Global Policy Forum

In the last ten years, the number of international peacekeeping missions has increased enormously. The outbreak of numerous intra-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War has called for intervention by the international community. What conclusions can be drawn from the last ten years of peace support operations and what are the lessons learned? This was the focus of the international conference on Peace Support Operations organized by the CIS in February 2001. The conference brought together renowned international experts to discuss overall strategies, and civilian and military aspects of peace support operations (PSO).

More than 270 participants from 28 countries took part in the conference organized by the CIS at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Fourteen international experts presented selected topics on PSO, drawing on their own personal experiences or on their own research. The conference addressed two main questions: How can international operations be better coordinated? How can a more coherent strategy be developed? It was generally agreed that the international community should strengthen its capacities for peace support operations and that military force alone cannot accomplish the job.

In his keynote address, Ambassador Leonidas Evangelidis, former Director General for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Council of the European Union, explained what the European Union could contribute to a peace-building strategy. Experiences in recent years have shown that the Union should gradually shift from an attitude of reaction to a culture of prevention. The development of a European security and defense policy (ESDP) reflects the EU's willingness to strengthen its crisis management capabilities. As no single state or institution can meet the challenges and risks of the future on their own, a network of interlocking international institutions needs to be created. Close cooperation with NATO is a main priority for the EU. As far as maintenance of peace and security is concerned, the Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. The ESDP should enable the EU to respond more effectively to requests from the UN.

One of the main recurring threads of the conference was the evolution of PSO and the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Cold War experience was characterized by the model of traditional peacekeeping which required a mandate by the UN Security Council and the consent of the warring parties. Since the aim of the operations was to supervise cease-fires, the restriction of the use of force for self-defense only was an important principle. In the new generation of PSO, such as the NATO military engagement in the Balkans, interventions can be carried out without the consent of the conflicting parties with the aim to enforce peace.

According to John Mackinlay of the Centre for Defence Studies in London, the new post-Cold War model encompasses a multifunctional response to a complex emergency taking place in a failing state where the government can no longer exercise its writ over the whole of its territory. The end of the Cold War confronted the international community with a new conflict environment. Conflicts no longer take place among states, but among local war leaders. The withdrawal of superpower support at the end of the Cold War weakened state governments and left a vacuum of authority that has been filled by local war leaders. The suddenness, speed, and intensity of the change from the traditional to the multifunctional response have outstripped our ability to design effective responses to the continuing emergencies of a new strategic era. According to Mackinlay, the most important issue is the basis on which nations intervene. Is it in order to prevent the breakup of a failing state, restoring the status quo ante? Or is it to support and foster the state's disintegration promoting a new generation of unattached communities and sub-states, which again could undermine the security and economic structures?

Does traditional UN peacekeeping still have a future? Mats Berdal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London put forward that it would be too simple to view the development of UN peacekeeping since the late 1980s as nothing more than evidence of the obsolescence of traditional peacekeeping. The practice of peacekeeping has clearly evolved, but its key features, above all its consent-based and non-threatening character, continue to distinguish it from other uses of military force. The question that needs to be asked is whether, in a given set of circumstances, peacekeeping is the appropriate response to the challenge at hand. History should have taught us to place greater emphasis on the limitations, as distinct from the possibilities, of peacekeeping.

The role of the UN and the international division of labor of PSO triggered lively discussions at the conference. Over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenges, as it has lacked adequate management and resources to support the sharp increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. The Brahimi Report, which put forward a vision of a more effective UN, encouraged member states to provide political, personnel, material, and financial support to UN peacekeeping missions.

Wolfgang Biermann, international security adviser to the Social Democratic Party of Germany, stressed in his contribution that the question of "who is in charge" was a matter of pragmatism rather than principle. The important thing is that PSO should be designed in a cooperative manner. Biermann outlined his concept of de-escalation, a form of intervention that is aimed at compromise. The prevention of violent conflict must take absolute priority, but once prevention fails, the international communities' major task should be early de-escalation. A diplomatic/civil/military unbiased "de-escalation taskforce" that actively seeks the consent and cooperation of the parties in conflict is immediately required once a conflict has become violent. By being prepared for the "Petersberg Tasks", the EU could become an excellent choice for mandates by the UN or the OSCE. NATO assets could be required. A joint peacekeeping doctrine shared by the main actors, compatible with international law and the spirit of the UN Charter, would be desirable.

Cooperation is also a necessary element of daily peacekeeping in the field. General Klaus Reinhardt, Commander KFOR, and Bernard Kouchner, head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), illustrated their experiences and lessons learned in Kosovo. How can military and civilian forces cooperate in an environment of conflict where the government has ceased to function and the basic needs of a civil society are not provided? Reinhardt pointed out that the UNMIK led by Kouchner, who coordinated the activities of UNHCR, OSCE and EU, was the most important partner for KFOR. A great amount of time was spent in discussions with local politicians and in meetings of the political bodies set up by the UNMIK in order to influence the course of events, to involve the Kosovar in their own affairs, and to win personal trust. In accordance with Kouchner's persuasion that there is no separation between military and civilian involvement, Reinhardt was part of the Interim Administration Council and thus actively involved in building an administration and a political body. Kouchner pointed out that the civilian tasks could not have been managed without the presence and support of KFOR. In contrast to the military, the UNMIK was not sufficiently prepared for the enormous task. Kouchner expressed his worries about the aftermath of the mission. In his view, Resolution 1244, which calls for substantial autonomy and self-administration in Kosovo, needs to be implemented or changed. Without a clear political decision on the international legal status of Kosovo and the continued presence of KFOR, new tensions will inevitably result.

The NATO experience in the Balkans was the subject of the presentation by James Appathurai of the NATO Political Affairs Division, which opened the second conference day. Appathurai made clear that NATO was, and continues to be transformed by this experience. When the Bosnian war began in 1991, NATO had never before conducted an operation outside its own territory. The lesson NATO had to learn was that it could not remain disengaged from the rest of Europe. NATO members realized that conflicts outside their territory could still damage Euro-Atlantic security, including their own. The most important lesson, however, was that robust engagement can make a difference. While Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that the price of indifference can be far higher than that of engagement, Kosovo demonstrated that timely intervention can preclude worse disasters. The latter operation has acted as a catalyst for necessary change – for improvements to NATO defense capabilities and to Europe's capacity as a security actor.

The issue of cooperation between military and civilian actors was brought up again by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC's main experience of cooperation in a PSO environment was in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. The aim of ICRC missions is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and internal violence. In Kosovo, the added value of the ICRC became very clear. The mandate for KFOR deployment and the UNMIK applied to only a part of the country. For more than a year, this resulted in a situation where the ICRC was essentially alone in having a structured and permanent presence in both Pristina and Belgrade. Kellenberger pointed out that it was crucial for the ICRC to engage with political and military actors and to be a predictable co-actor for PSO, while retaining its operational independence and ensuring that its own identity is preserved.

Civil-military relations in PSO were also the focus of Michael Pugh's contribution. The director of the Plymouth International Studies Centre noted that the relationship between external military and civilian actors had shifted from detachment and suspicion towards a level of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) that was becoming institutionalized. The Balkan crises have given military establishments incentives to invite humanitarian organizations to integrate into PSO. Pugh clearly rejects the notion that the military should be trained to take on tasks other than war and security. According to Pugh, it cannot be their job to empower groups whose voices are ignored and suppressed. The assumption that NATO is the organization to accomplish UN-mandated conflict prevention operations is therefore highly debatable, since the authority of the NATO Council is not recognized as the global repository of humanitarian values.

The penultimate session of the conference concentrated on national experiences with PSO. Lt. Gen. Günther Greindl, the Austrian Military Representative to NATO, presented the Austrian view, acknowledging that the increasing complexity of recent crises requires integrated crisis management. Austria has therefore adapted its concept of peace support units to the new peacekeeping environment. The main lessons Austria has learned are that potential troop-contributing nations should be involved early on in the planning and fact-finding stage, that interoperability should be achieved, and that over-tasking of the military with humanitarian and civil tasks should be avoided.

The Swiss experience was expounded by Bruno Lezzi, editor for Security and Defense Policy issues at the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, and Colonel GS Bruno Rí¶sli, head of the Division for Peacekeeping Operations in the General Staff of the Swiss Ministry of Defense. Switzerland has already taken part in several missions abroad, for example, in Korea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Kosovo. Its engagement in those missions was unarmed. The fundamental question for the country remains whether and to what extent a neutral country should become involved in international peace initiatives. Bruno Lezzi outlined the controversy surrounding this subject, given the fact that in June 2001 the Swiss people will have to decide whether armed Swiss troop contingents should participate in multinational peace operations. The advocates of strict neutrality reject all such Swiss involvement and want Swiss support to concentrate exclusively on the ICRC and so-called good offices. They deny that peacekeeping missions based on the UN Charter are compatible with neutrality. Lezzi made the argument that Swiss neutrality had become increasingly irrelevant to the ICRC. Apart from that, only states that can offer a complete range of diplomatic, economic, and military services can remain serious partners in international crisis management. Withdrawing behind one's own borders is no solution, since Switzerland has already been directly affected by the consequences of the Balkan conflicts. Even more important than the national interest is the maintenance of a global order of peace. Colonel Rí¶sli pointed to the new training requirements for PSO. Given Switzerland's national restrictions concerning armaments, the Swiss experience in KFOR is comparable to other nations. Overall responsibility for the training lies with the general staff directorate responsible for the actual conducting of the operation. In the Swiss case, this arrangement ensures that lessons learned find their way into the training syllabus without delay.

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