5. Cuba
A/AC.247/5 (e)
1. One of the formulas for the process of expansion and reform of the Security Council can be the following.
2. The increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members should be strictly in accordance with the principle of the equitable geographic representation.
3. In any formula, the expansion of the permanent membership should not only contemplate industrialized countries. This would simply generate a further imbalance in the membership of the Council. New permanent members from developed and developing countries should enter the Council together and at the same time.
4. The total number of members of the enlarged Security Council could be 23, with the following distribution:
. (a) Three from Asia;
. (b) One from Europe and others;
. (c) Two from Africa (as this is the decision of the Organization of
African Unity, although taking into account the amount of countries in this
region and their diversity, the number could be higher);
. (d) Two from Latin America and the Caribbean.
6. Indonesia
A/AC.247/5 (f)
Criteria for permanent membership in the Security Council
1. The reform and revitalization of the Security Council is a conditio sine qua non for strengthening the United Nations and is critically important for the emerging new world order. The main objective in these endeavours is to render the Council more responsive to the emerging challenges and changing realities in the international landscape. In this context, it is essential to ensure that the question of an increase in the permanent membership reflects the current configuration of membership of the United Nations and to ensure a more representative and effective Security Council. It is undeniable that the present arrangements do not reflect the profound changes and transition that have taken place in the global arena. The international community continues to face an untenable anomaly where three States from Europe are among the five permanent members. At the same time Asia is underrepresented, while Africa and Latin America are not represented, an arrangement that in geopolitical terms is unacceptable.
2. Objective criteria should therefore guide the selection process for an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council. While the principle of equitable geographic representation is a valid basis, it should not constitute the sole criterion to determine eligibility for permanent membership. A host of other criteria are equally important to assume the responsibilities inherent in such a status.
3. Far from paying mere lip service and perfunctory exhortations, States must have supported the United Nations as the principal multilateral organization through which Governments can and should resolve conflicts and thereby seek to strengthen the validity and efficacy of its organs as forums for consultations and negotiations on all issues of global concern. Such a stance, stemming from a genuine commitment to an active and independent foreign policy that is free from externally induced constraints must have the continuing and steadfast support of the Governments and peoples concerned for the United Nations and, most importantly, in their timely contributions to its budget.
4. Furthermore, the willingness of Member States to assume the onerous responsibilities inherent in permanent membership of the Security Council and thereby bolster its capacity in fulfilling its mandate must be deemed to be essential. These should have been convincingly demonstrated by their contribution to the promotion of regional peace and global security through successful diplomatic initiatives to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Equally important is participation in peace-keeping activities over a period of time, as well as contributions to the civil, military, financial and other resources of the United Nations. Proven capacity for constructive global influence and for undertaking global responsibilities, especially in guiding a coalition of the largest number of States in history comprising all continents and regions, would constitute yet another criterion. It is also pertinent to take into account the size of the population.
5. Moreover, a country's standing within the new realities of regional and subregional dynamism and in building the edifice of confidence and concordance should be fully considered. It is also pertinent to take into account the legitimate aspirations of the largest States and the varied abilities and potentialities of their populations as important attributes for permanent membership. Of no less importance is a prominent and constructive role in resolving issues of global concern, particularly through compromise, cooperation and consensus.
6. Additionally, economic power - both current and potential - and social stability, as well as the capacity and willingness to contribute significantly to socio-economic development, are other factors. Another central criterion that should be taken into account is a record of strong and sustained economic growth, including progress towards balanced, equitable and sustainable development that would make it one of the largest and vibrant economies in the world. This could be assessed by such characteristics as rapid output and productivity in agriculture and industry together with increased growth rates in physical and human capital. Likewise, sustained economic performance and resilience even in the face of adverse global economic conditions such as recession should also be given due weight. Stable macroeconomic performance, substantial domestic and foreign investment flows and demographic strength, not just in quantitative terms but also with regard to quality and participation in economic growth and development, are also essential attributes. It is from such strengths that a country's capacity to contribute towards development cooperation under multilateral auspices is derived.
7. An increase in membership of the Security Council should therefore accommodate new permanent members who should join on the basis of a combination of appropriate criteria, which would reflect, among others, the new and emerging constellation of powers, their proven regional and global responsibilities as well as political, economic and demographic realities.
8. A measured and realistic expansion of the permanent membership in the Security Council has become both necessary and appropriate. In these endeavours, the exclusion of developing countries through a process of predetermined selection should be unacceptable. Enlargement should be accomplished through a process of open-ended negotiations on the basis of consensus and as a comprehensive package. The time for reform and restructuring of the Security Council has long been overdue. It has now become imperative to achieve a more representative Security Council.
7. Italy
A/AC.247/5 (g)
15 May 1995
I. Introductory remarks
1. It is generally agreed that the present membership of the Security Council is in need of expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership of the United Nations. General membership has grown from 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965 (date of the Council's only enlargement, from 11 to 15 seats), to 185 today.
2. The five permanent members all belong to the northern hemisphere, and four of them are economically developed countries, while one is rapidly approaching industrialized status. To add new permanent seats only for two developed countries, which also belong to the northern hemisphere, would not be equitable or democratic. Rather than correct the existing imbalance, such a solution would aggravate it.
3. To redress this situation, one logical remedy might be to add three permanent seats to the Security Council, one for each of the three geographic areas presently underrepresented (Asia, Africa and Latin America), but there would be the objective difficulty of selecting the countries that should represent the three continents.
4. A more equitable solution for all would be to increase non-permanent seats only, as was the case with the reform of 1965. Among other things, this would prevent the difficulties connected with the proliferation of veto power and its dangers.
5. The numbers speak clearly: 79 countries have never been members of the Security Council, while 44 others have been able to serve only once (see appendices I and II). The problem stems mainly from the fact that, within each geographic group, several large countries tend to compete for a Security Council seat much more frequently, thus elbowing out the smaller countries. A formula must be found to redress this chronic situation and provide for a greater and more regular involvement of the many, not of the few, in the Security Council.
II. Proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council
6. Italy first presented its proposal on 30 June 1993, in response to the Secretary-General's questionnaire. The proposal was later illustrated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on 30 September 1993 and gradually modified in the light of observations and proposals made by other countries in the course of the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. The present document is the latest revision of the Italian proposal, which can now be summarized as follows:
. (a) The two categories of permanent and non-permanent members should be kept, and the current permanent membership of five should remain the same;
. (b) Eight to 10 new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, 3 States would be rotating, making a total of 24-30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 24-30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly;
. (c) All 24-30 countries due to rotate more frequently would be subject to regular elections. They would need to obtain two thirds of the votes of the General Assembly, in a manner similar to the present clean-slate mechanism, every time it is their turn;
. (d) Obviously this model presupposes maintaining the Charter provision that bans immediate re-election for a member who has just completed a two- year term. In fact, if the ban were to be abolished, the number of spaces available for other countries would automatically be reduced, limiting the right of all to equitable representation. We should not forget that in the League of Nations, the possibility of immediate re-election to a seat on the Council was one of its key problems;
. (e) The list of the above-mentioned 24-30 countries to rotate with greater frequency would be subject to periodic revisions (every 10, 12 or 15 years), thus avoiding the risk of creating new situations of "eternal" privilege. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country has managed to honour the commitment and meet the increased responsibilities stemming from its more frequent rotation. If it has not, it should be replaced, by resolution of the General Assembly, with another country.
7. The Italian proposal may be better illustrated by this diagram:
Permanent members
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Non-permanent members
Ordinary rotation
. . 1.
. . 2.
. . 3.
. . 4.
. . 5.
. . 6.
. . 7.
. . 8.
. . 9.
. . 10.
More frequent rotation
. . 11.
. . 12.
. . 13.
. . 14.
. . 15.
. . 16.
. . 17.
. . 18.
. .(19)
. .(20)
8. Should there be a total of 25 members on the new Council, 10 additional non-permanent seats would be needed and 30 Seats would rotate on them; should there be a total of 24 members, 9 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 27 States; should there be a total of 23 members, 8 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 24 States; and so forth.
9. In other words, for the additional non-permanent seats the ratio would be of one seat per three rotating countries. The geographic distribution of these seats could be made once the total number of new seats has been defined. Naturally the subdivision should favour geographic areas that are currently underrepresented, out of respect for the principle established in Article 23 of the Charter.
III. Criteria for identifying countries to rotate with greater frequency
10. By way of example, one could consider the following criteria:
. (a) The contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization (Article 23 of the Charter);
. (b) Equitable geographic distribution (Article 23 of the Charter);
. (c) The capacity and willingness of States to contribute specifically to peace-keeping operations with military personnel, equipment and financial resources;
. (d) The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development and the protection of human rights.
11. Needless to say, additional criteria could be taken into consideration.
IV. Advantages of the United Nations
12. Following are some of the benefits to the Organization:
. (a) An enlarged Council more representative of the increased general United Nations membership;
. (b) Avoidance of new situations of "eternal" privilege, as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created;
. (c) A greater and more democratic participation of all Member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for more effective decisions;
. (d) A more equitable geographic distribution of the seats in the Council. It is easier to obtain this result on a basis of 24-30 countries than on the more limited basis of two or five additional permanent member countries;
. (e) An important incentive for more frequently rotating members to maintain or increase their commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, in particular for the maintenance of international peace and security. Such members might be asked to make an increased contribution to peace-keeping operations; this would be a tangible sign of the greater responsibilities deriving from their more frequent presence in the Council;
. (f) Lowering the growing contentiousness that seems to characterize elections to the Security Council.
V. Advantages for all member countries
13. The proposal also presents a set of concrete advantages for all Member States of the United Nations, namely:
. (a) Smaller countries would be given a more fair chance of being elected to a non-permanent seat by removing and shielding them from the unequal competition of the larger ones in each regional group. Even better, rotation agreements could be reached, and respected, within each group, thus ensuring that also for ordinary rotation the "clean slate" formula could be adopted;
. (b) Countries rotating more frequently would be given recognition of their more substantial role in support of the United Nations. They could also plan in a more regular and long-term way - their policy of support for the United Nations and their contribution, financial and otherwise, to the achievement of the goals of the Organization, in particular to those of the Security Council. Furthermore, these countries could establish among themselves special liaisons, in groups of three, for rotating the additional non-permanent seats;
. (c) The permanent members could see their present burden for peace- keeping operations reduced, since it could be shared not with 2 or 5 additional members, but with 24-30 more frequently rotating countries.
VI. Reasons for opposing the extension of veto power
14. Veto power - invoked as an inalienable prerogative of permanent membership by some countries aspiring to that status - is an institution that may have been justified during the cold war years. Nowadays, the hope of many is that it may become obsolete through non-use.
15. While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guarantees that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council's proceedings and the final outcome of its debates.
16. This is why Italy is opposed to extending veto power to other countries. One of the main advantages of the Italian proposal - to increase non-permanent members - is that the issue of such an extension would not arise at all.
17. Moreover, while it may appear unrealistic to hope that the current holders of the veto will be willing to renounce it spontaneously, Italy shares the opinion of those who believe that its use should nevertheless be regulated and contained as much as possible: by trying to limit its area of application, for example, or requiring at least two vetoes to block the adoption of a resolution.
VII. Final considerations
18. If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons:
. (a) It would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 24-30 countries rotating more frequently;
. (b) The General Assembly would periodically, every 10 to 15 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition;
. (c) All non-permanent members of the Council - without exception - would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly and obtain a two-thirds majority.
19. Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their selection, review and election for every term, these countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly. Secondly, up to now countries rotating more frequently than others have always existed within geographic groups. What the Italian proposal aims for is an easing of rivalries and a fostering of a more fair and equitable participation in the Council for everyone. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would include the smaller States, which have thus far been kept out of the Council. Shielded from the competition of larger countries, they could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for "clean slate", with a realistic hope of being elected.
20. Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two articles in the Charter of the United Nations: Article 23 (composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and Article 27 (voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions.
Appendix I
(graph on terms in the Security Council, for non permanent members)
Appendix II
A. Member States that have not served on the Security Council
1. Afghanistan
2. Albania
3. Andorra
4. Angola
5. Antigua and Barbuda
6. Armenia
7. Azerbaijan
8. Bahamas
9. Bahrain
10. Barbados
11. Belize
12. Bhutan
13. Bosnia and Herzegovina
14. Brunei Darussalam
15. Cambodia
16. Central African Republic
17. Chad
18. Comoros
19. Croatia
20. Cyprus
21.Democratic People's Republic of Korea
22. Dominica
23. Dominican Republic
24. El Salvador
25. Equatorial Guinea
26. Eritrea
27. Estonia
28. Fiji
29. Gambia
30. Georgia
31. Grenada
32. Guatemala
33. Guinea-Bissau
34. Haiti
35. Iceland
36. Israel
37. Kazakstan
38. Kyrgyzstan
39. Lao People's Democratic Republic
40. Latvia
41. Lesotho
42. Liechtenstein
43. Lithuania
44. Luxembourg
45. Malawi
46. Maldives
47. Marshall Islands
48. Micronesia (Federated States of)
49. Monaco
50. Mongolia
51. Mozambique
52. Myanmar
53. Namibia
54. Palau
55. Papua New Guinea
56. Qatar
57. Republic of Korea
58. Republic of Moldova
59. Saint Kitts and Nevis
60. Saint Lucia
61. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
62. Samoa
63. San Marino
64. Sao Tome and Principe
65. Saudi Arabia
66. Seychelles
67. Singapore
68. Slovakia
69. Slovenia
70. Solomon Islands
71. South Africa
72. Suriname
73. Swaziland
74. Tajikistan
75.The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
76. Turkmenistan
77. Uzbekistan
78. Vanuatu
79. Viet Nam
B. Member States elected only once to the Security Council
1. Bangladesh
2. Belarus
3. Benin
4. Botswana
5. Burkina Faso
6. Burundi
7. Cameroon
8. Cape Verde
9. Congo
10. Costa Rica
11. Djibouti
12. Gabon
13. Greece
14. Guinea
15. Honduras
16. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
17. Jamaica
18. Kenya
19. Kuwait
20. Lebanon
21. Liberia
22. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
23. Madagascar
24. Mali
25. Malta
26. Mauritania
27. Mauritius
28. Nicaragua
29. Niger
30. Oman
31. Paraguay
32. Portugal
33. Rwanda
34. Sierra Leone
35. Somalia
36. Sri Lanka
37. Sudan
38. Thailand
39. Togo
40. Trinidad and Tobago
41. United Arab Emirates
42. United Republic of Tanzania
43. Uruguay
44. Yemen
8. Mexico
A/AC.247/5 (h)
Submitted in April, 1995
Proposed new membership of the Security Council
| Region | Existing | First two-year period | Second two-year period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Africa | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Asia | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Western Europe | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Eastern Europe | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Permanent members | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Japan | - | 1 | - |
| Germany | - | - | 1 |
| Total | 15 | 20 | 20 |
9. Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
A/AC.247/5 (i) February 13, 1995
Cluster I
Reform of the Security CouncilThe Question of the Composition of the Security Council
As regards the expansion of the Security Council, the Non-Aligned countries are guided by the positions enunciated in the final documents adopted at the Jakarta Summit and at subsequent Ministerial meetings in Cairo and New York.
1. Guiding principles established by the movement of the non-aligned countries:
A. Equitable geographical distribution
B. Sovereign equality of states
2. The non-aligned countries are grossly under-represented in the Council. This under-representation should, therefore, be corrected by enlargement of the Security Council which should enhance the credibility of the Council, to reflect the universal character of the world body, and to correct existing imbalances in the composition of the Security Council in a comprehensive manner.
3. The extent, nature and modalities of the expansion of the Security Council should be determined on the basis of the above principles. Attempts to exclude NAM from any enlargement in the membership of the Security Council would be unacceptable to the movement.
4. The negotiating process should be fully democratic and transparent and negotiations on all aspects should be held, in all cases, in an open-ended setting.
5. If there is no agreement on other categories of the membership, expansion should take place only, for the time being, in the non-permanent category.
6. Increase the membership of the Security Council by not less than 11 based on the guiding principles (see Annex).
7. The last sentence of Article 23.2 (immediate re-election) of the United Nations Charter may be examined in the context of the over-all agreement on the expansion of the Council.
8. After an over-all agreement on the reform of the Security Council has been reached, there should be a periodic review of the composition of the Council in the accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.
Annex
As an example, the mathematical formula when applied would lead to the following result:
| Regional Groups | No. of Countries | Proposed Membership Not Less Than... |
|---|---|---|
| Western European & Other States Group | 27 | 4 |
| Eastern European Group | 20 | 3 |
| Asian Group | 49 | 7 |
| African Group | 53 | 7 |
| Latin America and the Carribean Group | 33 | 5 |
| Total | 182 | 26 |
x=y/z x w
x= proposed new membership for each region
y= present number of members per region
z= total number of members of the united nations
w= proposed total new membership
Cluster II
Recommended Measures to Enhance the Effective and Efficient Functioning of the Security Council
Both the reform and expansion aspects of the Security Council, including the democratization of its decision-making processes and procedures, should be examined as integral parts of a common package.
Bearing in mind Article 24(1) of the Charter, qualitative measures to enhance both the transparency of the Council's work and, as appropriate, the participation of the non-members as well as the contribution of the principal organs in the decision-making process of the Council would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council. This would lead to wider acceptance of the Security Council. This would lead to wider acceptance of the Security Council resolutions. It would also confer added legitimacy and contribute in ensuring active support to and implementation of its decisions. Towards this end and in accordance with Article 10 of the Charter, listed below are measures of a practical nature recommended for urgent consideration by the Security Council.
These measures fall under the mutually reinforcing categories of the:
1) Relationship of the Security Council with the General Assembly, other bodies and organizations as well as non-members of the Security Council; and
2) Reform by the Security Council of its working methods and procedures.
1. Relationship of the Security Council with:
A. General Assembly
There is a need for enhanced cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with Articles 10, 11, 12, 14 and other relevant articles of the Charter.
In this regard, the following measures are recommended:
i) to take fully into account the provisions of the General Assembly resolution 48/264 regarding the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly; and its consideration by the latter organ.
ii) to institutionalize the practice of consultations between the Presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly or their designated representatives on matters before the Council, with a view to keeping the General Assembly apprised in an appropriate manner of developments in the Council which may be of interest to the general membership.
iii) to conduct briefings by the President of the Security Council or his/her spokesperson for the General Assembly on all matters which the Council is seized of on a regular basis, particularly on issues of an urgent nature.
iv) to consider ways and means to ensure an effective flow of information and exchange of views between the Security Council and the General Assembly on matters under consideration by the Council and its subsidiary organs.
v) to ensure steady flow of information provided to the Security Council by the Secretariat and to the General Assembly.
vi) to consider, under Article 12, requesting the General Assembly to forward recommendations to ascertain whether there is a broad consensus among the general membership on a particular course of action or on urgent matters.
B. Members of the United Nations
1. To enhance the possibilities for those countries affected by Council actions, including the establishment and conduct of the PKO, to present their positions publicly to the Council before the Council embarks upon informal consultations; and to permit these countries to observe the informal consultations of the whole on the relevant issue.
2. The consultations between the President of the Security Council with respective Chairmen of the regional groups would be regularized to deal with the Council's substantive issues and a review of its activities.
3. The outgoing President of the Council would report on the accomplishments of the council during his/her tenure in a briefing for the general membership in an informal public meeting.
4. Briefings on informal consultations (see section on Reform).
5. As peace keeping operations have become more complex, the Council is invited to devise a system of consultations during the decision-making process on the establishment, the conduct and the termination of a PKO, which would include the following:
a) To institutionalize structured and direct consultations with troop contributors during the life of a PKO. These consultations could be in addition to, merged with or replace the briefings and consultations sponsored by the Secretariat and should focus on key issues such as mandates and other factors directly affecting the status of an operation. This arrangement should replace the present type of ad hoc meetings such as the "out-of-chambers" meetings with troop-contributors.
b) Subsidiary organs, ad hoc or otherwise might be established by the Council in accordance with Article 29 to monitor developments of the most important PKOs with the participation of troop contributing Member States.
6. There is also a need for improving the operational significance of Article 50; action should be taken to respond to the expectations by this Article of the Charter, in addition to the recommendations contained in para. 75 of the position paper presented by the Secretary-General as a SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE and other relevant proposals, the Council is invited to consider the following measures:
a) to institutionalize the practice and make extended use of the consultations envisaged under Articles 50, which should be aimed at arriving at an appropriate solution to the problem; along the lines stated in para 2a, Section IV of UNGA resolution 47/120B.
b) the subsidiary organs dealing with enforcement measures such as Sanctions Committees should fully take into account the problems in implementing enforcement measures brought before it by the non-members and take decisions on them in a transparent and fair manner.
7. Records of the Sanctions Committees' meetings should be available to all members.
8. Subsidiary organs should be established to deal with other specific matters under consideration by the Council, with the participation of interested non-members for example, organs to assist the Council in monitoring sanctions or elaborating recommendations f or certain issues.
C. Regional Agencies/Arrangements
a) In accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, the Security Council shall encourage the development of Pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
b) The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Council.
c) Regional efforts undertaken by regional arrangements or agencies in the area of the maintenance of International Peace and Security, within their respective fields of competence and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, should be encouraged and, where appropriate, supported by the Security Council.
d) Exchange of information and holding consultations at appropriate levels between the Council and the regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII.
e) In the event that the Security Council is taking a decision under Chapter VII of the Charter on a certain issue, prior consultations between the Council and the regional arrangement directly concerned would be useful.
f) If action by the Security Council involves peace-keeping or peaceful settlement measures, the Council shall consult the parties concerned and, taking into account the views of the latter, consider consulting the relevant regional arrangements and agencies.
D. Relations with International Court of Justice
Legal Considerations:
The Council shall use, as appropriate, the International Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Reform by the Security Council of its Working Methods and Rules of Procedures
A. Review of the Provisional Rules of Procedure
The Council should review its Provisional Rules of Procedure with a view to their early formal adoption. The Rules of Procedure should ensure transparency and involvement of the general membership in its decision-making process, and indicate the rights and obligations of non-members in relation to the functioning of the Security Council. The elements of such a review should include, inter alia, the following:
1) Briefings of the President of the Security Council to the General Membership should be institutionalized by amending the Security Council rules of procedures.
2) Provisions for the prompt convening of formal meetings of the Security Council when requested by a member state of the United Nations.
3) Provisions concerning the participation of non-members of the Council in informal consultations of the whole.
4) Detailed provisions regarding subsidiary organs for specific issues.
5) Clear provisions concerning the transparency of meetings, circulation of documentation, and records.
6) The veto power which guarantees an exclusive and dominant role to the permanent members of the Council is contrary to the aim of democratizing the United Nations and must therefore be reviewed. The review, as an interim measure, should include the scope of application of the veto.
7) The establishment of a general criterion for the identification of what is to be considered an action of a procedural nature with respect to the application of article 27 of the Charter (paras. 2 and 3) with a view to a voiding any arbitrary judgement and enabling the Council to carry out its functions in an efficient and prompt manner.
B. Other Practical Measures
a) The Council should consider holding of a greater number of formal open meetings than informal consultations of the whole on an issue before a resolution is adopted or a decision is taken.
b) Written highlights of the main content of informal consultations of the whole should be circulated to the general membership.
c) Given the need for greater transparency of its decision-making process, the Council should institutionalize regular and structured briefings for the general membership on the results of its informal consultations. Such briefings could be made by the President of the Council or a designated representative.
d) The provision of the tentative monthly work program should be institutionalized and it should include, as appropriate, the nature or type of action that might be considered during the month.
e) The annotated agenda and expected action to be taken at formal Council meetings could be reflected in the Journal.
f) An effective mechanism could be established for alerting non-members of emergency and/or weekend meetings of the Security Council.
C. Ascertaining Facts and Follow up
a) Using rule 23 of the Provisional rules of procedure in order to appoint the Secretary-General as a rapporteur for a specified question.
b) Using rule 28 of the Provisional rules of procedure to appoint a commission or a committee to ascertain facts, conduct consultations with concerned parties, and ensure proper follow up.
D. Meetings with Non-Members
It is further recommended to hold informal meetings between members of the Security Council and members of the United Nations to exchange views regarding the implementation of the above recommended measures and other related matters. Progress made in the implementation of these recommendations should be included in the reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly.
10. Nordic Countries
Position paper
Cluster I
The fundamental objective of an enlargement of the Security Council should be to strengthen its capacity to discharge the duties assigned to it by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.
There should be an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members.
In enlarging the Security Council special importance should be given to the principle of equitable geographical representation.
The total size of the Security Council should be a function of the above-mentioned requirements. It should be in the low twenties, preferably 23.
Five new seats could be allocated as permanent seats for qualified States.
It is important that the veto does not weaken the ability of the Security Council to play the role assigned to it by the Charter. The question of additional vetoes should therefore be considered in the broader context of decision-making in the Council, including the proper role and function of the veto instrument.
The ban on immediate re-election of non-permanent members should be maintained in the interest of the vast majority of member States.
Regional groups should be encouraged to establish equitable systems of rotation for non-permanent members.
The competence of regional groups freely to agree on appropriate systems of such rotations should not be circumscribed. Countries should not be assigned for privileged frequent rotation except by agreement of their regional group.
The question of the composition of the Security Council should be re-examined a suitable period (10-20 years) after the entry into force of changes as a result of the present consideration.
Cluster II
The recent steps taken to enhance the relationship between the Security Council and the general membership as well as to improve its working methods and procedures are welcome.
The Council should consider further concrete steps to involve the membership at large more closely in the work of the Council and in the follow-up to its decisions.
The Council should also consider the formalization of the above mentioned steps, without prejudice to their further elaboration, e.g. by including them in its rules of procedure.
In particular, formalization should be considered with regard to consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council. Formalization should also be considered with regard to briefings by the presidency of the Security Council on the work of the Council.
It is important that institutionalized consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council take place when mandates are extended and/or modified, and, when-ever possible, before a decision is taken by the Council to launch a new peace-keeping operation
The work of the sanctions committees should be made more transparent.
If a significant revision of the Charter is undertaken, it could be worthwhile to include a new provision, e.g. in Article 24, that the Security Council shall inform and consult interested Member States on its work.
There is a close substantial inter-relationship between the two aspects of the Working Group's mandate. The final result of the work on the reform of the Security Council should be agreed as a comprehensive package. Nothing is nevertheless to be gained from postponing implementation of measures enjoying broad support, and not requiring Charter amendments.
11. Singapore
A/AC.247/5 (k)
These suggestions were first made by the Singapore Foreign Minister in his plenary speech at the fortyeighth session of the General Assembly.
1. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council
has discussed the critical issue of permanent membership in the Security
Council since the fortyeighth session of the General Assembly. Several
Member States have been proposed as new permanent members. Each of the
prospective candidates has its own strengths and weaknesses. At this
stage, however, no consensus exists on which specific Member State could be
elevated to this status.
2. There are two basic problems. The first is simply to decide what is the current configuration of international power that should be reflected in the distribution of permanent seats. This is not as straightforward as it may seem.
3. When the Charter was being drafted, the end of the Second World War was in sight and prepared for, with easily discernible winners and losers. The intention was for the winners to have primary responsibility for guiding the new international order. The end of the cold war took everyone by surprise and was far from clear-cut in its resolution. Economic, political and military power no longer necessarily cohere in a single locus.
4. The second problem is even more vexing. If the new Security Council is really to reflect the current international distribution of power, it should logically entail the relegation of some from the elite as well as the appointment of others. Even if some were to be so elevated without necessarily displacing others, the expansion of the small group of the select would imply the relative diminution of the status of the current permanent members. This reality compels us to confront the difficult question of the veto.
5. To make progress, Singapore is of the view that there is no alternative but gradually to shape a consensus through a patient process of debate and discussion. To force the pace or attempt to impose a majority agreement will not work.
6. At this stage, it would be most useful to try to identify and build consensus on objective general criteria that all permanent members, present or aspiring, must fulfil. This is a more clinical and constructive approach than attempting to identify and promote one specific Member State or another. To attempt to do so at this stage is premature and as the Working Group's experience of the past two years has demonstrated, is only divisive. The identification of objective criteria will set a common standard, and if we can agree on them, a consensus on specific countries will naturally emerge.
7. Singapore suggests the following criteria that could be used for selecting new permanent members of the Security Council:
. (a) A permanent member must have a long-established tradition of good conduct in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular in the maintenance of international peace and security;
. (b) The Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Apermanent member must therefore first of all have the capacity and will to wield military force in support of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. All permanent members should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations;
. (c) A permanent member must also have the capacity and will to contribute civilian and humanitarian resources, which are increasingly needed in the growing multidimensional nature of United Nations peace- keeping operations;
. (d) Privilege must be paid for. A permanent member should not shirk its financial commitments to the United Nations and must be prepared to carry a larger portion of the financial burden of the United Nations. In particular, a permanent member must bear special financial responsibilities for peace-keeping;
. (e) A permanent member must be a major contributor to other aspects of the United Nations besides peace-keeping. These include international economic, financial and social cooperation, which are major elements in bringing about international peace and security;
. (f) A permanent member should have the widest possible if not consensual support of all the members of the United Nations.
12. Turkey
A/AC.247/5 (l)
1. Turkey presented its first written proposal pertaining to the reform of the Security Council on 28 June 1993. This proposal was published in General Assembly document A/48/264, dated 20 July 1993. Following is the revised version of the Turkish proposal on the question of enlargement of the Security Council, which was initially outlined in the statement of the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Open-ended Working Group on 30 January 1995.
2. The prospective size of the Council should be determined on the basis of the concepts of representativity, democracy, legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness.
3. Turkey holds the view that a Security Council with at least 25 members would be more representative as well as more effective and efficient.
4. The Security Council should be enlarged with an additional 10 non- permanent members. Thus, the existing ratio of 1:3 between permanent and non-permanent members should be reorganized as 1:5.
5. These new additional seats should rotate among a predetermined list of countries. The number of countries to be included in this list could be fixed between 30 to 40.
6. The selection of the countries to be included in the list could be made according to a set of objective criteria.
7. The criteria and the list should be flexible so that it could be updated after a certain period of time, that is, there should be a mechanism that would ensure that political and economic changes in the international scene would be reflected in the composition of the Council more regularly. The review of the list could be made either every 12 or 16 years.
8. This proposal also calls for a new assessment of the concept of constituencies in the distribution of seats in the Council. As stated in Turkey's first written proposal of 28 June 1993, present arrangements for the geographical distribution of the non-permanent seats of the Council, adopted in 1963, are outdated. With the enlargement of the membership, a new approach in this regard based on the replacement of the current large geographical groups by narrower constituencies is worth considering. Designation of separate and smaller constituencies would further enhance the representative character of the Council. It would also ensure more equitable and balanced geographical distribution.
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