Introduced to the House of Representatives
H.R. 938March 8, 2001
1st Session
H. R. 938
To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. FRANK, and Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `United Nations Rapid Deployment Act of 2001'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The December 1999 United Nations `Report on the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda' indicates that in April 1994, the United Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two weeks of the initial violence, thereby allowing the conflict to escalate. The six-month estimated cost of the deployment would have been $115,000,000. Instead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives along with $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.
(2) The April 2000 report of the United Nations Secretary General, `We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century', states that only member nations of the United Nations can fix the structural weakness of United Nations peace operations. The report compares the current system for launching peacekeeping operations to a volunteer fire department that has to find fire engines and the funds to run them before starting to douse any flames. The present United Nations system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military personnel. Availability and readiness of forces is very unpredictable and constraints on resources preclude rapid deployment.
(3) In August 2000, the specially-appointed panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued its findings. Known as the `Brahimi Report' (A/55/305; S/2000/809), the report concludes that `few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future'. These building blocks include a standing police corps, a reserve corps of mission leadership, a sufficient stockpile of equipment, and arrangements for recruitment of civilian personnel. Furthermore, the report encourages member nations to enter partnerships with one another in the context of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS). These partnerships would form the basis for Rapid Deployment Brigades (RDBs), which would develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy `traditional' peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution and to fully deploy `complex' peacekeeping operations within 90 days of the adoption of an authorizing Security Council resolution.
(4) Former United States Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, speaking before the United Nations Security Council on November 15, 2000, stated that `[u]nless we move decisively on meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capability to perform its essential peacekeeping function'.
(5) Both the nations of Europe and the United States have recognized the value and need for rapidly deployable combat units in response to a full spectrum of contingencies, including peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts, and full-scale warfare. The European Union has proposed forming a standing police force and rapid deployment brigades as part of the European Defense Force, and in the United States, the Department of Defense is establishing interim brigade combat teams as part of the overall Army transformation strategy.
(6) The United States' veto power in the United Nations Security Council gives it the capacity to halt the deployment of United Nations forces if the deployment is not in the national interests of the United States.
SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT- The President shall direct the United States representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the United Nations--
(1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) that--
(A) is rapidly deployable under the authority of the United Nations Security Council;
(B) should be able to deploy within 15 days of a United Nations Security Council resolution to establish international peace operations;
(C) is limited to a maximum deployment of six months for any given mission;
(D) should be deployed only when the United Nations Security Council determines that violations of human rights, breaches of the peace, or the failure to restore the rule of law, requires rapid response to ensure adherence to
negotiated agreements to prevent or end hostilities;
(E) should be composed of at least 6,000 volunteers who train together and are appropriately equipped expressly for international peace operations, including civilian policing; and
(F) should be given the authority to protect itself, execute negotiated peace accords, disarm combatants, protect civilians, detain war criminals, restore the rule of law, and to carry out other purposes as detailed in United Nations Security Council
resolutions;
(2) to recruit personnel to serve in the Force; and
(3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for the Force.
(b) DEFINITION- In this section, the term `international peace operations' means any operation carried out under a United Nations Security Council resolution.
SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADES.
In order to promote the development of human and material resources for United Nations peacekeeping operations as recommended by the August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305; S/2000/809), commonly known as the `Brahimi Report', the President--
(1) shall direct the Secretary of State and the United States representative to the United Nations to encourage the member nations of the United Nations to enter into partnerships with one another, in the context of the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form the basis for Rapid Deployment Brigades, which would develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy `traditional' peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution and `complex' peacekeeping operations within 90 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution; and
(2) shall direct the Secretary of Defense to undertake a study, not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, to determine the advisability of and the feasibility of using interim combat brigade teams as part of Rapid Deployment Brigades as described in paragraph (1).
SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT.
Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on--
(1) the status of negotiations to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) in accordance with section 3;
(2) the status of United States activities to encourage member nations of the United Nations to establish Rapid Deployment Brigades in accordance with section 4(1); and
(3) the results of the study conducted under section 4(2).
More Information on Standby Arangements and Rapid Deployment
More Information on UN Peacekeeping Reform
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