Global Policy Forum

By Borut Grgic*

With so much attention now focused on Iran's nuclear potential and intentions, the bottom-line assumption is that Europe and America cannot tolerate a nuclear Iran. But that may not be the worst option. Convincing Iran to stay on the no-nukes track is an important trans-Atlantic security objective, and Washington and Europe should work together to ensure that the mullahs adhere to the deal presented to the International Atomic Energy Agency this week. The question is: What if they don't? Should Europe and America opt for the military card? Probably not. For one, the threat from a nuclear Iran is not immanent, particularly in light of the available deterrence option. Second, the goal of the Euro-American strategy for Iran should be a transformed, democratic, integrated Iran, and not necessarily a nonnuclear one. This means that if the price for a democratic Iran is Tehran's being allowed to develop limited nuclear capabilities, then so be it. Europe and American can afford it.

There are also no good military options. For one, a military strike against Iran would probably not receive Security Council authorization - Russia and China, and most likely France, would not support it. Another use of force without UN approval would only further weaken the value of the multilateral approach to international crisis management. And what would come after an attack? The invasion of Iraq is a reminder that a top-down approach to democracy and a free-market economy is not necessarily the best way to transform decades of political stagnation and economic underdevelopment in an Islamic country. At this point, neither Europe nor the United States has the necessary staying power to see through a full transformation of Iran. A military strike short of an invasion would do little in terms of extinguishing what is in fact a national obsession in Iran to develop a nuclear bomb. It would, however, isolate the reformist camp and strengthen the hand of the radical mullahs.

The transformation and democratization of the Middle East as a whole would also be undermined. A strike on Iran would only further enrage the Islamists and significantly complicate efforts to move the Palestinian-Israeli peace process forward. The opportunity to capitalize on Yasser Arafat's death and establish a Palestinian state would be lost. The central challenge for an effective Euro-American strategy on Iran is to preserve the reform process inside Iran, ensuring that reform continues and that pro-Western forces are strengthened.

With oil prices shooting through the roof, sanctions against Iran, let alone force, would damage the world economy. Europe can't afford to lose Iran's natural gas supplies when that would only strengthen Russia's hand over the EU energy market, and the U.S. economy is too weak to lose Iranian oil. Finally, China, desperate for energy, would oppose sanctions.

The Bush administration, it seems, has decided that it will not tolerate a nuclear Iran. The perception in Washington is that the medium-term risks that come with Tehran's developing a bomb are higher than the longterm benefits associated with supporting and nurturing the democratic process. But what if the real risk comes from the Islamic radicals, whose power will swell in the event of a military attack? In this case, Washington is off the mark in its threat assessment, and Europe needs to find a way to preserve a common European approach. Another split inside Europe would be bad news for the future of a common European security and defense policy. Europe should avoid such a split, and agree ahead of time on a long-term strategy for Iran.

About the Author: Borut Grgic is director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana.