it is necessary that they should make the ultimate sacrifice, then it must be prepared to bring them home.

About the Author: Menzies Campbell is the leader of the Liberal Democrats in the UK.