Global Policy Forum

by Manfred Kulessa/Dorothee Starck

Policy Paper 7 of the Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn, Germany
Paper Presented at a Conference in Bonn, January 15, 1998

Can coercive measures by the international community preserve or restore peace? Those who founded the United Nations believed that they could - at least in individual cases. Hence they gave the UN Security Council the right to impose binding sanctions. To begin with, the council was only rarely able to make use of this right, because during the Cold War years the consensus needed to do so was lacking. Since then, however, there have been a range of sanctions resolutions, and against the background of these new experiences, the question of the correct use of these kinds of instruments has become a live issue in the political debate.

The reason why the sanctions instrument is so attractive to political decision-makers is obvious. Sanctions constitute a means of exerting international influence that is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military intervention. It is this which also explains the increased involvement of the Security Council in the imposition of these kinds of measures since 1990. However, the initial enthusiasm over this newly acquired capacity for action has now given way to a more sober attitude and to ruminations on the functionality and use of UN sanctions. One thing, at any rate, is clear: sanctions cannot entirely replace military intervention in effect, as is shown by the examples of Iraq and Haiti, where the goals originally pursued via sanctions had ultimately still to be secured by military force on the part of the international community. And even the effectiveness of sanctions themselves is being called into question. Although their imposition against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is generally judged to have been a success, their political effect in other cases remains uncertain or disputed. What is more, actual practice has shown that comprehensive economic measures are more likely than anything else to have devastating effects on the broad mass of the population in the target countries, without any clear indication that the desired change in the latter's policies has taken place.

At least fifty researchers and academic institutes in the United States are currently considering these issues; and in Europe as a whole, there is evidence of an active interest in them. In Germany, meanwhile, the discussion has hardly begun. Yet the German government, via its involvement in the Security Council and its presidency of the Iraq Sanctions Committee in 1995 and 1996, has acquired a considerable body of experience in this area. And simply in terms of Germany's aspiration to acquire permanent membership of the Security Council, it is crucial that a German stance on international sanctions policy be worked out and introduced into the United Nations, in concert with the European Union. What follows here is intended as a stimulus to this process.

I. Security Council Practice on Sanctions

Article 41 of the United Nations Charter lists economic relations, transport, communications, and diplomatic relations as possible areas of application for sanctions. These are examples of a broad arsenal of non-military sanctions instruments that may extend, for instance, to sport and cultural relations. Even tribunals such as those set up recently for former Yugoslavia in The Hague and for Rwanda in Arusha, to try war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, constitute a measure as stipulated in Article 41. Scholars have identified more than fifty possible sanctions domains, not all of which have yet been made use of in practice. The current development of space technology and computer technology will probably generate further variants.

Sanctions in the UN Charter System

The legal bases for UN sanctions are contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to this, the precondition for the imposition of sanctions in a specific case is a determination by the Security Council that there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. According to Articles 39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter, the council can then opt for whatever coercive measures of a non-military or military kind it considers necessary to preserve world peace and international security. In terms of the Charter system, non-violent sanctions as stipulated in Article 41 of the Charter rank as a milder expedient than the use of military measures. The Security Council may only have recourse to the latter if it believes 'that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate' (Article 42). If the council decides to apply sanctions, all member states must, in accordance with Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, regard such a decision as immediately binding in law and strictly implementable. At the UN level, the Security Council regularly appoints sanctions committees as auxiliary bodies. These are made up of representatives of all the members of the council, and their job is to interpret and administer the sanctions regime.

In each of these areas, the relevant measures can be applied, as in medicine, in appropriate doses and combinations. A particular sanctions regime is thus put together for each individual case. Comprehensive sanctions regimes have been imposed by the Security Council on two occasions since 1990 - against Iraq and against rump Yugoslavia. In these instances, a whole package of measures - notably a total ban on imports and exports - was bundled together, with certain exceptions being made on humanitarian grounds. Partial sanctions, notably arms embargoes, were decreed for Somalia, Libya, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sudan, and the UNITA movement in Angola.

II. Aims of UN Sanctions

Sanctions are not punishments; they are international measures designed to bend wills. They are intended, by their coercive pressure, to get those at whom they are directed to alter behaviour that is breaking or endangering the peace. Bound up with this is the desire to bring home to the target state the international community's disapproval of its behaviour. Finally, the demonstration of international law-enforcement which sanctions constitute is also intended to deter other states from breaches of their duties under international law.

The aims of sanctions as set out in the Security Council's resolutions, and the conditions under which the sanctions are to be lifted, are often formulated ambiguously, and have given rise to differences in interpretation. Sanctions resolutions contain a mechanism whereby, for sanctions to be lifted, a new resolution of the Security Council is needed in each case. This creates a possibility of leverage, especially for the permanent members of the council. For this reason alone, the greatest possible clarity must be sought in this area, thus discouraging council members from pursuing covert strategies (e.g. that of getting the sanctions against Iraq lifted only after the present government has been brought down - an aim not mentioned in the resolutions). In addition, there must be a minimum of security before the law: it ultimately damages the credibility of UN sanctions if, after the original aims have been achieved, different demands are brought into play, constituting new hurdles for the target country. That country must be given a fair chance of achieving the lifting of the sanctions through appropriate behaviour.

Recommendation:

Future resolutions should clearly state the aims of the sanctions and should stipulate the conditions for their removal unequivocally in advance. The permanent members' right of veto must not be used in such a way that the lifting of the sanctions by virtue of an explicit resolution of the Security Council is rendered uncertain for the target country. Consideration should therefore be given to the possibility, in certain circumstances, of sanctions being suspended automatically when certain aims have been achieved.

III. Mode of Operation

How ought sanctions to achieve the desired change of behaviour on the part of the target country? In order to take effect, sanctions must be efficient, effective, and successful.

Efficiency here means translation into legal and administrative provisions in the countries imposing the sanctions. For this to be achieved, the relevant political will is required. All member states - including the neighbours and friends of the target country - must pull together in applying the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Models of uniform legislation for achieving translation into national law may prove useful here. Within the European Union, the major economic measures are implemented uniformly on the basis of Articles. 228(a) and 73(g) of the EC Treaty; individual measures, on the other hand - particularly where they have a bearing on security - remain within the competence of the member states.

Sanctions may be judged to be effective when they have the intended negative impact on the reputation or economy of the country targeted by the sanctions. In the case of comprehensive economic sanctions, the isolation of the target country must be accomplished effectively, and not be hindered by strategies of circumvention or accommodation. Effective control of the borders of the target country plays an important role here. Both Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were cut off from important communication routes by maritime blockades instituted by the allied troops/NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) following approval by the Security Council. In the countries neighbouring on Yugoslavia, an exemplary system of international customs-aid was also set up: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU sent a total of between 200 and 240 experienced customs officers to Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, and the Ukraine. These officers helped the authorities in these countries to monitor the border crossings into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, without themselves assuming executive functions. These 'sanctions assistance missions' (SAMs), as they were known, were financed and equipped by their home countries, members of the OSCE. Their activities were co-ordinated and evaluated by the SAMCOMM (SAM Communications Centre) in Brussels. The SAMCOMM and the EU/OSCE sanctions co-ordinator appointed to provide political back-up and analysis of the sanctions reported regularly to the sanctions committee of the Security Council on violations and on the practical difficulties encountered in implementing the sanctions. Thanks to these reports, the sanctions committee was able to gain a much fuller picture of the effectiveness of the sanctions than would have been possible from information provided by individual states. The reports resulted both in important refinements to the mechanism of control and approval for supplies allowed under the humanitarian-exception provisions, and in more thorough investigation of sanctions violations and the prosecution of persons involved in this. The SAMs, for their part, were provided with up-to-date information on the exceptions approved by the sanctions committee and were thus able to verify that the humanitarian supply system was functioning as it should.

Sanctions can only be judged to have worked or been successful where they actually influence the policies of the state at which they are directed - in other words, where the state fulfils the conditions stipulated in the sanctions resolutions and no longer engages in the behaviour classed as constituting a threat to peace. This alteration in the policies of the target country may be achieved as a result of a changed cost-benefit analysis on the part of the government: at some point, the costs to the latter of preserving its internal political legitimacy become so high as a result of the sanctions that, for that government, they no longer bear any defensible relation to the advantages of breaking the peace. A different model assumes a policy of at least limited interest in pluralism in the target country: in this case, the sanctions back up the critical stance of opposition groups and, via the growth in influence of these groups, help indirectly to bring about a change in policy. Whereas the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, generally rated a success, may militate in favour of these kinds of models, the experiences in Iraq point up the limits of such theoretical paradigms. The members of the autocratic regime there are not themselves directly affected by the general deterioration in their country's economy; nor can they be moved to alter their policies as a result of their people's sufferings. Opposition groups which-like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa-might see sanctions as bolstering their own ends are no longer present in sufficient numbers. In cases such as this, calls for targeted sanctions therefore become more pertinent. These are sanctions aimed directly at members of the power élites, such as the government or army.

IV. Political Problems

Sanctions are justified where they prevent a disruption to peace without recourse to war. In practice, however, a number of typical problems have developed in this area.

1. The problem of justice. Given that the Security Council resolutions are political and not legal in nature, and given that, in addition, the permanent members have a decisive influence on decisions by virtue of their right of veto, non-similar decisions may be arrived at in similar situations. For example, sanctions were imposed against Haiti but not against Nigeria or Burma. In the war in Chechnia, imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation would have been unthinkable. The most disputed case, in terms of international law, is that of the sanctions imposed against Libya in 1992. Security Council Resolution 748 of 31 March 1992 demanded that two persons suspected of having carried out the Lockerbie bombing be handed over to the USA and Britain and that Libya in general renounce the use of terrorism. Libya refused to recognize the legitimacy of this demand and brought an action against it at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The case is still pending, though the ICJ did refuse to issue a provisional injunction in Libya's favour in 1992. Occasional declarations by Libya that it is ready to reach a compromise have been rejected by the authors of the resolution as inadequate. In the meantime, more and more doubts have been expressed about the guilt of the suspects and about Libya's responsibility for the Lockerbie affair and for recent acts of terrorism. Every attempt at mediation in the conflict - for example, by a number of European, African, and Arab states that are in favour of sanctions being lifted-have so far foundered on the deep animosity that characterizes relations between the USA and Libya.

2. The problem of the North-South divide. With the exception of former Yugoslavia, all existing sanctions are targeted against countries of the South.

3. The problem of third countries. Some neighbouring countries may be disproportionately affected by sanctions: Jordan, for example, suffered as a result of the sanctions imposed against Iraq; and the states bordering the Danube had considerable burdens to bear as a result of the sanctions imposed against former Yugoslavia. There is no form of compensation for such states' 'denial damage', and the provisions of Article 50 of the UN Charter, which give third countries that suffer especial sanctions-related economic disadvantage the right to consultation with the Security Council, have so far proved ineffective.

4. The ethical problem. Civilian populations suffer more than the political élites and can end up as hostages in the dispute (witness the case of Iraq).

5. Questionable political calculations. Expectations about the success of a sanctions regime are rarely fulfilled. This was obvious as early as 1967, with the Wagenburg effect in southern Rhodesia. When you are standing up against the whole world, you tend to rally round the flag and put internal political disagreement to one side. In Iraq, the sanctions had actually to take the blame for increased repression by the rulers. With much sanctions practice, one also has to ask whether the sanctions have not actually encouraged adverse political developments. In the case of Yugoslavia, for example, breaking off cultural exchanges and halting delivery of international newspapers hampered both the political dialogue and the defence of human rights.

Against this background of past problems, the attitude of member states in regard to the imposition of sanctions varies: China and Russia are more cautious than the United States, and each country has its own particular stance. For China, the principle of sovereignty ranks high, and the government regularly stresses that disputes should be resolved by peaceful negotiations between states of equal standing - a solution which, they say, has not been tried often enough. As a result, China has often abstained when relevant resolutions have been voted on. Moving beyond the various political standpoints, however, a greater degree of conscientiousness and creativity would be welcome in the selection of the sanctions applied in each case. In January 1995, the former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested the institution of a 'mechanism' for verifying the effects of intended measures before sanctions were imposed. His proposals for reform have been intensively discussed in the United Nations since then, but no decisive resolutions have yet been passed.

'I should like to...suggest the establishment of a mechanism to carry out the following five functions:

(a) To assess, at the request of the Security Council, and before sanctions are imposed, their potential impact on the target country and on third countries;

(b) To monitor application of the sanctions;

(c) To measure their effects in order to enable the Security Council to fine-tune them with a view to maximizing their political impact and minimizing collateral damage;

(d) To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups;

(e) To explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage and to evaluate claims submitted by such States under Article 50.'

Recommendations:

1. Sanctions should not be imposed blanket-fashion. In order to be effective, they must take account of the circumstances and political structures in the target country. Deliberately targeted attempts to influence the leadership classes, or deliberately targeted support for opposition groups, is often more effective than comprehensive economic sanctions that adversely affect the whole population. Before sanctions are imposed, an assessment of the political and economic situation in the country should be carried out. For this, reference could be made to the information gathered by international organizations and institutes, and the analyses conducted by them. If it can be seen that a chosen measure is not going to be successful, the sanctions package must be flexible enough to be adapted to the newly perceived requirements.

2. The international credibility of the Security Council's decisions is an important factor in determining the success of the sanctions. One must avoid a situation in which the council is used as a means of pushing through the foreign-policy interests of a (permanent) member. High standards must therefore be set as regards substantiating council decisions. Calls must go out for an agreement to be concluded between permanent and non-permanent members , in which, whilst acknowledging the present broad discretionary scope of the UN charter, they lay down aims and principles for the collective safeguarding of peace. It is against these aims and principles that the operations of the Security Council must to be measured.

3. The implementation and enforcement of the Security Council's resolutions is a task for the whole international community. Third countries particularly affected by sanctions are entitled to expect others to show solidarity by sharing their special economic burdens. This kind of equalization can be achieved through the creation of an equalization fund, under the umbrella of the United Nations. The international customs-aid provided by the EU and OSCE in Yugoslavia provides a model for future cases. Both these organizations are called upon to carry out a careful evaluation of their practical and organizational experiences and to make this available for further operations of this kind.

V. Criteria for the Choice of Sanctions

Appropriate criteria for the choice of sanctions may be summed up in the key terms 'proportionality', 'promise', 'targeting', and 'humanitarian considerations'. In proportionality, the task is to weigh the misconduct by which the peace has been broken against the probable effects of sanctions. Promise means the likelihood of the target country's actually effecting the desired change in policy. This also covers the question of the shaping of public opinion in the target country, and the role of the opposition: in South Africa, Nigeria, Haiti, and Burma, publicly acknowledged spokespersons expressed their support for sanctions because they hoped these would bring about a political turn-around. Lastly, the aim of ensuring that it is the 'perpetrators' who are hardest hit, and that the innocent are spared, dictates the adoption of a method of operation directed at a particular target group. As regards the consequences for the civilian population, too, there is a humanitarian threshold that must not be overstepped.

What kind of sanctions are justifiable on these criteria? An arms embargo is generally the easiest to accept and is almost always conducive to peace; however - like all partial embargoes - it is also particularly difficult to enforce effectively. In most cases, it merely helps drive trade underground and push prices upwards. The huge range of weapons on offer, particularly in the small-arms domain, adds to the difficulty. The enforcement of arms embargoes involves considerable effort and cost. However, there have now been a number of positive experiences in this area, notably in the case of former Yugoslavia. Here, the embargo was, on the whole, effectively enforced - except in one regard: with the knowledge and tacit consent of one of the permanent members of the Security Council, it was circumvented to aid the weakest party to the conflict, namely Bosnia.

A second category of measures, in which the potential for secondary damage is generally slight, comprises those that primarily serve to express the disapproval of the international community. This would include, for example, exclusion from the Olympic Games, or, at a general level, the halting of exchanges in sport, culture, science, technology, information, diplomacy, and development co-operation, as well as the suspension of the target state's membership of international organizations. Naturally, as already mentioned, one has to take care here that there are no counterproductive effects on the potential for democratic change.

A further group of measures includes those in the fields of transport and communications, financial sanctions, and partial embargoes for specific goods - as in the COCOM regime, the embargo on certain strategic goods enforced against socialist countries (up to 1994). The targeting of specific groups is an important factor here - for example, in restrictions on travel. In many developing countries, it hits the ruling political élite very hard if they can no longer travel on their own business or send their children to schools and universities in the North. Prime examples of this kind of approach are the sanctions against Haiti and against the UNITA movement in Angola. In Haiti, a target-group strategy was finally put into operation, in addition to the arms and oil embargo which has been in force since 1993 - and which was extended into a general ban on trade in 1994: the generals responsible for the putsch against President Aristide, the democratically elected leader, and for the subsequent violent regime, were refused visas and had their foreign bank-accounts frozen. In 1993, an arms and oil embargo was imposed against UNITA, one of the parties to the Angolan civil war, as a way of forcing it to take an active part in the peace process. From August 1997, the Security Council also decreed a ban on flights to and from UNITA-occupied areas, a ban on entry to other UN member-states by UNITA representatives and their families, and the closure of all UNITA offices in other UN countries.

Partial or total trade boycotts may be regarded as constituting a fourth category. Such boycotts entail a ban on the import of all or some goods from the target country as part of a collective endeavour to safeguard peace. Boycotts should thus be viewed as the opposite of embargoes, which block the export of goods from UN member states to the country against which the sanctions are directed. Research shows that boycotts are considerably less damaging, both economically and in terms of human rights, than blanket economic sanctions - the weightiest gun in the sanctions arsenal, and one which, as the experiences of the last few years have shown, ought to be used with extreme caution. Indeed, in the case of Iraq, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that a systematic oil-boycott combined with an arms embargo may have sufficed as a solution.

Recommendations:

1. In selecting sanctions, preference should be given as a matter of principle to measures allowing influence to be exerted specifically on the outcome of the conflict or on the political decision-makers in the target country. Such measures include arms embargoes, travel restrictions, and the freezing of funds belonging to the ruling classes. Comprehensive economic sanctions, on the other hand, should be avoided: the damage they cause is out of all proportion to their actual benefits, and in the past, the expectation that a deterioration in a country's overall economic situation would be more effective in bringing about a change in its policies than targeted measures has not been fulfilled.

2. Where sanctions are imposed, they must be given time to take effect. The independent coercive nature of the measures must also be taken seriously by those instituting them. A rapid change-over to military measures should be rejected as an option, just as the transition to the use of force should not be regarded as a step of logical consequence.

VI. The Humanitarian Question

The humanitarian problems associated with economic sanctions are illustrated by the example of Iraq, against which comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed beginning in August 1990. From 1991, increasing numbers of alarming reports began to circulate there about the situation of the civilian population. The food and health situation was described as worrying; many observers feared a humanitarian catastrophe. Humanitarian aid was permitted, but was not available in the necessary quantities. The Security Council responded to this emergency by developing the 'oil for food' programme. Under UN supervision, Iraq was to be allowed to export a specific quantity of oil, the revenue from which was to be used, amongst other things, to make reparations payments and to acquire humanitarian goods such as food and medicine for the ailing population. But until the end of 1996, Iraq refused to implement this programme on the grounds that it constituted an infringement of its sovereign rights. In the meantime, the country's general economic situation, and the provision of basic supplies to the population, deteriorated further. Ninety per cent of Iraq's foreign-currency revenue prior to the war derived from the oil trade, and these funds - as well as the monies in the foreign accounts frozen by the Security Council - were no longer available for rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed in the war. The sanctions helped prevent the Iraqi economy from growing strong again after the war, but they did so chiefly at the expense of Iraq's civilian population. Inflation and shortages rendered food unaffordable to the impoverished population. A system of rationing introduced by the government barely managed to assure minimum supplies and was unable to prevent a devastating deterioration in the general health situation of people in Iraq. Disease and malnutrition were the result. UN studies assume a five-fold increase in the mortality of infants under the age of 5. Iraq's health system is on the brink of collapse. The 'oil for food' programme has now been put under stricter UN supervision. What change this will bring in the situation in Iraq remains to be seen.

The deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Iraq is not an isolated case. Economic sanctions, particularly where they are comprehensive and effectively implemented, are by nature such that they mainly affect the civilian population. Thus, adverse effects on people in the target countries are also reported for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Haiti.

Such effects are not only ethically questionable; they are also of significance from the legal point of view. Human rights and the humanitarian provisions of international law are increasingly being recognized as marking the limits of permissibility for economic sanctions. They form part of the core of UN goals and principles which the Security Council is required, by Article 24, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter, to observe in fulfilling its mandate to safeguard peace. Hence, at the very least, the peremptory rights (ius cogens) of the people affected by the sanctions - particularly the right to life, health, food, water, housing, and clothing - must be taken into account when sanctions are being imposed. Starvation is not allowed on any count. The limit is overstepped if sanctions help bring about a situation where a large part of the population falls below subsistence level.

Unfortunately, within the framework of the international debate, it has been usual here to be content with calling for access to humanitarian aid to be guaranteed. The Security Council's sanctions-regimes soon began to take notice of this as well. Since then, the sanctions committees and their secretariat have devoted most of their capacity to processing and approving applications for the provision of humanitarian aid and basic supplies. On the other hand, it is clear that the available humanitarian aid is in no way sufficient to supply the needs thrown up by all the world's catastrophes. Hence the ailing population of an internationally proscribed country is that much less likely to receive assistance, particularly if it is situated a long way from the countries of the wealthy North. Iraq is a sad example of this - and also of the paradoxical situation whereby a country's own ample resources cannot be used to provide emergency aid.

Finally, the internal UN procedure for approving supplies for exceptional humanitarian reasons itself gives grounds for criticism: trading companies and non-profit-making organizations alike are subject to it, and both view it as an unnecessary burden. Since the sanctions committees operate on the consensus principle, each member virtually has a right of veto and there is a suspicion that the system is being operated in an arbitrary manner.

Recommendations:

1. A special Security Council body (sanctions council) or central sanctions committee should be set up to oversee all sanctions regimes, and its reports should be published regularly. Rule-of-law yardsticks should be applied to the decisions of this body; it should rule in a similar way on similar matters and thus offer the requisite predictability.

2. As far as possible, humanitarian aid organizations should be freed from administrative and logistical conditions. Large-scale, established institutions such as those belonging to the UN or Red Cross system should be excepted from embargo conditions as long as they adhere to the limits stipulated by the Security Council. They should then, in their turn, provide 'umbrellas' of joint guarantees for smaller organizations.

3. In respecting the humanitarian limits to sanctions, account must be taken not only of their direct effects on the ability of humanitarian goods to get through, and on the practical provision of humanitarian aid; their overall effects on the economy, and the way in which they aggravate the situation of the population in the target country, must also constantly be kept in mind. Once they help force a significant part of the population below subsistence level, they must be regarded as legally impermissible. They must then be either completely lifted, moderated, or replaced by specifically targeted measures. The Security Council should therefore make regular checks on the situation of the civilian population in the target countries. Suitable sources of information in this connection are the country reports and analyses of special UN organizations such as the FAO and WHO. Special note should be taken of the situation of particularly vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women.

VII. For a Thoroughgoing Debate on the Aims and Areas of Application of UN Sanctions

Nowadays we have available to us all the experience which the Security Council has gathered since the end of the Cold War in implementing the procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In sum, one can say that sanctions are potentially a peace-promoting tool; but their use requires careful thought and must take account of humanitarian factors.

For these reasons, the member states of the UN - above all the permanent members of the Security Council, who have a special responsibility in this regard - urgently need to clarify their future approach to sanctions. Sanctions must not be used unreflectingly, merely in order to 'do something' in cases where other measures are regarded as too costly. Sanctions are not a panacea that can achieve every foreign-policy goal with the same degree of success. Rather, they offer possible strategies and procedures to be used and combined in discriminating ways in each individual case, according to the type of goal aimed at and the specific mode of operation of the chosen sanction. Moreover, the range of alternatives includes measures that offer the target country a positive incentive to change its behaviour.

Recommendations:

1. As far as future use of UN sanctions is concerned, there must be an open debate by the international community, and agreement must be reached as to the aims, areas of application, control mechanisms, and selection of specific types of sanctions. Practically speaking, in addition to the recommendations already made, agreement has to be arrived at on the following points:

a) Should the UN be given 'exclusive power' internationally in the area of peace-related sanctions? One factor that militates in favour of this is the general trend towards multilateral conflict-resolution. Bilateral pressure aimed at preventing the breaking of the peace has historically been used more to secure individual interests than for the general good of humanity. Even bilateral trade wars are in future to be prevented through international arbitration within the framework of GATT and the WTO. This also helps protect the weak against the strong. After all, sanctions gain in credibility and force if they are sponsored by the international community as constituted in the UN. We therefore support the notion of a UN monopoly on sanctions based on an international convention.

b) In what cases do non-military sanctions offer any prospect of success? And in what way should they be applied in these cases? Experience shows that for each country that is (potentially) a target of sanctions, an individual decision has to be made as to how far it will - and actually does - respond to outside measures by changing its policies. As a rule, specifically targeted measures promise a greater degree of success than untargeted sanctions aimed generally at inflicting damage on the economy.

c) Sanctions cannot bring about success in isolation. The dialogue with the target country must be maintained in every case, both at the official, diplomatic level and via exchanges with citizens and opposition groups in the country. The flow of independent information, particularly as supplied via the international media, must not be hampered by sanctions. The search for a political solution to the conflict must be pursued at every stage. The aims of the sanctions must be clearly conveyed, and once they have been achieved, the sanctions must be lifted. The system of 'negative' sanctions set out in the UN Charter could be complemented by agreeing on positive incentives to particular forms of behaviour.

2. This kind of thoroughgoing debate - which has already partly begun within the framework of the discussion about the 'Agenda for Peace' - should lead to the formulation of guiding principles for the activities of the Security Council. As regards the form these might take, one could imagine not only a General Assembly resolution, but the conclusion of an international convention.

3. As far as the nature of Germany's part in this debate is concerned, we must hope for a more earnest consideration of the topic of UN sanctions by scholars and politicians. Parliamentary questions have so far tended to confirm the impression that it is treated as being of marginal concern. A relevant session in the German Bundestag, and the organization of a specialist international conference, would be useful steps here.

Published by:

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Editor: Tobias Debiel
Translated by Margaret Clarke