Global Policy Forum

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United Nations Economic Sanctions: Minimizing Adverse Effects on Nontarget States by Margaret Doxey

1. INTRODUCTION Sanctions ordered by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be regarded as instruments of the collective will of the international community used in support of international norms and standards relating to peace and security. But after nearly a decade of experience in which UN sanctions have been imposed against a variety of international offenders, 1 there is considerable debate about their shortcomings as well as their achievements. In fact, the conventional advocacy of economic measures as preferable to military force because of their nonlethal consequences appears to require some qualification because of the unwelcome and possibly unacceptable costs they entail. Experience with UN sanctions againt Iraq, Haiti and Yugoslavia focused attention on their serious humanitarian effects on innocent civilians in the target - especially on vulnerable groups such as children, women and older people - which have both immediate and long-term consequences for health and education. There is concern too about the wider economic and social implications of external economic pressure which undermines normal patterns of life, retards economic progress and contributes to criminalization and instability. A further cause for concern, in addition to these humanitarian problems, is the fact that comprehensive economic sanctions can have serious consequences for non-target sender states, particularly those in the developing world. It is not surprising that academics and practitioners are seriously studying the possibility of developing a repertory of more precisely targeted measures which would minimize these unwelcome effects and, at the same time, exert a more direct impact on the policy-makers in the target state. But whatever the merits of 'targeting' in theory and practice, attention still needs to be paid to minimizing the adverse consequences of economic sanctions. This policy-oriented paper is concerned with sanctions-related collateral damage, an issue which has been taken up in the UN General Assembly and in various UN Committees and working groups. 2. In the summer of 1998 it was also the subject of a UN Expert Group meeting, mandated by General Assembly Resolution 52/162.3 The writer contributed a paper to the Expert Group and its proceedings proved very helpful in preparing this discussion paper. The paper provides background material and sketches recent experience before making some practical recommendations for improvement.

2. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM The imposition of a set of sanctions which disrupt or prohibit the normal flow of economic transactions between the target and sender states cannot be cost-free for the senders. States who have close ties with the target will suffer the most from their severance and these are often, though not necessarily, neighbouring states. Nor can it be denied that developing countries are less able than the more affluent to bear additional costs of the kind sanctions can impose. What is tolerable for the United States or Britain may be disastrous for the fragile economies of developing countries, already overloaded with debt and struggling to build a sound economic base. There is, however, no system in place by which burden-sharing is automatically a feature of UN sanctions programmes. The structure of the Security Council, which has authority to order sanctions on behalf of the membership of the UN as a whole, ensures that the five permanent members can exercise their veto power to block the passage of sanctions resolutions which -for whatever reason - they find unacceptable. The ten non-permanent members can also contribute to the Council's decision-making. But the remaining 170 members are obligated to implement resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter regardless of adverse consequences for their own economies. The only provision in the Charter which addresses their problems is Article 50 which states that 'If preventive or enforcement measures against any State are taken by the Security Council, any other State, whether a Member of the United Natons or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems'. Article 50 does not define the nature of 'special problems' nor does it set up machinery to handle requests for assistance or offer any guarantee of redress. It is, however, reinforced by Article 49 in which members pledge to afford each other mutual assistance in carrying out measures ordered by the Security Council. In practice, as outlined below, the Article 50 procedure has been of very limited use and effective help has come from other sources. In order to show the dimensions of the problems which sanctions can bring for non-target states the following section identifies the range of possible costs and notes the difficulty of measurement. This is followed by a brief sketch of experience in three major cases of UN sanctions: Rhodesia(now Zimbabwe), Iraq and Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). (a) The Cost Factor Certain sender states may benefit from sanctions, for instance by acquiring markets forfeited by the target or by saving on previously extended development assistance. Others will be minimally affected or can afford the cost involved; where particular sectors of the economies of advanced industrial countries are hard hit by embargoes, their governments can undertake compensatory arrangements. But the needs of a third group of states merit closer international attention because they are vlnerable to adverse consequences which they can ill-afford, even if they are willing to bear some hardship in a worthy cause. Both in terms of the direct adverse impact of sanctions imposition and in terms of their ability to cope with it, weaker economies may find themselves bearing a disproportionate burden of cost. The situation will be particularly serious if existing economic difficulties are compounded; for instance, where there is heavy dependence on imports of essential commodities from the target. Adverse effects of sanctions will obviously vary from case to case and in relation to the time frame adopted and, as the Expert Group noted, they can be classified in a number of different ways: direct and indirect, primary and secondary, temporary and long-lasting.4 Direct effects which result from cancelled contracts and interruptions of shipments, payments and joint ventures impact mainly on the balance of payments on current account, although capital account activities can also be affected. Indirect effects are experienced in the domestic economy and affect ouput, investment, employment and the budget. Sectoral categorization is complicated by the enormous expansion of trade in services in recent years. For purposes of this paper it may be useful to make a broad distinction between lost trade in goods and services and financial costs which can be termed primary effects, and miscellaneous secondary costs, and to indicate the major items under each heading. (i) Trade in goods and services: - Loss of exports which entails forfeiture of foreign exchange earnings and the accumulation of undelivered goods of which production may already have commenced. - Loss of imports which is particularly damaging if they were received on concessionary terms and/or were essential commodities (such as fuel or spare parts) or essential components of production for which alternative sources of supply are either not available or, because of distance or other factors, only available at a higher cost. Undelivered imports for which payment has already been made represent a financial as well as a physical loss. - Loss of services, for instance banking, technical assistance. (ii) Financial costs: - These relate to the suspension of capital flows, current transfers and debt servicing. Examples are the loss of profits or other income from investments in the target, migrants' remittances, grants, loans and credits and tourist revenues, and the confiscation or seizure of assets by the target in retaliation for sanctions. - The effects of severance of transportation links should also be noted. If the target was an important conduit for road, rail, waterways and/or pipelines, higher costs (and delays) will be inevitable. (iii) Miscellaneous administrative and social costs: - These include costs of enforcing sanctions; of repatriating and rehabilitating migrant workers; of housing and feeding refugees. In the most serious cases, where senders experience a combination of these adverse effects, development may be retarded by the diversion of already limited resources to cover sanctions-related costs and the social fabric may be strained. As a result, the damage caused by sanctions is prolonged into the post-sanctions period. (b) The Problem of Measurement Given such a wide range of possible adverse consequences of imposing sanctions, it is not surprising that developing a unified methodology which would offer accurate measurement has proved an elusive quest, particularly if the results are also viewed as a basis for calculating what form or scale of external assistance might be appropriate. The Expert Group which met in June 1998 was mandated: (1) to 'develop a possible methodology for assessing the consequences actually incurred by third States as a result of precentive or enforcement measures, with due regard to the particular problems and needs of developing countries...'; (2) to explore 'practical and innovative measures of assistance' which could be provided from within and without the UN system.5 Measures of assistance are considered later in this paper; in regard to methodology the Expert Group considered the following methods which could be used for impact assessment: Time series analysis of balance of payments changes to assess primarily the direct effects of sanctions in reducing merchandise imports and exports and financial transfers, but capable of expansion to estimate indirect effects on domestic variables. Sectoral division is also possible in such calculations. Stratified sample of firms: impact analysis at the microeconmic level on affected firms. Gravity model of bilateral trade flows intended to measure the dynamics of trade interaction between the target state and a sender state. The Group also noted a longer-term method involving regression equation of income shocks (which requires prior impact assessment) and a complex model which employs perceptions of priority to build an analytic hierarchy of sanctions-induced effects.6 All these methods have common as well as specific drawbacks. What would have happened in the absence of sanctions is always an unknown factor. In addition, concurrent developments affect the economic situation of sender states and where conflict is occurring simultaneously it is obviously extremely difficult to attribute effects specifically to sanctions. On the other hand, offsetting factors such as redirected exports and savings on payments owed to the target need to be factored in. Reliable and up-to-date macro- (or micro-) economic data is a prerequisite for accurate measurement and is not always available.7 As pointed out in the Expert Group discussions, complex models and equations are likely to be impenetrable to policy-makers nor are resources likely to be forthcoming for costly and time-consuming processes of measurement. In any case, needs may be urgent. Further comments on the practical aspects of methodology are reserved for the final section of this paper. (c) Past Experience (i) Rhodesia: Selective sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were imposed on Rhodesia in 1966, became comprehensive in 1968 and were lifted at the end of 1979 when a constitutional settlement paved the way for the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe under majority rule. While the United States ignored the UN embargo on imports of Rhodesian chrome between 1971 and 1978, neighbouring African states who strove to apply the sanctions in accordance with UN resolutions suffered much hardship.8 Zambia, which was newly independent and formerly linked with Rhodesia in the Central African Federation under British rule, and Mozambique which gained independence from Portugal in 1975 were particularly hard hit by severance of trade and transportation facilities.9 Both governments appealed to the Security Council under Article 50. As a result, UN missions made assessments of their losses and coordinators for assistance were appointed in New York. Several donors' meeetings were organized. The General Assembly and ECOSOC supported these efforts which went some way to mitigate the hardships associated with sanctions imposition. But the disruption of vital trade and transport routes forced Zambia to re-open its borders with Rhodesia in 1978 which it had closed in 1973 and it is generally acknowledged that its overall sanctions-related costs exceeded those of Rhodesia.10 It may also be noted that although comprehensive UN sanctions were never imposed on South Africa, there was much concern about the harmful effects they would have on other states in the region, particularly Zimbabwe and South Africa's three small neighbours Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.11 (ii) Iraq Sanctions were imposed on Iraq and Kuwait in August 1990, following Iraq's invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait. All sanctions on Kuwait were lifted after its liberation, but comprehensive sanctions on Iraq remained and are still in force at the time of writing (November 1998). Neighbouring states suffered immediate and serious economic effects from the imposition of sanctions and countries further afield were also badly affected. In all, 2l governments appealed for help under Article 50, claiming a total estimated loss of $30 billion. The major impact in the first six months of the crisis was the higher price of oil; as well there were financial losses from the termination of migrants' remittances and the problems of dealing with a flood of returnees and refugees. Over the longer term, sender states had to reckon with the loss of trade and aid and the non-payment of debts. The cooperation of Egypt, Jordan and Turkey - the 'front-line states' - was obviously crucial if sanctions were to have an impact and Jordan needed immediate help. Vulnerable to both Iraq and Israel, with a largely Palestinian population sympathetic to Iraq, Jordan normally sent 30 per cent of its exports to Iraq and Kuwait, relied on Iraq for oil supplies, received grants from both Iraq and Kuwait and earned considerable revenue from transportation particularly through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Not only did Jordanian nationals flood into the country, but also some 300,000 displaced migrant workers of other nationalities, along with large numbers of refugees. Jordan estimated its direct financial loss at $1.5 billion per annum and asked for emergency help in the form of grants, long-term soft loans, and oil and oil derivatives at concessionary rates. A UN mission was despatched to Amman and a short-term emergency package made available. Moreover, from 1991 Jordan was allowed to import oil from Iraq. Egypt estimated a loss of foreign exchange of $4.5 billion in 1990-91 as well as heavy expenditure to re-absorb 600,000 migrant workers. Turkey relied on Iraq for 60 per cent of its oil supplies and normallly earned revenue from the pipeline shut down by sanctions. Further afield, four countries in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania) who were struggling with political and economic reforms at home complained that repayment of Iraqi debts in the form of oil shipments had ceased and business contracts had been cancelled. Asian countries also experienced difficulties. For instance, the Philipppines and Vietnam lost export markets and also had to deal with the problem of thousands of displaced migrant workers: 65,000 Philippinos and 17,000 Vietnamese. India had to cope with 200,000 returning workers. An overall estimate made by a group of non-governmental organizations to the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee listed 35 low and middle income countries where the economic impact of the Gulf crisis was over one per cent of GDP.12 Some of this was undoubtedly the result of sanctions. The original Iraq sanctions resolution 661 of 6 August 1990 did not mention Article 50, but resolution 669 of 24 September established a Sanctions Committee which was given responsibility for monitoring sanctions implementation and for performing a number of other tasks, one of which was to receive requests for consultation under Article 50. The Iraq Sanctions Committee, like earlier committees established for Rodesia and South Africa (subject to a UN mandatory arms embargo from 1977-90), has representatives of all 15 members of the Security Council. It operates in closed session and by consensus. Such a body was obviously not competent to make detailed assessments of the validity of the various claims put forward under the Article 50 procedure. Its modus operandi was to set up a working group to examine all requests for help, with some analysis from the UN Secretariat, and then forward recommendations to the Council which in turn appealed to states to render immediate technical, financial and material assistance. The Council also requested UN agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs) and regional development banks to consider how they might help. Apart from the mission to Jordan, there were no fact-finding missions.13 The IMF took limited action to increase the flexibility and availability of financing to affected countries, for instance by introducing a temporary oil element into the compensatory and contingency funding facility (CCFF) that compensates member states for cost increases in petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas.14 The World Bank and regional development banks accelerated disbursements from existing loans and credits and expanded concessionary lending. But a collective complaint made by the 21 affected states in March 1991 that their problems had worsened produced no more than a further Security Council appeal to governments and international institutions for help. No doubt there would have been a more serious outcry had the United States not taken the lead outside the UN in organizing assistance principally for the front-line states through the Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group which also raised funds to pay for military operations. The Group included membership from the G7, the European Community (now European Union) and the Gulf States and was chaired by the United States. The US contribution to non-target states mainly took the form of debt relief to Egypt and Turkey. By May 1991 Egypt, Jordan and Turkey had received total pledges of $11.7 billion and contributions of $6 billion disbursed in the form of grants or concessionary loans. Eight other countries (Bangladesh, Djibouti, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Tunisia) had received pledges of $4.4 billion and contributions of $2.9 bilion.15 But a number of adversely affected countries, including India and Vietnam received nothing. (iii) Yugoslavia Comprehensive economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia-Montenegro (the rump of the former Yugoslavia) by Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 and tightened in Resolution 820 of 17 April 1993. The sanctions were suspended in November 1995 after the signing of the Dayton Accords and lifted on 1 October 1996 by Resolution 1074. Conflict in Kosovo led to a renewed embargo on the supply of arms, military vehicles and spare parts to Yugoslavia in March 1998.16 Resolution 757 recalled the right of states to initiate consultation with the Security Council under Article 50 and the Sanctions Committee which had been set up the previous year to monitor the arms embargo imposed on the whole of Yugoslavia undertook the task of dealing with requests for help. Like the Iraq Sanctions Commttee it set up a working group to examine requests for consultation which came from seven states in the region: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, FYROM (now Macedonia) and Ukraine. There was also a specific complaint from Uganda with reference to a cancelled pipeline project. The major sources of hardship for states in south-east Europe were sanctions-induced loss of trade with Serbia and Montenegro and interference with established transportation and communication links. The result was to hinder their transition to market economies and add substantially to expenditure in transportation costs. The IMF was asked for assistance in impact assesment and in suggesting ways and means of addressing special problems and it cooperated with the World Bank in these tasks. An internal report prepared by the IMF's Policy Development and Review Department in December 1994 noted that estimates submitted by Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic offered estimates of the impact on balance of payments and domestic variables ranging from 1.9 per cent to 111.5 per cent of GDP; total losses over the period were estimated at $49 billion.17 IMF staff attempted to make their own assessments, focusing mainly on balance of payments effects and not on overall welfare effects,but they encountered severe data and methodology problems.18 The Report notes that in the initial period from June 1992 to April 1993 the main effect of sanctions was to prohibit direct trade with Serbia and Montenegro, but after transshipment was prohibited and the target's foreign assets were frozen by Resolution 820, 'sanctions had a broader impact including trade between third countries'.19 The Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee's working group reviewed applications on a case-by-case basis before forwarding them with recommendations to the Security Council. As in the Iraq case, the Council appealed to governments, agencies, IFIs and development banks to render assistance. The matter was also taken up by the General Assembly which affirmed support for the recommendations of the Sanctions Committee and for the extension of help. The response was not overwhelming. International organizations with already stretched resources tried to adapt existing programmes to met special needs while 19 donor states offered some additional emergency aid. More important, and an innovative feature of this case, was the system of Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) which involved professional customs officers from CSCE(now OSCE) countries giving on-the-ground advice and help with the enforcement of sanctions at border points to seven states in the region: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, FYROM, Romania and Ukraine.20 In all cases, the host country consented to the deployment of these officers: personnel costs were covered by the countries which suppplied them while common costs were covered by CSCE/OSCE. A sophisticated computerized communications centre (SAMCOMM) was set up in Brussels, financed by the EU and the United States, with liaison at UN headqarters in New York. The SAM system served several purposes. It strengthened enforcement procedures, offset some of the costs which would otherwise have been borne by states in the region and facilitated legitimate trade. The CSCE also convened an ad hoc senior officials' meeting early in 1994 to 'identify priorities for various international projects to assist affected states in the region.'21 Participants were member states (particularly those bordering the Danube or whose traditional trading routes had been blocked), the EU and other international organizations, and Japan. Short-term projects to alleviate bottlenecks in traffic flows around Yugoslavia were identified and the EU promised 100 million ECUs to help with infrastructure development. These short-term priorities were followed up in subsequent meetings: for instance two customs corridors were established in the summer of 1994 to accelerate the transit of goods.22 But the Article 50 procedure was generally unproductive of help. Like its counterpart for Iraq, the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee could only serve as a conduit while the Security Council functioned as a launch pad for appeals which governments were free to ignore. Neither resources nor powers were available for more direct action.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS As mentioned earlier in this paper, there has been considerable discussion inside and outside the UN on the vexed question of assistance to non-target states. Not surprisingly, complaints about inadequate procedures and lack of practical help have come mainly from those states who have been directly and adversely affected, especially those in the developing world for whom the burden is more severe. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his major report An Agenda for Peace commented that states who experienced special economic problems as a result of imposing sanctions should have 'a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed', recommending that the Security Council should devise a set of measures 'to insulate states from such difficulties.'23 In the Supplement to this report, he went into more detail, arguing that the costs of sanctions 'should be borne equitably by all Member States and not exclusively by the few who have the misfortune to be neighbours or major economic partners of the target country.'24 He also proposed a permanent mechanism within the UN Secretariat to handle sanctions-related tasks, one of which would be 'to explore ways of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage and evaluate claims submitted...under Article 50.'25 Assistance to non-target states has become a regular General Assembly item and as noted in the Introduction to this paper an Expert Group was convened in the summer of 1998 to address the two issues of methodology and practical assistance. The matter has also been considered by the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (the 'Charter Committee') and by the Sanctions Sub-group of the General Assembly's Informal Open-Ended Working Group on the Agenda for Peace.26 Proposals put forward in these bodies have included: preliminary consultation between the Security Council and countries likely to be seriously affected; a comprehensive and unified methodology for determining the economic needs of non-target states; the involvement of the Security Council, IFIs and other bodies in addressing problems 'specifically and directly'; a standing committee to make studies and propose measures of assistance; a 'mechanism' to implement them; a compensation fund. The most recent report of the Charter Committee recommendced that the General Assembly should consider the report of the ad hoc Expert Group 'in an appropriate substantive manner... and address further the question of the implementation of the provisions of the Charter to third states affected by the aplication of sanctions...'27 But the report also reflects the divisions among member states about what needs to be done, particularly between those who favour permanent administrative arrangements and generous compensation and those who do not.28 This is a basic problem and any set of recommendations which seeks to address the problems of non-target states must take it into acount. In all discussions in UN bodies it has become clear that there is strong opposition to the idea of any permanent sanctions 'mechanism' within the Secretariat. A major argument is that each case is different and therefore requires special consideration. There is also no disposition on the part of those who would be required to fund it to set up any permanent compensation fund for affected sender states. Putative donor countries also stress correctly that the Charter does not provide for any such response, but merely offers a right of consultation. These are political realities and although pressure for compensation from developing countries is understandable, it seems clear that the idea of a permanent fund is a non-starter. Nor are there existing resources available, except perhaps to help with emergencies, such as the massive displacement of persons. On the other hand, Article 50 cannot be altogether discounted, particularly when read in conjunction with Article 49. 'Consultation', which is guaranteed, should produce some practical results if it is not to be merely formulaic. It is quite likely that failure to address the issue of collateral damage and burden-sharing will affect future willingness to support Security Council sanctions and thus limit their effectivensss. The threatening global economic climate at the end of the 20th century merely adds weight to an existing disinclination to disrupt important and established trade and investment links over issues which may have no direct bearing on the interests of a sender state. From this point of view, any progress towards meeting 'special economic problems' should be regarded as a contribution to making sanctions work better and this element needs to be stressed in the context of proposals for reform. The argument has also been made that help should be 'neutral' - in other words, not directed specifically to one or other group of countries. But as whatever help is forthcoming is likely to be very limited, it surely makes sense for it to be directed to the most severely affected states both in terms of their ability to cope with additional costs as well as the impact of the costs themselves. A common-sense reading of 'special economic problems' supports this interpretation. Help may also need to be extended very quickly. This in turn suggests that the answer may not be found in elaborate econometric models which often require prior data which is not readily available and have other drawbacks as noted in the previous section. But an acceptable basis for claims does need to be developed and it would be helpful for the Security Council in each case: to indicate to affected states what specific economic needs are worthy of consideration; to ensure that presentations are made to the Security Council on a standardized and comparable basis. This suggests the involvement of international agencies in the preparation of claims, a point which is developed further below. The recommendations which are discussed below and summarized at the end of the paper are divided into those which would precede the imposition of sanctions and help to avoid excessive collateral damage and those which would address the problems which remain. The possibility of using the target's resources for compensation has not been included because of legal difficulties.29 and because these resources may be needed more urgently for offsetting the humanitarian effects of sanctions inside the target itself. A. Action to minimize collateral damage (i) Prior consideration of likely effects While there may be a need for a swift response to international crises, the acknowledged need to consider the humanitarian impact of sanctions on vulnerable groups in the target should be accompanied by prior consideration of the adverse effects of different kinds of sanctions on third states before a Security Council resolution is adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. By this means, some serious damage could be avoided without undermining the effectiveness of a sanctions regime once it is in place. This procedure would also help to flag problems which are likely to arise.30 The Expert Group suggested that when the Council is considering the imposition of a sanctions regime, it might ask the Secretary-General to submit a quick report giving an advance impact assessment not only in respect of the target, but also in respect of non-target states. It should be obvious which states are most likely to be seriously affected and for purposes of this preliminary assessment statistical data should be available. More detailed work might be necessary once sanctions were imposed (see below). (ii) Consultation Whenever possible, some form of consultation should take place beween the Council and representatives of states which are likely to face severe economic hardship as a result of imposing sanctions. Non-membership of the Council should not preclude such consultation. (iii) Targeted measures In every case consideration should be given to the merits of targeted measures which impact directly on rulers and elites in the target not only because such measures may be effective in bringing compliance with UN demands, but also because they avoid humanitarian problems in the target and at the same time ease problems for third states. (iv) Exemptions Exemptions do not generally find favour becaue they obviously weaken the sanctions 'front' and offer scope for sanctions-busting on a wider scale. Nevertheless, there may be a case for partial or total exemptions for specific commodities in particular cases, particularly where trade can be closely monitored. Acceptance of such monitoring should be mandatory when exemptions are granted. Exemptions also obviate the need for compensation. It was generally agreed that exemptions would have been necessary for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland if comprehensive UN sanctions had been imposed on South Africa; the exemption for oil imports granted to Jordan in the Iraq case was mentioned above. B. Assistance for adversely affected nontarget Members of the Expert Group agreed that assessments of 'special economic problems' could not be divorced from subsequent efforts to deal with these problems: the process had to be viewed as a continuum so that the identification and categorization of adverse effects, the selection of methods for estimating relevant costs and the design of feasible and practical measures of assistance were all part of the process. In discussing forms of assistance, it may be useful for purposes of discussion to suggest some administrative improvements before listing a variety of practical measures, both monetary and non-monetary. (i) Administrative arrangements (a) Initial Security Council action The Security Council did not make any pronouncement on the need to help adversely afected non-target states in its resolutions imposing sanctions on Iraq and Yugoslavia. Indeed in the Iraq case, as noted above, the original resolution 661 did not even mention the Article 50 procedure. It is interesting to recall that in the Rhodesian case Security Council resolution 253 of 29 May 1968, which made sanctions comprehensive, specifically called for assistance to Zambia to help solve its special economic problems and this was followed up in resolution 277 of 18 March 1970 which stressed the urgency of need. Mozambique's appeal for help in 1975 prompted a similar response. It is strongly recommended that in any future cases where serious problems are obviously going to arise, the Security Council should issue a similar call in the original sanctions resolution(s) and indicate the availability of the Article 50 procedure. (b) Use of experts As the Expert Group noted, IFIs at both the global and regional level are equipped with the necessary expertise and have some resources to provide assistance to non-target states, and it agreed that these bodies 'should play the lead role in both assessing economic consequences actually incurred... and providing financial assistance...'31 And though neither the Security Council nor its Sanctions Committees have relevant expertise, the UN Secretariat, at the request of affected states, could also provide technical assistance in the preparation of material to accompany requests for consultation. In reports to the General Assembly the Secretary-General has confirmed that departments of the Secretariat could collect information, provide analysis and suggest measures, but to date there has been no request for them to do so.32 As noted above, a standard categorization of potential, relevant effects, tailored to each case, would be helpful in the preparation of national requests and provide a comparable basis for their consideration. For the most severe cases, however, the Expert Group strongly recommended that the Secretary-General should appoint a Special Representative 'to undertake, in consultation with the governments concerned, a full assessment of the consequences actually incurred...'33 This individual should convene an inter-agency task force with the participation of relevant international organizations. Following the Expert Group's division of adverse effects into three broad categories of economic and financial effects, social and humanitarian effects, and secondary effects associated with problems of sanctions enforcement, the task force would have three sub-groups. One would be responsible for evaluating and mitigating the economic effects of sanctions, with the IMF and World Bank as the major participants. A second would deal with social and humanitarian effects, and here agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF would play a prominent role. This sub-group would also include relevant non-governmental organizations. The third sub-group, staffed from the UN Secretariat, would address secondary effects by recommending administrative improvements, partial or limited exemptions and other non-financial measures with the object of maximizing political effect and minimizing collateral damage. These sub-groups would be responsible for preparing impact assessments and action-oriented proposals. In all cases regional organizations should be also be involved. Fact-finding missions are recommended as particularly important in these serious cases.34 (c) Sanctions Committees Sanctions Committees will continue to be the conduit for requests for assistance and for monitoring further developments, receiving and reviewing reports from donor states and from international organizations on a regular basis. Further streamlining of their procedures will be welcome, as well as increased transparency in their deliberations. (ii) Measures of Assistance Assistance can come from individual states as well as from international organizations; wherever possible it should be additional to existing programmes and not merely a diversion of resources. Donors' conferences, as used for the 'front line states' in the Rhodesia case could be a valuable means of organizing financial help, particularly if appropriate preparatory work has been done. This could also encourage cooperative efforts by donors - and possibly by recipients. It is impossible to set out a detailed list of measures of assistance in a paper of this length. No two cases will be identical and donors' ability to extend help will differ. However, a check list of possible forms of direct financial help would include: grants or loans at concessionary rates, debt relief and the extension of credit. Other possible measures tooffset economic loss would include: tariff adjustment; ensuring the supply of essential commodities (for instance food and/or energy supplies); technical assistance; humanitarian assistance; help with sanctions enforcement perhaps on the SAM model. It is suggested that close attention should be given to regional cooperation when a number of neighbouring states are affected, although extra-regional help may still be needed. The model of OSCE/EU help for states in southeast Europe in the Yugoslavia case, particularly through the SAM system, might be adaptable to other cases. Regional initiatives not only pool information and encourage mutually beneficial arrangements, but also bring prospective bilateral and multilateral sources of help together and facilitate an integrated approach. Organizing assistance for adversely affected non-target states, particularly those already facing serious eonomic problems, may seem less urgent in the absence of major new UN sanctions cases. Nevertheless, preparatory work is needed in recognition that, on the one hand, there is a responsibility to go beyond consultation to extend help and, on the other, good practical reasons for doing so. The Expert Group suggested that the costs of implementing sanctions should be viewed as the opportunity cost of economic measures employed as an alternative to international military action or a peackeeping operation.35 The costs of such operations are internationally shared and the same argument for equitable sharing could be made for economic sanctions. In principle, this is acceptable, but its practical application seems doubtful. However, reluctant donor countries should recognize that effective sanctions implementation in future cases cannot be divorced from burden-sharing arrangements. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 1. GENERAL (a) Development of broad and accepted categories of 'special' economic problems distinguishing (i) trade, finance and tranport related effects; (ii) socio-economic effects; (iii) secondary effects particularly enforcement costs. (b) Provision for international agencies to assist in the preparation of claims by non-target states. 2. AVOIDING COLLATERAL DAMAGE (a) Prior consideration of the likely effects of sanctions on non-target states as well as on the target. (b) Consultation with potential applicants for assistance under Article 50. (c) Focus on targeted measures (travel, representational, financial) which avoid collateral damage. (d) Consideration of exemptions from sanctions regime. 3. ASSISTING ADVERSELY AFFECTED NON-TARGET STATES (i) Administrative arrangements (a) Reference to Article 50 in original sanctions resolution(s). (b) Use of experts to assist with assessment of damage, preparation of claims, and organization of assistance. (c) Serious cases warrant a Special Representative apointed by the Secretary-General. The IMF/World Bank should take the lead in the area of economic damage; social effects would call for the expertise of agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF; addressing secondary effects could be the responsibility of UN Secretariat staff. (d) Involvement of regional organizations in developing and implementing assistance. (e) Involvement of relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs). (f) Possibly convening donors' conferences. (g) Continuing overall authority of UN Sanctions Committees. (ii) Practical measures (a) Direct financial help: grants or loans at concessionary rates; debt relief; extension of credit. (b) Other: tariff adjustment; ensuring suppply of essential commodities; technical assistance; humanitarian assistance; help with sanctions enforcement. NOTES 1. Since 1990 sanctions under Chapter VII have been imposed on Iraq (and Kuwait to 1991); former Yugoslavia/Serbia-Montenegro; Somalia; Libya; Haiti; Angola (UNITA); Rwanda; Sudan; Sierra Leone. Cases tabulated with details of salient resolutions in Margaret Doxey, United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1997, p.3. Return to Text 2. See particularly the 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 Reports of the Charter Committee (A/49/33, A/50/33, A/51/33, A/52/33, A/53/33. Return to Text 3. A summary of the deliberations and main findings of the Expert Group is included in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Provisions of the Charter related to Third States..., UN Document A/53/312, pp.6-57. Return to Text 4. A/53/312, para.13. Return to Text 5. G.A. Resolution 52/162, 15 December 1997. Return to Text 6. A/53/312, paras. 21-33. Return to Text 7. International Monetary Fund: Impact of Implementing the UN Sanctions against the FRY(Serbia/Montenegro), 1 December 1994, p.4. Return to Text 8. South Africa declined to implement any UN sanctions against Rhodesia. Return to Text 9. See for instance, Statement by the Coordinator of UN Assistance to Zambia, 27 July 1976, UN Document E/5867; Assistance to Mozambique, Report of the Mission appointed by the Secretary-General, UN Document E 5/812, 30 April 1976. Return to Text 10. Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1981, p.82. Return to Text 11. See The Front-Line States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle, Commonwealth Secretariat, London 1978. Return to Text 12. The Economic Impact of the Gulf Crisis on the Third World. Memorandum subitted by OXFAM annd other charities to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and reprinted in its 3rd Report, The Middle East After the Gulf War, Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence with Apendices, 9 July 1991, pp. 263-70. Return to Text 13. An effort by the UNDP to convene a donors' meeting at the UN proved unsuccessful. Return to Text 14. David M Cheney, 'Dealing with the Unexpected: The IMF's Respose to the Middle East Crisis'. Washington D.C.: IMF (External Relations Dept.) pp.3-4. Return to Text 15. See Table 'Economic Asssistance to Front-Line States and Other Countries in the Gulf Crisis', US House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 31 July 1995. Hearing: Foreign Contributions to the Cost of the Gulf War, p.71. Return to Text 16. Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998. Return to Text 17. Report cited in n.7 above. Details in UN Document A/53/573-S/26705. Return to Text 18. Report cited in n.7 above, p.1. Return to Text 19. Ibid., p.3. Return to Text 20. Information about Sanctions Assistance Missions can be found in UN Document S/776/1996, 24 September 1996, which summarizes proceedings of the OSCE Round Table on Sanctions against the former Yugoslavia held in Copenhagen in June 1996. Return to Text 21. See UN Document A/49/356, pp.19-21. Return to Text 22. Ibid. Return to Text 23. UN Document A/47/277-S/24111, para. 41. Return to Text 24. UN Document A/50/60, 3 January 1995, para. 17. Return to Text 25.Ibid. Return to Text 26. See, for instance, UN Documents A/50/361, 1995; CRP 3/Rev.2, 17 April 1996; A/52/33. Return to Text 27. UN Document A/53/33, para. 34. Return to Text 28. Ibid., para 20-29. Return to Text 29. On the legal issues see Gian Luca Burci "The Indirect Effects of UN Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter, African Yearbook of International Law, 1995, pp.157-71. Return to Text 30. See for instance the paper presented by the Economic Commission for Africa to an International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa: 'The Effects on Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique of Sanctions imposed against South Africa'. UN Document A/Conf.107/1, 26 March 1981. Return to Text 31. UN Document A/53/312, paras. 38-39. Return to Text 32. UN Document A/52/308, 28 August 1997, pp.2-3. Return to Text 33. A/53/312, para 49. Return to Text 34. Ibid. Return to Text 35. Ibid., para. 32.Return to Text Margaret Doxey is Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate, Department of Political Studies, Trent University